**A****TIS-1000080.v003**

ATIS Standard on

**Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN):
Governance Model and Certificate Management**

**Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions**

Approved August 14, 2020

**Abstract**

Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN) is an industry framework for managing and deploying Secure Telephone Identity (STI) technologies with the purpose of providing end-to-end cryptographic authentication and verification of the telephone identity and other information in an IP-based service provider voice network. This specification expands the SHAKEN framework, introducing a governance model and defining X.509 certificate management procedures. Certificate management provides mechanisms for validation of a certificate and verification of the associated digital signature, allowing for the identification of illegitimate use of national telecommunications infrastructure.

**Foreword**

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Suggestions for improvement of this document are welcome. They should be sent to the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions, PTSC, 1200 G Street NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20005, and/or to the SIP Forum, 733 Turnpike Street, Suite 192, North Andover, MA, 01845.

The mandatory requirements are designated by the word *shall* and recommendations by the word *should*. Where both a mandatory requirement and a recommendation are specified for the same criterion, the recommendation represents a goal currently identifiable as having distinct compatibility or performance advantages. The word *may* denotes an optional capability that could augment the standard. The standard is fully functional without the incorporation of this optional capability.

The **ATIS/SIP Forum IP-NNI Task Force** under the **ATIS** **Packet Technologies and Systems Committee (PTSC)** and the **SIP Forum** **Technical Working Group (TWG)** was responsible for the development of this document.

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# Scope & Purpose

## Scope

This document expands the Signature-based Handling of Asserted Information using Tokens (SHAKEN) ATIS-1000074 [Ref 1] framework, introducing a governance model and defining certificate management procedures for Secure Telephone Identity (STI) technologies. The certificate management procedures identify the functional entities and protocols involved in the distribution and management of STI Certificates. The governance model identifies functional entities that have the responsibility to establish policies and procedures to ensure that only authorized entities are allowed to administer digital certificates within Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) networks. However, the details of these functional entities in terms of regulatory control and who establishes and manages those entities are outside the scope of this document.

## Purpose

This document introduces a governance model, certificate management architecture, and related protocols to the SHAKEN framework ATIS-1000074 [Ref 1]. The governance model defines recommended roles and relationships, such that the determination of who is authorized to administer and use digital certificates in VoIP networks can be established. This model includes sufficient flexibility to allow specific regulatory requirements to be implemented and evolved over time, minimizing dependencies on the underlying mechanisms for certificate management. The certificate management architecture is based on the definition of roles similar to those defined in “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile”, [Internet Engineering Task Force](http://www.ietf.org/rfc.html) (IETF) RFC 5280 [Ref 11]. Per the SHAKEN framework, the certificates themselves are based on X.509 with specific policy extensions based on RFC 8226 [Ref 25]. The objective of this document is to provide recommendations and requirements for implementing the protocols and procedures for certificate management within the SHAKEN framework.

# References

The following standards contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Standard. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All standards are subject to revision, and parties to agreements based on this Standard are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the standards indicated below.

## Normative References

[Ref 1] ATIS-1000074, *Signature-based Handling of Asserted Information using Tokens (SHAKEN).*[[1]](#footnote-2)

[Ref 2] ATIS-1000084, *Technical Report on Operational and Management Considerations for SHAKEN STI Certification Authorities and Policy Administrators.*1

[Ref 3] ATIS-0300251, *Codes for Identification of Service Providers for Information Exchange.*1

[Ref 4] ATIS-1000054*, ATIS Technical Report on Next Generation Network Certificate Management.*1

[Ref 5] draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist, *TNAuthList profile of ACME Authority Token.*2

[Ref 6] RFC 2986, *PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7.*2

[Ref 7] RFC 3261, *SIP: Session Initiation Protocol.*2

[Ref 8] RFC 3647, *Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework.*2

[Ref 9] RFC 4949, *Internet Security Glossary, Version 2.*2

[Ref 10] RFC 5246, *The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2.*2

[Ref 11] RFC 5280, *Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.*2

[Ref 12] RFC 6749, *The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework.*2

[Ref 13] RFC 7231, *Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content.*2

[Ref 14] RFC 7468, *Textual Encodings of PKIX, PKCS, and CMS Structures.*2

[Ref 15] RFC 7515, *JSON Web Signatures (JWS).*2

[Ref 16] RFC 7517, *JSON Web Key (JWK).*2

[Ref 17] RFC 7519, *JSON Web Token (JWT).*2

[Ref 18] RFC 8224, *Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol*.2

[Ref 19] RFC 8225, *Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT)*. 2

[Ref 20] RFC 8226, *Secure Telephone Identity Credentials: Certificates.*2

[Ref 21] RFC 8555, *Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME).*2

## Informative References

[Ref 101] draft-ietf-acme-authority-token, *ACME Challenges Using an Authority Token.*[[2]](#footnote-3)

[Ref 102] RFC 3966, *The tel URI for Telephone Numbers.*2

[Ref 103] RFC 5958, *Asymmetric Key Package.*2

[Ref 104] RFC 6960, *Online Certificate Status Protocol (OSCP).*2

[Ref 105] RFC 7159, *The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON).*2

[Ref 106] RFC 7375, *Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model.*2

[Ref 107] RFC 7516, *JSON Web Algorithms (JWA).*2

# Definitions, Acronyms, & Abbreviations

For a list of common communications terms and definitions, please visit the *ATIS Telecom Glossary*, which is located at < <http://www.atis.org/glossary> >.

## Definitions

The following provides some key definitions used in this document. Refer to IETF RFC 4949 [Ref 9] for a complete Internet Security Glossary, as well as tutorial material for many of these terms.

**Caller ID:** The originating or calling party’s telephone number used to identify the caller carried either in the P-Asserted-Identity or From header fields in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [Ref 7] messages.

**(Digital) Certificate:** Binds a public key to a Subject (e.g., the end-entity). A certificate document in the form of a digital data object (a data object used by a computer) to which is appended a computed digital signature value that depends on the data object [Ref 9]. See also STI Certificate.

**Certification Authority (CA):** An entity that issues digital certificates (especially X.509 certificates) and vouches for the binding between the data items in a certificate [Ref 9].

**Certificate Validation:** An act or process by which a certificate user established that the assertions made by a certificate can be trusted [Ref 9].

**Certificate Revocation List (CRL):** A data structure that enumerates digital certificates that have been invalidated by their issuer prior to when they were scheduled to expire [Ref 9].

**Chain of Trust:** Deprecated term referring to the chain of certificates to a Trust Anchor. Synonym for Certification Path or Certificate Chain [Ref 9].

**Certificate Chain:** See Certification Path.

**Certification Path:** A linked sequence of one or more public-key certificates, or one or more public-key certificates and one attribute certificate, that enables a certificate user to verify the signature on the last certificate in the path, and thus enables the user to obtain (from that last certificate) a certified public key, or certified attributes, of the system entity that is the subject of that last certificate.Synonym for Certificate Chain. [Ref 9].

**Certificate Policy (CP):** A named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements [Ref 8].

**Certification Practice Statement (CPS):** A statement of the practices that a certification authority employs in issuing, managing, revoking, and renewing or re-keying certificates [Ref 8].

**Certificate Signing Request (CSR):** A CSR is sent to a CA to request a certificate. A CSR contains a Public Key of the end-entity that is requesting the certificate.

**Company Code:** A unique four-character alphanumeric code (NXXX) assigned to all Service Providers [Ref 3].

**End-Entity:** An entity that participates in the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Usually a Server, Service, Router, or a Person. In the context of SHAKEN, it is the Service Provider on behalf of the originating endpoint.

**Fingerprint:** A hash result ("key fingerprint") used to authenticate a public key or other data [Ref 9].

**Identity:** Unless otherwise qualified (see, for example, Telephone Identity below), an identifier that unambiguously distinguishes an entity for authentication and other security and policy application purposes. In this report, a Service Provider Code is an example of the identity of one kind of participant in the certificate management process.

**National/Regional Regulatory Authority (NRRA):** A governmental entity responsible for the oversight/regulation of the telecommunication networks within a specific country or region.

NOTE: Region is not intended to be a region within a country (e.g., a region is not a state within the US).

**POST-as-GET**: An HTTP POST Request containing a JWS body as defined by RFC 8555 [Ref 21], where the payload of the JWS is a zero-length octet string.

**Private Key:** In asymmetric cryptography, the private key is kept secret by the end-entity. The private key can be used for both encryption and decryption [Ref 9].

**Public Key:** The publicly disclosable component of a pair of cryptographic keys used for asymmetric cryptography [Ref 9].

**Public Key Infrastructure (PKI):** The set of hardware, software, personnel, policy, and procedures used by a CA to issue and manage certificates [Ref 9].

**Root CA**: A CA that is directly trusted by an end-entity. See also Trust Anchor CA and Trusted CA [Ref 9].

**Secure Telephone Identity (STI) Certificate:** A public key certificate used by a service provider to sign and verify the PASSporT.

**Service Provider Code:** In the context of this document, this term refers to any unique identifier that is allocated by a Regulatory and/or administrative entity to a service provider. In the US and Canada this would be aCompany Code as defined in ATIS-0300251 [Ref 3].

**Service Provider Code (SPC) Token:** An authority token that can be used by a SHAKEN Service Provider during the certificate ordering process to demonstrate to the STI-CA that the requesting SP has authority over the identity information contained in the TN Authorization List extension of the requested STI Certificate. The SPC Token complies with the structure of the TNAuthList Authority Token defined by draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist [Ref 5], but with the restriction for SHAKEN where the TNAuthList value contained in the token’s "atc" claim identifies a single Service Provider Code.

**Signature:** Created by signing the message using the private key. It ensures the identity of the sender and the integrity of the data [Ref 9].

**Telephone Identity:** An identifier associated with an originator of a telephone call. In the context of the SHAKEN framework, this is a SIP identity (e.g., a SIP URI or a TEL URI) from which a telephone number can be derived.

**Trust Anchor:** An established point of trust (usually based on the authority of some person, office, or organization) from which a certificate user begins the validation of a certification path. The combination of a trusted public key and the name of the entity to which the corresponding private key belongs [Ref 9].

**Trust Anchor CA:** A CA that is the subject of a trust anchor certificate or otherwise establishes a trust anchor key. See also Root CA and Trusted CA [Ref 9].

**Trusted CA:** A CA upon which a certificate user relies for issuing valid certificates; especially a CA that is used as a trust anchor CA [Ref 9].

**Trust Model:** Describes how trust is distributed from Trust Anchors.

## Acronyms & Abbreviations

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ACME | Automated Certificate Management Environment (Protocol) |
| ASCII | American Standard Code for Information Interchange |
| AoR | Address-of-Record |
| ATIS | Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions |
| CA | Certification Authority |
| CORS | Cross-Origin Resource Sharing |
| CP | Certificate Policy |
| CPS | Certification Practice Statement |
| CRL | Certificate Revocation List |
| CSR | Certificate Signing Request |
| DER | Distinguished Encoding Rules |
| DN | Distinguished Name |
| DNS | Domain Name System |
| ECDSA | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm |
| HTTPS | Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure |
| IETF | [Internet Engineering Task Force](http://www.ietf.org/rfc.html) |
| JDK | Java Development Kit |
| JSON | JavaScript Object Notation |
| JWA | JSON Web Algorithms |
| JWK | JSON Web Key |
| JWS | JSON Web Signature |
| JWT | JSON Web Token |
| NECA | National Exchange Carrier Association |
| NNI | Network-to-Network Interface |
| NRRA | National/Regional Regulatory Authority |
| OAuth | Open Authentication (Protocol) |
| OCN | Operating Company Number |
| PASSporT | Personal Assertion Token |
| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
| PKIX | Public Key Infrastructure for X.509 Certificates |
| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
| SHAKEN | Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs |
| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
| REST | Representational State Transfer |
| SKS | Secure Key Store |
| SMI | Structure of Management Information |
| SP | Service Provider |
| SP-KMS | SP Key Management Server |
| STI | Secure Telephone Identity |
| STI-AS | Secure Telephone Identity Authentication Service |
| STI-CA | Secure Telephone Identity Certification Authority |
| STI-CR | Secure Telephone Identity Certificate Repository |
| STI-GA | Secure Telephone Identity Governance Authority |
| STI-PA | Secure Telephone Identity Policy Administrator |
| STI-VS | Secure Telephone Identity Verification Service |
| STIR | Secure Telephone Identity Revisited |
| TLS | Transport Layer Security |
| TN | Telephone Number |
| URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
| VoIP | Voice over Internet Protocol |

# Overview

This document introduces a governance model and defines certificate management procedures for the SHAKEN framework [Ref 1]. The SHAKEN framework establishes an end-to-end architecture that allows an originating Service Provider to authenticate and assert a telephone identity and provides for the verification of this telephone identity by a terminating service provider. The SHAKEN framework defines a profile, using protocols standardized in the IETF Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) Working Group (WG). This document provides recommendations and requirements for implementing these IETF specifications, RFC 8225 [Ref 24], RFC 8224 [Ref 18], and RFC 8226 [Ref 20], to support management of Service Provider-level certificates within the SHAKEN framework.

The SHAKEN framework uses X.509 certificates, as defined in “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile”, IETF RFC 5280 [Ref 11], to verify the digital signatures associated with SIP identifiers. Specifically, SHAKEN uses STI Certificates that support the TN Authorization List extension defined in RFC 8226 [Ref 20].

The governance model is described in Clause 5 of this document. Clause 6 then defines the protocols and procedures used to create and manage STI Certificates using the recommended governance model where there is a central policy administrator who authorizes Service Providers to acquire certificates from trusted Certification Authorities (CAs).

# SHAKEN Governance Model

This clause introduces a governance model to support STI, defining two new functional entities: an STI Governance Authority (STI-GA) and an STI Policy Administrator (STI-PA). Clause 5.1 defines baseline requirements that lead to this model, and Clause 5.2 defines the roles and responsibilities of these functional elements and the relationship of the STI-PA to the STI Certification Authority (STI-CA) and Service Provider.

## Requirements for Governance of STI Certificate Management

The governance, creation, and management of certificates to support STI introduce the following requirements:

1. A PKI infrastructure to manage and issue the STI Certificates, including a trust model.
2. A mechanism to authorize Service Providers to be issued STI Certificates.
3. An entity to define the policies and procedures around who can acquire STI Certificates.
4. An entity to establish policies around who can manage the PKI and issue STI Certificates.
5. An entity to apply the policies and procedures established for STI Certificate management.

Clause 5.2 defines a certificate governance model to support these requirements.

## Certificate Governance: Roles & Responsibilities

The SHAKEN governance model for STI Certificate management is illustrated in the following diagram.



Figure 5.1 – Governance Model for Certificate Management

This diagram identifies the following roles associated with governance and STI Certificate management:

* Secure Telephone Identity Governance Authority (STI-GA).
* Secure Telephone Identity Policy Administrator (STI-PA).
* Secure Telephone Identity Certification Authority (STI-CA).
* Service Provider (SP).

The STI-GA serves in an oversight role for the policies established or endorsed by a National/Regional Regulatory Authority (NRRA). The SHAKEN governance model assumes there is only one STI-GA for a given country or region.

The STI-GA is responsible for:

* Defining the policies and procedures governing which entities can acquire STI Certificates.
* Establishing policies governing which entities can manage the PKI and issue STI Certificates.

There is a relationship required between the STI-GA and the STI-PA as the latter serves in a policy enforcement role for the policies defined by the former. The STI-GA role satisfies requirements 3 and 4 in Clause 5.1. The STI-PA role satisfies requirement 5 in Clause 5.1. The STI-GA and the STI-PA are defined as distinct roles in this model, though in practice both roles could be performed by a single entity.

NOTE: The details of the policies and procedures defined by the STI-GA and enforced by the STI-PA are outside the scope of this document.

This document specifies the protocols and message flows between the STI-PA, the Service Providers, and STI-CAs to support the issuance and management of certificates to support STI, satisfying the first two requirements identified in Clause 5.1. The following clauses summarize the roles and responsibilities of these functional elements within the SHAKEN framework.

### Secure Telephone Identity Policy Administrator (STI-PA)

The STI-PA serves in a policy enforcement role and is entrusted by the STI-GA to apply the defined rules and policies to confirm that Service Providers are authorized to request STI Certificates and to authorize STI-CAs to issue STI Certificates.

The STI-PA manages an active, secure list of approved STI-CAs in the form of their public key certificates. The STI-PA provides this list of approved STI-CAs to the service providers via a Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) interface as specified in Clause 7 of ATIS-1000084 [Ref 2]. The SHAKEN-defined Secure Telephone Identity Verification Service (STI-VS) can then use a public key certificate to validate the root of the digital signature in the STI Certificate by determining whether the STI-CA that issued the STI Certificate is in the list of approved STI-CAs.

The STI-PA also issues Service Provider Code (SPC) Tokens to SHAKEN Service Providers. The STI-PA maintains a distinct X.509 based PKI for digitally signing these SPC Tokens. The SP uses the SPC Token during the recommended ACME certificate ordering process to demonstrate to the issuing STI-CA that the SP has authority over the scope of the requested STI Certificate. The mechanism by which the SP acquires the SPC Token from the STI-PA is described in Clause 6.3.4.2, while the structure of the SPC Token is described in Clause 6.3.4.1.

The trust model for SHAKEN defines the STI-PA as the Trust Anchor for this token-based mechanism for validation of Service Providers within a national/regional administrative domain. For example, all STI Certificates for the SPC Tokens in the United States would be associated with a single STI-PA Trust Anchor. Other countries could have a different Trust Anchor.

### Secure Telephone Identity Certification Authority (STI-CA)

In the X.509 model, the STI-CA serves as the Root CA for the STI Certificates used to digitally sign and verify telephone calls. The STI-CA provides the service of issuing valid STI Certificates to the validated SPs. There will likely be a number of STI-CAs, supporting specific or multiple SPs, depending upon the SP. It is also worth noting that although the STI-CA and Service Provider are distinct roles, it would also be possible for a Service Provider to establish an internal STI-CA for its own use under the authority of the STI-PA.

In the North American telephone network, it is anticipated that the number of entities that would serve as STI-CAs is relatively small. However, this framework and architecture does not impose a specific limit.

### Service Provider (SP)

The Service Provider obtains STI Certificates from the STI-CA to create signatures authenticating itself as the signing entity and protecting the integrity of the Identity header field. The SP can obtain STI Certificates from any approved STI-CA in the list of approved CAs, which is received from the STI-PA. During the verification process by the STI-VS, the SP checks that the STI-CA that issued the STI Certificate is in the list of approved STI-CAs received from the STI-PA.

In the context of the SHAKEN framework, STI Certificates are not required for each originating telephone identity but rather, the same STI Certificates can be used by a given SP to sign requests associated with multiple originators and SIP requests. The key aspect is that the identity-related information in the SIP requests is authenticated by the originating Service Provider and can be verified by the terminating Service Provider. Information contained within the Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT) in the SIP messages, attesting to a Service Provider’s knowledge of specific telephone identities that the terminating SP can use to determine specific handling for a call. Details for the attestation are provided in ATIS-1000074 [Ref 1].

The SHAKEN certificate management framework is based on using a signed Service Provider Code Token for validation when requesting an STI Certificate. Prior to requesting a certificate, the SP requests a Service Provider Code Token from the STI-PA as described in Clause 6.3.4.2. When an SP applies to the STI-CA for issuance of a new STI Certificate, the SP proves to the STI-CA that it has been validated and is eligible to receive an STI Certificate via the use of the Service Provider Code Token that is received from the STI-PA. Clause 6.3.5.2, steps 3, 4 and 5, provide the details of the SP validation mechanism.

# SHAKEN Certificate Management

Management of certificates for Transport Layer Security (TLS) [Ref 10] and HTTPS [Ref 13] based transactions on the Internet is a fairly well-defined and common practice for website and Internet applications. Generally, there are recognized certification authorities that can "vouch" for the authenticity of a domain owner based on out-of-band validation techniques such as e-mail and unique codes in the Domain Name System (DNS).

The certificate management model for SHAKEN is based on Internet best practices for PKI [Ref 4] to the extent possible. The model is modified where appropriate to reflect unique characteristics of the service provider-based telephone network. STI Certificates are initially expected to take advantage of service providers’ recognized ability to legitimately assert telephone identities on a VoIP network. The fundamental requirements for SHAKEN certificate management are identified in Clause 6.1. Clause 6.2 describes the functional elements added to the SHAKEN framework architecture to support certificate management. Clause 6.3 details the steps and procedures for the issuance of STI Certificates.

## Requirements for SHAKEN Certificate Management

This clause details the fundamental functionality required for SHAKEN certificate management. An automated mechanism for certificate management is preferred and includes the following fundamental functional requirements:

1. A mechanism to determine the STI-Certification Authorities (STI-CAs) that can be used when requesting STI Certificates.
2. A procedure for creating an account with the STI-CA.
3. A process to request issuance of STI Certificates.
4. A mechanism to validate the requesting Service Provider.
5. A process for adding public key STI Certificates to a Certificate Repository.
6. A mechanism to renew/update STI Certificates.
7. A mechanism to revoke STI Certificates.

In terms of certificate issuance, the primary difference between Web PKI and the requirements for STI is the procedure to validate that the entity requesting a certificate is authorized to acquire STI Certificates. Existing mechanisms for Web PKI, including the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol, rely on DNS or e-mail. SHAKEN uses a Service Provider Code Token mechanism as described in Clause 6.3.4.

## SHAKEN Certificate Management Architecture

The following figure represents the recommended certificate management architecture for SHAKEN.

Figure 6.1 – SHAKEN Certificate Management Architecture

The above SHAKEN certificate management architecture introduces the following additional elements:

* Service Provider Key Management Server (SP-KMS) – The service provider’s server that generates private/public key pair for signing, requests and receives a token from the STI-PA, requests an STI Certificate from the STI-CA, and receives the STI-CA signed public key certificate.
* Secure Key Store (SKS) – The store for private keys used by the originating service provider Authentication Service.
* Secure Telephone Identity Certificate Repository (STI-CR) – The HTTPS server that hosts the public key certificates used by the terminating service provider’s Verification Service to validate signatures.

## SHAKEN Certificate Management Process

This clause describes the detailed process for acquiring a signed public key certificate. It is described with an automated approach using the ACME protocol. Readers can also refer to Appendix A which illustrates an example of the steps for certificate creation and validation using openSSL.

Clause 6.3.1 lists the necessary functions in the process and provides a high-level flow. Subsequent clauses describe the specific details for using the ACME protocol for each of the STI Certificate management functions.

### SHAKEN Certificate Management Flow

This clause describes the detailed STI Certificate management process and the interaction model between the Service Provider, the STI-PA, and the STI-CA for acquiring STI Certificates.

The SHAKEN certificate management process encompasses the following high-level process functions that will be performed by the Service Provider and are detailed in the subsequent clauses of the document:

* STI-PA Account Registration and Service Provider Authorization.
* STI-CA Account Creation.
* Service Provider Code Token acquisition.
* Application for a Public Key Certificate.
* STI Certificate acquisition.
* Lifecycle Management of STI Certificates (including Revocation).

The certificate management process follows two main flows:

1. The STI-PA has a two-party Open Authentication (Protocol) (OAuth) RFC 6749-style [Ref 12] HTTPS interface with the Service Provider in order to provide a token the Service Provider can use for authorization by the STI-CA when requesting a certificate.

NOTE: Per Clause 5.2.1, the STI-PA maintains a list of approved STI-CAs that are authorized to create STI Certificates.

1. The Service Provider uses the ACME RFC 8555 [Ref 21] protocol for interfacing to the STI-CA for the acquisition of STI Certificates. ACME is a Representational State Transfer (REST) services-based request and response protocol that uses HTTPS as a transport.

Typical HTTP caching of resources with long lives (e.g., certificates, tokens, etc.) is recommended, although not required, to minimize overall transaction delays whenever possible. Another consideration for the HTTP interface is the requirement for a secure interface using TLS [Ref 10] (i.e., HTTPS). HTTP redirects shall not be allowed. Additional considerations on the use of HTTPS for ACME are provided in section 6.1 of RFC 8555 [Ref 21]. Since an ACME server supporting SHAKEN is not intended to be generally accessible, Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) shall not be used.

The processing flow for certificate management is as follows:



Figure 6.2 – SHAKEN Certificate Management High Level Call Flow

Prior to requesting STI Certificates from the STI-CA, the SP-KMS generates an SP STIR public/private key pair per standard PKI. The private key is used by the STI-AS in signing the PASSporT in the SIP Identity header field. The public key will be included in the public key certificate being requested.

1. The SP-KMS securelydistributes the SP STIR private key to itsSKS.

The ACME client on the Key Management Server presents a list of STI-CAs from which it could get a certificate. The Service Provider selects the preferred STI-CA and initiates the following steps:

1. The SP generates or chooses a set of public/private key ACME credentials for all transactions with the STI-CA. Assuming a first-time transaction or if the Service Provider Code Token is either expired or not cached, the SP-KMS sends a request for a Service Provider Code Token to the STI-PA with a fingerprint of the ACME account public key. This Service Provider Code Token is used for service provider validation during the process of acquiring a certificate.
2. If it has not already done so, the ACME client on theSP-KMS registers with the STI-CA by creating an ACME account using the ACME key credentials from step 2, prior to requesting an STI Certificate per the procedures in RFC 8555 [Ref 21].
3. Once the ACME client on the SP-KMS has registered with the STI-CA, the ACME client can send a request for a new STI Certificate to theACME server hosted on the STI-CA. The response to that request includes a URL for the authorization challenge.
4. The service provider that is requesting a signed STI Certificate responds to that challenge by providing the current valid token acquired from the STI-PA.
5. The STI-CA sends a request for a public key certificate to the STI-PA in order to validate that the signature of the token has been signed by the STI-PA. Once the STI-CA has verified that the SPC Token is valid,it canissue the certificate.
6. In parallel with step 4, the ACME client starts polling for the “valid” status to determine if the service provider has been authorized to get an STI Certificate and whether an STI Certificate is available. Upon successful authorization, additional steps are taken to complete the certificate acquisition process per Clause 6.3.5.2. Once the ACME client receives the status indicating the STI Certificate has been issued, the ACME client downloads the STI Certificate for use by the SP-KMS.
7. The SP-KMS notifies the STI-AS that the public key certificate is available through implementation specific means (e.g., SIP MESSAGE, WEBPUSH, etc.).
8. The SP-KMSputs the public key certificate in the STI-CR.

After initially retrieving the certificate, the ACME client periodically contacts the STI-CA to get updated public key certificates to keep the server functional and its credentials up-to-date as described in Clause 6.3.8.

### STI-PA Account Registration & Service Provider Authorization

The authorization model for SHAKEN assumes there is a single authorized STI-PA chosen by the STI-GA.

As identified in Clause 5.2.3, while the criteria by which a Service Provider is authorized to serve in the role is out of scope of this document, an interface to the STI-PA from the SP is required to determine if a specific Service Provider is allowed to assert and digitally sign the Caller ID associated with the originating telephone number of telephone calls initiated on the VoIP telephone network. A verification and validation process shall be followed by the STI-PA to provide a secure set of credentials (e.g., username and password combined with other secure two-factor access security techniques) to allow the SP to access a management portal for the STI-PA set of services.

This management portal will be specified by the STI-PA, but should allow Service Providers to input Service Provider-specific configuration details such as the following:

* Login password management.
* SP-KMS instance(s) configuration.
* API security client id/secret information.

The STI-PA shall provide secure API protection for the Service Provider that follows the procedures in RFC 6749 [Ref 12] Section 2.3 client credentials to access its HTTP-based APIs. This includes the use of an STI-PA-defined client id/secret that is used in the HTTP Authorization header of each request from the Service Provider to the STI-PA. This authorization will allow an SP to acquire the Service Provider Code Token as described in Clause 6.3.4.2.

### STI-CA Account Creation

Before ACME account creation, the SP-KMS ACME client shall be configured with an ACME directory object URL for each of the SP’s preferred STI-CAs. The ACME client can use the directory object URL of the selected STI-CA to discover the URLs of the ACME server resources that the ACME client will use to create and manage its ACME accounts, and to obtain STI Certificates.

When a Service Provider selects a particular STI-CA to service STI Certificate requests, the Service Provider shall use the ACME account creation process defined in RFC 8555 [Ref 21].

In order to initiate the account creation process, the requesting Service Provider shall create a key pair using the ES256 algorithm. This key pair represents the Service Provider’s ACME account credentials.

NOTE: The public key of this account key pair is also used for the STI-PA Service Provider Code Token fingerprint value to tie the ACME account credentials to the validation of the Service Provider Code Token by the STI-CA, as detailed in Clause 6.3.46.3.4.1.

The Service Provider’s ACME account is created with the STI-CA using the following HTTP POST request:

NOTE: Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the ACME examples in Clause 6 are included for illustrative purposes only and not intended to profile the referenced ACME specifications.

 POST /acme/new-account HTTP/1.1

 Host: sti-ca.com

 Content-Type: application/jose+json

 {

 "protected": base64url({

 "alg": "ES256",

 "jwk": {...},

 "nonce": "6S8IqOGY7eL2lsGoTZYifg",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/new-account"

 })

 "payload": base64url({

 "contact": [

 "mailto:cert-admin-sp-kms01@sp.com",

 "tel:+12155551212"

 ]

 }),

 "signature": "RZPOnYoPs1PhjszF...-nh6X1qtOFPB519I"

 }

Per ACME, the requesting Service Provider shall sign this request with the ACME account private key. The public key shall be passed in the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Key (“jwk” header parameter) [Ref 15] as a JSON Web Key (JWK) [Ref 16]. An example JWK is as follows:

{

 "kty":"EC",

 "crv":"P-256",

 "x":"f83OJ3D2xF1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8Tus9uPHvRVEU",

 "y":"x\_FEzRu9m36HLN\_tue659LNpXW6pCyStikYjKIWI5a0",

 "kid":"sp.com Reg Public key 123XYZ"

}

If the account already exists with the key, then the response shall be 200 OK. Otherwise, if the account creation succeeds and is created at the STI-CA, the response shall be 201 OK in the following form:

 HTTP/1.1 201 Created

 Content-Type: application/json

 Replay-Nonce: D8s4D2mLs8Vn-goWuPQeKA

 Location: https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1

 Link: <https://sti-ca.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="index"

 {

 "status": "valid",

 "contact": [

 "mailto:cert-admin-sp-kms01@sp.com",

 "tel:+12155551212"

 ]

 "orders": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1/orders"

 }

In the case where the Service Provider wants to change the account’s public/private key pair used for the particular STI-CA, it can use the following request with both the old key and signature, and updated key and signature as follows:

 POST /acme/key-change HTTP/1.1

 Host: sti-ca.com

 Content-Type: application/jose+json

 {

 "protected": base64url({

 "alg": "ES256",

 "jwk": /\* old key \*/,

 "nonce": "K60BWPrMQG9SDxBDS\_xtSw",

 "url": “https://sti-ca.com/acme/key-change"

 }),

 "payload": base64url({

 "protected": base64url({

 "alg": "ES256",

 "jwk": /\* new key \*/,

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/key-change"

 }),

 "payload": base64url({

 "account": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

 "newKey": /\* new key \*/

 })

 "signature": "Xe8B94RD30Azj2ea...8BmZIRtcSKPSd8gU"

 }),

 "signature": "5TWiqIYQfIDfALQv...x9C2mg8JGPxl5bI4"

 }

### Service Provider Code Token

Before a Service Provider can apply for issuance of an STI Certificate from the STI-CA, it shall get a valid and up-to-date SPC Token from the STI-PA.

#### SPC Token Definition

An SP uses an SPC Token during the certificate ordering process to demonstrate to the issuing STI-CA that the SP has control over the scope of the requested certificate. The scope of an STI Certificate is determined by the SPC and TN identity information contained in the TN Authorization List certificate extension defined in RFC 8226 [Ref 20]. SHAKEN shall restrict the scope of STI Certificates to a single Service Provider Code assigned to the SP holding the certificate. Therefore, the scope of an SPC Token shall identify the single SPC value of the certificate it authorizes.

An SPC Token shall comply with the TNAuthList Authority Token structure defined in draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist [Ref 5] per the following example:

**JWT Protected Header**

{

 "alg": "ES256",

 "typ": "JWT",

 "x5u": "https://sti-pa.com/sti-pa/cert.cer"

}

The “alg” value defines the algorithm used in the signature of the token. For Service Provider Code Tokens, the algorithm shall be “ES256”.

The “typ” is set to standard “JWT” value.

The “x5u” value defines the URL of the STI-PA certificate that contains the public key corresponding to the private key that was used to sign the token.

**JWT Payload**

{

 "exp":1300819380,

 "jti":"id6098364921",

 "atc":{"tktype":"TNAuthList",

 "tkvalue":"F83n2a...avn27DN3==",

 "ca":false,

 "fingerprint":"SHA256 56:3E:CF:AE:83:CA:4D:15:B0:29:FF:1B:71:D3:

 BA:B9:19:81:F8:50:9B:DF:4A:D4:39:72:E2:B1:F0:B9:38:E3"}

 }

The required values for the token are as follows:

* The “exp” claim contains the DateTime value of the ending date and time that the token expires. The time value is expressed in the NumericDate format in units of seconds, as defined in RFC 7519 [Ref 22].
* The “jti” claim contains a universally unique identifier for this TNAuthlist Authority token transaction.
* The “atc” claim is comprised of four elements, as defined in draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist [Ref 5]. In the context of SHAKEN, the contents of the elements are as follows:
	+ The "tktype" key shall contain the string value "TNAuthList".
	+ The "tkvalue" key shall be equal to the TNAuthList identifier “value” string, which shall contain the base 64 encoding of the TN Authorization List certificate extension ASN.1 object with explicit tagging, as defined in RFC 8226 [Ref 20]. This object shall contain a single SPC assigned to the requesting Service Provider.
	+ The “ca” key shall be set to false, indicating that the token is being used to authorize the request for an end-entity certificate.
	+ The “fingerprint” key shall be equal to the fingerprint of the ACME account credentials. The fingerprint value consists of the name of the hash function, which shall be ‘SHA256’ for this specification, followed by the hash value itself. The hash value is represented as a sequence of uppercase hexadecimal bytes, separated by colons. The number of bytes is defined by the hash function.

**JSON Web Token Signature**

The JSON Web token signature follows the standard JSON Web Signature (JWS)-defined signature string.

#### SPC Token Request API

The following is the HTTPS-based POST request that the STI-PA shall provide to a service provider to make the request for an SPC Token. A Service Provider can obtain multiple active SPC Tokens for the same SPC value, or for different SPC values. As a convenience, the STI-PA shall also include the URL to the Certificate Revocation List (Clause 6.3.9) in the response, since it is also required when the service provider applies for a certificate.

**POST /sti-pa/account/:id/token**

**Description**

A request to get a current Service Provider Code Token from the STI-PA, that a Service Provider can use during the ACME certificate ordering process to demonstrate to the issuing STI-CA that the SP has authority over the identity information contained in the TN Authorization List of the requested certificate.

**Request**

The following information is included in the request parameter.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Filter** | **Description** |
| id | A unique account id provided to Service Provider |

And the following information is included in the JSON body of the request.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Property** | **Type** | **Description** |
| atc | JSON Object | The “atc” object as defined in Clause 6.3.4.1. |

**Response**

A 200 OK response shall be sent in the case that an SPC Token has been allocated and in the case of specific errors that do not directly map to HTTPS error responses.

**200 OK Response**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Filter** | **Type** | **Description** |
| status | string | The status of the request. Initial values are: “success” and “error”  |
| message | string | Text to indicate success or describe the exception encountered. Initial values for error codes are defined in the table below. In the case of a successful transaction, the message claim is set to “SPC Token Granted” |
| token | string | A signed Service Provider Code Token, using the STI-PA certificate with a TTL of the token set by policy |
| crl | string | A URL to the Certificate Revocation List maintained by the STI-PA |
| errorCode  | integer | An optional field included in the response in the case of a status value of “error”.  |

In the case of a status of “error” in the “status” field in the 200 OK response, the message and errorCode claims shall include one of the following:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **message Value** | **Description**  | **errorCode Value** |
| Invalid ATC | The “atc” claim is not properly formatted or has invalid content (e.g., “ca” claim shall be false for SHAKEN).  | 701 |
| Invalid SPC  | SPC value in the "tkvalue" element of the “atc” claim does not match the SPC values associated with the account.  | 702 |
| Missing ATC | The request did not contain an “atc” claim.  | 703 |

If there is an error, the “token” field shall be set to “null”.

**HTTP Error Responses**

In the case of an error, an appropriate HTTP response code, as defined in RFC 7231 [Ref 13] shall be returned. The following provides two examples of possible HTTP error responses with semantics specific to the SPC Token request:

**403 - Forbidden**

Authorization header credentials are invalid.

**404 - Invalid account ID**

Account ID provided does not exist or does not match credentials in Authorization header.

#### SPC Token Request Example

This section provides an example showing how an SP would use the SPC Token API to obtain a fresh SPC Token.

First, the SP sends a POST request to the STI-PA with a body containing an "atc" element as defined in draft-ietf-authority-token-tnauthlist [Ref 5]. In this case, the "atc" element identifies a single SPC value.

 POST /sti-pa/account/3141/token HTTP/1.1

 Host: sti-pa.com

 Content-Type: application/json

 {

 "atc":{"tktype":"TNAuthList",

 "tkvalue":"F83n2a...avn27DN3==",

 "ca":false,

 "fingerprint":"SHA256 56:3E:CF:AE:83:CA:4D:15:B0:29:FF:1B:71:D3 \

 :BA:B9:19:81:F8:50:9B:DF:4A:D4:39:72:E2:B1:F0:B9:38:E3"}

 }

Once it has determined that the SP is authorized to use the requested the SPC value, the STI-PA responds with the SPC Token, plus the CRLURL, and status information about the request, as follows:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

 Content-Type:application/json

 {

 "status":"success",

 "message":"SPC Token Granted",

 "token":"DGyRejmCefe7v4N...vb29HhjjLPSggwiE",

 "crl":"<https://sti-pa.com/sti-pa/crl>"

 }

### Application for a Certificate

Assuming the Service Provider has a current and up-to-date signed Service Provider Code Token, as detailed in the previous clause of this document, it can immediately initiate an application for a new STI Certificate to the STI-CA.

This process includes two main steps, creation of the CSR and the ACME-based certificate application process as defined in RFC 8555 [Ref 21].

#### CSR Construction

The general creation of a CSR is defined in RFC 5280 [Ref 11] with a format defined as PKCS #10 and defined in RFC 2986 [Ref 6]. For the SHAKEN certificate framework and ACME-based protocols the overall process and definitions do not change; however, there are a few specific uses of and guidelines for CSR attributes defined as part of the SHAKEN Certificate Framework. The following summarizes the attributes that are described in further detail in this document:

* Following RFC 8226 [Ref 20], a Telephone Number (TN) Authorization List certificate extension shall be included in the CSR. In the case of SHAKEN, the TN Authorization List shall include only one Service Provider Code. A service provider can obtain multiple certificates for a given Service Provider Code or for different Service Provider Codes. The essential aspect is that the Service Provider Code uniquely identifies a given service provider. The Service Provider Code shall be the same SPC as that included in the "tkvalue" in the SPC Token (Clause 6.3.4) included in the ACME challenge response.
* As defined in RFC 8226 [Ref 20], the Object Identifier (OID) defined for the TN Authorization list extension will be defined in Structure of Management Information (SMI) Security for Public Key Infrastructure for X.509 Certificates (PKIX) Certificate Extension registry here: <http://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1> and assigned the value 26.
* The URL to the STI-PA CRL (Clause 6.3.9) shall also be included in the CRL Distribution Points extension. The URL is included in the DistributionPointName.

A comprehensive description of the other required attributes in the CSR is provided in Clause 6.4.1.

#### ACME Based Steps for Application for an STI Certificate

Once the ACME account has been created, the steps in the ACME protocol flow are as follows. It should be noted that it is possible for the ACME client to do a pre-authorization prior to applying for a certificate, in which case processing equivalent to steps 3-6 is done prior to an application for a certificate and thus the polling period for step 7 is abbreviated. However, that is not the recommended approach for the SHAKEN certificate framework at this time.

1) The application is initiated by the ACME client with an HTTP POST as shown in the following example:

 POST /acme/new-order HTTP/1.1

 Host: sti-ca.com

 Content-Type: application/jose+json

 {

 "protected": base64url({

 "alg": "ES256",

 "kid": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

 "nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/new-order"

 })

 "payload": base64url({

 "identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],

 "notBefore": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z",

 "notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:00:00Z"

 }),

 "signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g"

 }

The TNAuthList identifier is inserted into the JWS payload along with the requested time frame of the certificate application. The TNAuthList identifier, as defined in draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist [Ref 5], consists of a type field set to "TNAuthList", and a value field containing the base64 encoding of the TN Authorization List certificate ASN.1 object defined in RFC 8226 [Ref 20]. The request is signed using the private key that was used during the STI-CA account creation procedure (Clause 6.3.3).

2) Upon successful processing of the application request, the STI-CA sends a 201 (Created) response containing the newly created order object, as shown in the following example:

 HTTP/1.1 201 Created

 Replay-Nonce: MYAuvOpaoIiywTezizk5vw

 Location: https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/1234

 {

 "status": "pending",

 "expires": "2015-03-01T14:09:00Z",

 "notBefore": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z",

 "notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:00:00Z",

 "identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],

 "authorizations": [

 "https://sti-ca.com/acme/authz/1234"

 ],

 "finalize": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/1234/finalize"

 }

The order object has a status of “pending” indicating that the order authorizations have not yet been satisfied. The “authorizations” field URL references the authorization object containing the challenges the ACME client shall satisfy in order to demonstrate authority over the TNAuthList identifier listed in the “identifiers” field. The “finalize” field contains the URL that the ACME client will use to finalize the order once the outstanding authorizations have been satisfied.

3) The ACME client shall retrieve the authorization challenge details by sending a POST-as-GET request to the order object “authorizations” URL, an example of which follows:

 POST /acme/authz/1234 HTTP/1.1

 Host: sti-ca.com

 Content-Type: application/jose+json

 {

 "protected": base64url({

 "alg": "ES256",

 "kid": " https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

 "nonce": "uQpSjlRb4vQVCjVYAyyUWg",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/authz/1234",

 }),

 "payload": "",

 "signature": "nuSDISbWG8mMgE7H...QyVUL68yzf3Zawps"

 }

4) The STI-CA shall respond to the POST-as-GET with a 200 OK response containing an authorization object. The authorization object identifies the challenges that the ACME client must respond to in order to demonstrate authority over the TNAuthList identifier requested in step 1. In the case of SHAKEN, the STI-CA shall return a challenge "type" of "tkauth-01" and a "tkauth-type" of "atc", as specified in draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist [Ref 5]. The authorization object has a “status” of “pending”, indicating that there are outstanding challenges that have not been satisfied.

 HTTP/1.1 200 OK

 Content-Type: application/json

 Link: <https://sti-ca.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="index"

 {

 "status": "pending",

 "identifier": {

 "type": "TNAuthList",

 "value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="

 },

 "challenges": [

 {

 "type": "tkauth-01",

 "tkauth-type": "atc",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/authz/1234/0",

 "token": "DGyRejmCefe7v4NfDGDKfA"

 }

 ],

 }

5) Using the URL of the challenge, the ACME client shall respond to this challenge with the Service Provider Code Token to validate the Service Provider’s authority to request an STI Certificate whose scope is indicated by the Service Provider Code value contained in the TNAuthList identifier from step 1. An HTTP POST shall be sent back in the form as follows:

 POST /acme/authz/1234/0 HTTP/1.1

 Host: sti-ca.com

 Content-Type: application/jose+json

 {

 "protected": base64url({

 "alg": "ES256",

 "kid": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

 "nonce": "Q\_s3MWoqT05TrdkM2MTDcw",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/authz/1234/0"

 }),

 "payload": base64url({

 "atc": "evaGxfADs...62jcerQ"

 }),

 "signature": "9cbg5JO1Gf5YLjjz...SpkUfcdPai9uVYYQ"

 }

This challenge response JWS payload shall include an “atc” field containing the SPC Token described in Clause 6.3.4.1.

6) On receiving the challenge response from the ACME client, the STI-CA ACME server shall transition the challenge object “status” field to the “processing” state while it verifies the received Service Provider Code Token. As a part of that token validation, the STI-CA needs to retrieve the public key of the STI-PA, as identified in the x5u protected header value in the SPC Token. Once the token has been verified, the “status” of both the challenge and authorization objects shall be changed to “valid”, and the "status" of the order object shall be changed to “ready”.

7) While the challenge response is being verified by the STI-CA in step 6, the SHAKEN ACME client shall poll the status of the authorization object, waiting for the “status” to transition to the “valid” state. This is performed with the following POST-as-GET request:

 POST /acme/authz/1234 HTTP/1.1

 Host: sti-ca.com

 Content-Type: application/jose+json

 {

 "protected": base64url({

 "alg": "ES256",

 "kid": " https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

 "nonce": "uQpSjlRb4vQVCjVYAyyUWg",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/authz/1234",

 }),

 "payload": "",

 "signature": "nuSDISbWG8mMgE7H...QyVUL68yzf3Zawps"

 }

8) The STI-CA responds to the POST-as-GET request with a 200 OK response containing the authorization object. Once the challenge response has been verified, the STI-CA shall update the status of the authorization object to “valid”. The STI-CA responds to the next POST-as-GET request from the ACME client as follows:

 HTTP/1.1 200 OK

 {

 "status": "valid",

 "expires": "2015-03-01T14:09:00Z",

 "identifier": {

 "type": "TNAuthList",

 "value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="

 },

 "challenges": [

 {

 "type": "tkauth-01",

 "tkauth-type": "atc",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/authz/1234/0",

 "status": "valid",

 "token": "DGyRejmCefe7v4NfDGDKfA",

 }

 ]

 }

As an alternative (or in addition) to polling the authorization object, the ACME client may poll the order object with a POST-as-GET request, waiting for the “status” to transition to the “ready” state.

9) Once the challenge is “valid”, and the order object has transitioned to the “ready” state, the ACME client shall finalize the order by sending an HTTP POST request to the order object “finalize” URL that was returned by the ACME server in step 2. The body of the POST request shall contain the CSR described in Clause 6.3.5.1, as follows:

POST /acme/order/asdf/finalize HTTP/1.1

 Host: sti-ca.com

 Content-Type: application/jose+json

 {

 "protected": base64url({

 "alg": "ES256",

 "kid": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

 "nonce": "MSF2j2nawWHPxxkE3ZJtKQ",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/asdf/finalize"

 }),

 "payload": base64url({

 "csr": "MIIBPTCBxAIBADBFMQ...FS6aKdZeGsysoCo4H9P",

 }),

 "signature": "uOrUfIIk5RyQ...nw62Ay1cl6AB"

 }

10) On receiving the request to finalize the order, the STI-CA shall update the order object status to “processing” while finalizing the order, and respond with a 200 OK response containing the order object, as follows:

 HTTP/1.1 200 OK

 Replay-Nonce: CGf81JWBsq8QyIgPCi9Q9X

 Location: https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/asdf

 {

 "status": "processing",

 "expires": "2015-12-31T00:17:00.00-09:00",

 "notBefore": "2015-12-31T00:17:00.00-09:00",

 "notAfter": "2015-12-31T00:17:00.00-09:00",

 "identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],

 "authorizations": ["https://sti-ca.com/acme/authz/1234"],

 "finalize": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/asdf/finalize",

 }

11) While the order is being finalized, the ACME client shall poll the order object with a POST-as-GET request, waiting for the “status” to transition from “processing” to the “valid” state.

 POST /acme/order/1234 HTTP/1.1

 Host: sti-ca.com

 Content-Type: application/jose+json

 {

 "protected": base64url({

 "alg": "ES256",

 "kid": " https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

 "nonce": "uQpSjlRb4vQVCjVYAyyUWg",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/1234",

 }),

 "payload": "",

 "signature": "nuSDISbWG8mMgE7H...QyVUL68yzf3Zawps"

 }

12) Once the order has been finalized and the STI Certificate is available, the STI-CA shall update the order object status from “processing” to “valid”. The STI-CA responds to the next POST-as-GET poll request from the ACME client as follows:

 HTTP/1.1 200 OK

 Replay-Nonce: CGf81JWBsq8QyIgPCi9Q9X

 Location: https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/asdf

 {

 "status": "valid",

 "expires": "2015-12-31T00:17:00.00-09:00",

 "notBefore": "2015-12-31T00:17:00.00-09:00",

 "notAfter": "2015-12-31T00:17:00.00-09:00",

 "identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],

 "authorizations": ["https://sti-ca.com/acme/authz/1234"],

 "finalize": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/asdf/finalize",

 "certificate": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/cert/mAt3xBGaobw"

 }

The “certificate” field contains the URL to the STI Certificate that has been issued in response to this order.

###  STI Certificate Acquisition

Once the authorization process that validates the Service Provider and its ability to request an STI Certificate is complete, and the STI-CA has issued the certificate, the SP-KMS ACME client can retrieve the STI PEM certificate chain from the STI-CA ACME server using the URL in the “certificate” field of the order object. This is performed using a POST-as-GET request and response as follows:

 POST /acme/cert/mAt3xBGaobw HTTP/1.1

 Host: sti-ca.com

 Accept: application/pem-certificate-chain

 Content-Type: application/jose+json

 {

 "protected": base64url({

 "alg": "ES256",

 "kid": " https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

 "nonce": "uQpSjlRb4vQVCjVYAyyUWg",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/cert/mAt3xBGaobw",

 }),

 "payload": "",

 "signature": "nuSDISbWG8mMgE7H...QyVUL68yzf3Zawps"

 }

 HTTP/1.1 200 OK

 Content-Type: application/pem-certificate-chain

 Link: <https://sti-ca.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="index"

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

 [End-entity certificate contents]

 -----END CERTIFICATE-----

 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

 [Issuer certificate contents]

 -----END CERTIFICATE-----

 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

 [Other certificate contents]

 -----END CERTIFICATE-----

This certificate response will include the “end-entity” STI Certificate requested in the CSR. It will also include the complete certificate chain. The certificates are encoded with the PEM textual encoding according to RFC 7468 [Ref 14].

The SP-KMS shall store the certificate in the STI-CR and make the URL available to the STI-AS.

### STI Certificate Management Sequence Diagrams

Figure 6.3 provides the sequence of processing for a service provider to set up an account with the STI-PA and then create an account with the STI-CA using the ACME protocol. Figure 6.4 provides the sequence of processing for the SP-KMS to acquire a certificate using the ACME protocol.

 

Figure 6.3 – STI-PA Account Setup and STI-CA (ACME) Account Creation

****

Figure 6.4 – STI Certificate Acquisition

### Lifecycle Management of STI Certificates

There are a number of lifecycle processes that can happen for each of the three main participants in the SHAKEN Certificate Framework lifecycle.

The STI-PA has a role in the management and upkeep of the verification of Service Providers and the potential need to revoke the STI-PA certificate used to sign the Service Provider Code Token.

The STI-CA provides the capability to renew or update STI Certificates for Service Providers through recommended ACME interface capabilities. STI Certificate renewal requests shall use the same authentication procedures that are applied to requests for a new STI Certificate as described in Clause 6.3.5.

The Service Provider has the ability to manage, renew, and update STI Certificates and the ability to renew Service Provider Code Tokens as credentials used to obtain STI Certificates as part of the SHAKEN certificate framework.

### STI Certificate Revocation

It is anticipated that initially many service providers will not support short-lived certificates; thus, a mechanism to handle certificate revocation is required. Rather than each STI-CA publishing a Certificate Revocation List (CRL), an indirect CRL published by the STI-PA shall be used, following the model outlined in RFC 5280 [Ref 11]. The CRL shall be an X.509 V2 CRL format as detailed in RFC 5280 [Ref 11] and Clause 6.4.2.

It is anticipated that the list will not be large given that service providers are not expected to be using a large number of certificates initially and some service providers will choose to use short-lived certificates. The Certification Practice Statement (CPS) shall outline the criteria under which a specific STI-CA would revoke a certificate. Service providers likely will establish their own criterion as well, thus an STI-CA shall provide a mechanism that allows an SP to revoke a certificate. The STI-CA or Service Provider shall notify the STI-PA, when a certificate is revoked via a mechanism as defined by the Certificate Policy (CP) established by the STI-PA. Initially, an out-of-band mechanism is deemed sufficient, until operational experience indicates otherwise.

The URL to the STI-PA CRL shall be provided to the service providers for inclusion in the CSR. Given the static nature of this URL, it does not need to be frequently updated. Rather than defining a separate API, this URL shall be included as a field in the response to the SPC Token Request (Clause 6.3.4.2), per the following diagram:



Figure . – Distribution of the CRL

The inclusion of the STI-PA CRL in the STI Certificates follows standard practices per RFC 5280 [Ref 11] for inclusion of a CRL distribution point in a certificate. In the case of SHAKEN, the STI-VS uses this field to ensure that the certificate used to sign the PASSporT in the SIP Identity header field has not been revoked, per the following diagram:



Figure . – Using the CRL

### Evolution of STI Certificates

SHAKEN proposes starting with Service Provider-level certificates. There are important use cases that may require finer granularity for STI Certificates, including the possibility of telephone number level certificates (e.g., for school districts, police, government agencies, and financial institutions), where calls should be validated in order to guarantee delivery through the potential use of anti-spoofing mitigation techniques.

Future versions of this document and associated documents may provide the ability to validate telephone numbers and blocks of telephone numbers likely utilizing certificate details and practices defined in RFC 8226 [Ref 20].

## STI Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile for SHAKEN

This section provides the detailed requirements for the attributes that shall be included in the STI Certificate and Certificate Revocation List.

### SHAKEN Certificate Requirements

This section defines the STI Certificate profile that shall be supported by SHAKEN-compliant STI-CAs and Service Providers.

NOTE: The term "SHAKEN certificates" in this section refers to end entity certificates containing a TNAuthList extension as defined in Clause 6.3.5.1 of this document, plus any intermediate/root certificate in the certification path of a SHAKEN end entity certificate.

SHAKEN certificates shall contain Version field specifying version 3 (value 2).

SHAKEN certificates shall include a Serial Number field containing a serial number that is unique within the scope of the issuing STI-CA.

SHAKEN certificates shall contain a Signature Algorithm field with the value "ecdsa-with-SHA256".

SHAKEN certificates shall include a Subject field containing a Distinguished Name (DN). The DN shall contain a Country (C=) attribute, a Common Name (CN=) attribute and an Organization (O=) attribute. Other DN attributes are optional. The Common Name attribute shall include the text string "SHAKEN" to indicate that this is a SHAKEN certificate. For non-end entity CA certificates (Basic Constraints CA boolean = TRUE), the Common Name shall also indicate whether the certificate is a root or intermediate certificate. The Common Name of an end entity certificate shall include the SPC value identified in the TNAuthList of the certificate (e.g.,"CN= SHAKEN cert 1234"). The Organization (O=) attribute shall include a legal name identifying the service provider. The Organization must be the name which has been registered as the assignee for the SPC value included in the certificate (e.g., “O=Comcast”). The Organization (corporation, limited partnership, university, or government agency) must be registered with some authority at the national, state, or city level.

Editor’s note: The “atc” changes in this contribution are accepted, but offline review of text may lead to changes to the changes in the paragraph above.

SHAKEN certificates shall include an Issuer field. For root certificates, the Issuer field shall match the certificate’s Subject field. For intermediate and end entity certificates, the Issuer field shall match the Subject field of the parent certificate.

SHAKEN certificates shall contain a Subject Public Key Info field specifying a Public Key Algorithm of "id-ecPublicKey” and containing a 256-bit public key.

SHAKEN certificates shall contain a BasicConstraints extension marked critical. For root and intermediate certificates, the BasicConstraints CA boolean shall be set to TRUE, while for end entity certificates, the CA boolean shall be set to FALSE.

SHAKEN certificates shall contain a Subject Key Identifier extension identifying the public key of the certificate.

SHAKEN intermediate and end entity certificates shall contain an Authority Key Identifier extension (this extension is optional for root certificates). For root certificates that contain an Authority Key Identifier extension, the Authority Key Identifier shall contain a keyIdentifier field with a value that matches the Subject Key Identifier value of the same root certificate. For intermediate and end entity certificates, the Authority Key Identifier extension shall contain a keyIdentifier field with a value that matches the Subject Key Identifier value of the parent certificate.

SHAKEN certificates shall contain a Key Usage extension marked as critical. For root and intermediate certificates, the Key Usage extension shall contain the key usage value keyCertSign (5), and may contain the key usage values digitalSignature (0) and/or cRLSign (6). For end entity certificates, the Key Usage extension shall contain a single key usage value of digitalSignature (0).

SHAKEN end entity certificates shall contain a CRL Distribution Point extension with a CRL Distribution Point Name identifying the HTTP URL reference to the file containing the SHAKEN CRL hosted by the STI-PA.

SHAKEN intermediate and end entity certificates shall include a Certificate Policies Extension containing a single OID value that identifies the SHAKEN Certificate Policy established by the STI-PA. The OID value is specified in the SHAKEN Certificate Policy document.

SHAKEN end entity certificates shall contain a TNAuthList extension as specified in RFC 8226 [Ref 25]. The TNAuthList shall contain a single SPC value.

The private key of a SHAKEN root or intermediate certificate shall be used to sign SHAKEN certificates, and may be used to sign other items that are used internally by the STI-CA (i.e., internal CRLs). Likewise, the private key of a SHAKEN end entity certificate shall only be used to sign PASSporTs, supported by SHAKEN-compliant authentication services (i.e., PASSporTs supporting the "shaken", "rph" and "div" extensions).

SHAKEN certificate examples are provided in Appendix A.

### SHAKEN CRL Requirements

Per RFC 5280 [Ref 11], the STI-PA shall populate the CRL with the following fields and values:

1. The tbsCertList element shall be constructed as specified in Clause 6.4.2.1.
2. The Authority Key Identifier extension shall contain a Key Identifier field populated with the Subject Key Identifier value of the STI-PA certificate used to sign the CRL.
3. CRL Number extension shall contain a sequence number that is monotonically incremented each time a new CRL is issued (i.e., each time the tbsCertList "This Update" field is updated).
4. The Issuing Distribution Point extension shall contain two booleans set to TRUE, the onlyContainsUserCerts boolean and the indirectCRL boolean. All other Issuing Distribution Point extension booleans shall be set to FALSE.
5. The Signature Algorithm shall contain the value "ecdsa-with-SHA256".
6. The Signature Value shall be populated with a digital signature computed using the algorithm identified by the Signature Algorithm field in conjunction with the private key of the STI-PA certificate identified by the Authority Key Identifier field.

#### CRL tbsCertList Requirements

The tbsCertList element in the CRL contains the (possibly empty) list of revoked certificates. The scope of the STI-PA CRL is certificates that have been revoked by one of the STI-CAs in the list of trusted STI-CAs or by a Service Provider. The tbsCertList shall not include expired certificates.

The tbsCertList shall be populated as follows:

* 1. The Signature field shall contain the algorithm identified by the CRL Signature Algorithm field.
	2. The Issuer field shall contain the Subject field value of the STI-PA certificate that was used to sign this CRL.
	3. The “This Update” field shall contain the issue date of the CRL encoded as UTCTime.
	4. The “Next Update” field shall indicate the issue date of the next CRL, encoded as UTCTime. The next CRL may be issued before and shall be issued no later than the “Next Update” date. The STI-PA shall set the “Next Update” field value to the “This Update” field value plus 24 hours, in order to ensure that verifiers download the CRL on a timely basis.
	5. The Authority Information Access extension shall contain an accessMethod of id-ad-caIssuers and an accessLocation with an HTTPS URL referencing the file that contains the STI-PA certificate that can be used to verify the signature of the CRL (i.e., a certificate whose Subject name matches the CRL Issuer name).
	6. The Revoked Certificates list shall be included only if there are one or more revoked STI-CA certificates. When included in the CRL, each Revoked Certificates list entry shall identify a revoked certificate and provide information about its revocation by including the following fields and values:
* The User Certificate field shall contain the Serial Number of the revoked certificate.
* The Certificate Issuer field shall contain a GeneralName identifying the STI-CA that issued the revoked certificate.

NOTE: Since the Serial Number of a SHAKEN certificate is unique within the scope of an STI-CA (see Clause 6.4.1), the combination of Serial Number and STI-CA identity uniquely identify the revoked certificate.

* The Revocation Date shall contain the date that the STI-CA revoked the certificate, encoded as UTCTime.
* The Reason Code shall identify the reason that the certificate was revoked.

#

# Appendix A – Certificate Creation & Validation with OpenSSL

1. TNAuthorizationList extension

Check OpenSSL version and make sure it is at least 1.0.1e:

|  |
| --- |
| **# openssl version****OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013** |

Check if 256-bit Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) keys are supported, such as prime256v1:

|  |
| --- |
| **# openssl ecparam -list\_curves****secp384r1 : NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime fieldsecp521r1 : NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime fieldprime256v1: X9.62/SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field** |

Prepare the configuration file for generating DER encoded value of the TNAuthorizationList extension. For example, for requesting a STI-CA certificate with Service Provider Code “1234”, the following configuration file, TNAuthList.conf, would be generated:

|  |
| --- |
| **# cat > TNAuthList.conf << EOFasn1=SEQUENCE:tn\_auth\_list[tn\_auth\_list]field1=EXP:0,IA5:1234EOF** |

Generate the DER encoded value for the TNAuthorizationList extension; for example, by using the TNAuthList.conf file generated in the previous step. The TNAuthList.der file will be generated:

|  |
| --- |
| **# openssl asn1parse -genconf TNAuthList.conf -out TNAuthList.der** **0:d=0 hl=2 l= 8 cons: SEQUENCE** **2:d=1 hl=2 l= 6 cons: cont [ 0 ]** **4:d=2 hl=2 l= 4 prim: IA5STRING :1234** |

Add output of the following command to the end-entity section in OpenSSL configuration file:

|  |
| --- |
| **# od -An -t x1 -w TNAuthList.der | sed -e 's/ /:/g' -e 's/^/1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.26=DER/'** |

1. Setup directories

Assuming $HOME is /home/ubuntu/certs

|  |
| --- |
| **# cd $HOME****# mkdir -p root intermediate private** |

1. Create private key and CSR
	1. Create private key

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/private****# openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout -out private.key.pem** |

* 1. Create CSR from private key

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/private****# openssl req -key private.key.pem -new -sha256 -out private.csr.pem -subj "/C=US/ST=Pennsylvania/L=Philadelphia/O=Comcast/CN=SHAKEN"** |

1. Signing certificate using root CA

This Clause illustrates creating an end-entity certificate from a root CA.

|  |
| --- |
| **# cd $HOME/root****# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/root** |

SAVE THIS OPENSSL CONFIG IN **$HOME/root/openssl.cnf FILE**

|  |
| --- |
| **[ ca ]****default\_ca = CA\_default****[ CA\_default ]****default\_md = sha256****name\_opt = ca\_default****cert\_opt = ca\_default****preserve = no****policy = policy\_strict****# directories and files****dir = ./****database = $dir/db****serial = $dir/srl****new\_certs\_dir = $dir/newcerts****private\_key = $dir/rootca.key.pem****certificate = $dir/rootca.crt.pem****[ policy\_strict ]****countryName = match****stateOrProvinceName = match****organizationName = match****organizationalUnitName = optional****commonName = supplied****emailAddress = optional****[ req ]****default\_bits = 2048****string\_mask = utf8only****prompt = no****distinguished\_name = ca\_dn****[ ca\_dn ]****countryName = US****stateOrProvinceName = Pennsylvania****localityName = Philadelphia****0.organizationName = Comcast****commonName = Comcast SHAKEN Root CA****[ ca\_ext ]****subjectKeyIdentifier = hash****basicConstraints = critical, CA:true****keyUsage = critical, keyCertSign****[ leaf\_cert ]****1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.26=DER:30:08:a0:06:16:04:31:32:33:34****basicConstraints = critical, CA:FALSE****subjectKeyIdentifier = hash****authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid,issuer:always****keyUsage = critical, digitalSignature** |

NOTE THAT *leaf\_cert* SECTION CONTAINS TNAuthorizationList EXTENSION DERIVED FROM THE DER VALUE

|  |
| --- |
| **# od -An -t x1 -w TNAuthList.der | sed -e 's/ /:/g' -e 's/^/1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.26=DER/'** |

* 1. Create file to be used as certificate database by openssl

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/root****# touch db** |

* 1. Create file that contains the certificate serial number

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/root****# echo 1000 > srl** |

* 1. Create directories to be used to store keys, certificates and signing requests

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/root****# mkdir -p newcerts** |

* 1. Create root key

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/root****# openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout -out rootca.key.pem** |

* 1. Create root certificate

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/root****# openssl req -config openssl.cnf -key rootca.key.pem -new -x509 -days 7300 -sha256 -extensions ca\_ext -out rootca.crt.pem** |

* 1. Verify root certificate

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/root****# openssl x509 -in rootca.crt.pem -text -noout****Certificate:** **Data:** **Version: 3 (0x2)** **Serial Number: 12496366116147440257 (0xad6c02c628322a81)** **Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256** **Issuer: C=US, ST=Pennsylvania, L=Philadelphia, O=Comcast, CN=Comcast SHAKEN Root CA** **Validity** **Not Before: Dec 9 23:06:34 2019 GMT** **Not After : Dec 4 23:06:34 2039 GMT** **Subject: C=US, ST=Pennsylvania, L=Philadelphia, O=Comcast, CN=Comcast SHAKEN Root CA** **Subject Public Key Info:** **Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey** **Public-Key: (256 bit)** **pub:** **04:94:b3:67:34:de:36:1c:68:bc:bb:72:c2:17:73:** **41:4d:74:f4:96:4b:91:cc:57:8c:15:7d:5c:1f:e3:** **81:fb:fd:ab:2f:59:25:f7:0f:ef:1f:5c:ae:34:9b:** **cc:1b:b5:f8:8a:06:eb:94:20:be:0e:45:1b:3e:56:** **e9:74:75:70:a2** **ASN1 OID: prime256v1** **NIST CURVE: P-256** **X509v3 extensions:** **X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:** **91:90:CA:B1:86:0E:4F:16:5E:BE:B5:37:51:3F:69:79:E5:23:1B:1C** **X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical** **CA:TRUE** **X509v3 Key Usage: critical** **Certificate Sign** **Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256** **30:45:02:20:3a:52:c8:2b:99:c9:ee:5a:38:04:1d:c0:db:2f:** **3a:a4:e8:0c:42:52:cb:dc:3d:bf:57:ec:18:b8:f6:03:2b:7a:** **02:21:00:d5:7b:36:19:af:86:44:8d:31:d7:a0:88:72:a8:45:** **7b:f3:5f:4a:5b:be:e5:3c:01:05:8b:45:e4:93:1d:0d:f3** |

* 1. Sign CSR with root CA cert and create end-entity certificate
* CSR was created in Clause 7.3.2

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/root****# openssl ca -config openssl.cnf -extensions leaf\_cert -days 375 -notext -md sha256 -in /home/ubuntu/certs/private/private.csr.pem** |

* 1. Verify end-entity certificate

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/root****# openssl x509 -in newcerts/1000.pem -text -noout****Certificate:** **Data:** **Version: 3 (0x2)** **Serial Number: 4097 (0x1001)** **Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256** **Issuer: C=US, ST=Pennsylvania, L=Philadelphia, O=Comcast, CN=Comcast SHAKEN Root CA** **Validity** **Not Before: Dec 9 23:38:35 2019 GMT** **Not After : Dec 18 23:38:35 2020 GMT** **Subject: C=US, ST=Pennsylvania, O=Comcast, CN=SHAKEN cert 1234** **Subject Public Key Info:** **Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey** **Public-Key: (256 bit)** **pub:** **04:20:ee:f3:47:0f:b4:ab:fd:56:74:25:c4:cc:e9:** **8f:81:2b:ae:fb:5d:24:3d:72:d7:62:16:5e:91:f0:** **1a:62:1e:96:da:13:4d:72:3d:fb:f0:3e:47:cf:80:** **3c:a7:3d:fa:74:7b:eb:6d:9e:00:e7:98:cb:d5:79:** **1b:37:11:58:59** **ASN1 OID: prime256v1** **NIST CURVE: P-256** **X509v3 extensions:** **1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.26:** **0.....1234** **X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical** **CA:FALSE** **X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:** **B6:26:4C:D2:45:81:87:08:6E:09:EA:F9:66:8C:0F:8D:05:C2:E6:46** **X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:** **keyid:91:90:CA:B1:86:0E:4F:16:5E:BE:B5:37:51:3F:69:79:E5:23:1B:1C** **X509v3 Key Usage: critical** **Digital Signature** **Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256** **30:46:02:21:00:fa:4c:fb:ad:97:5a:1e:46:09:13:9c:5b:ef:** **a4:7f:82:a6:9d:6c:d9:1e:f8:07:9b:ab:de:5e:64:52:77:2e:** **f8:02:21:00:d5:b2:bd:d7:84:ee:ce:e0:e4:69:e7:ea:f9:e9:** **cf:35:b3:56:37:85:f8:1f:f4:47:5b:bf:f5:5d:9c:4d:62:2c** |

* 1. Verify chain of trust

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/root****# openssl verify -CAfile rootca.crt.pem newcerts/1000.pem****private/private.crt.pem: OK** |

1. Signing certificate using intermediate CA

This Clause illustrates creating an end-entity certificate from an intermediate CA of a root CA.

|  |
| --- |
| **# cd $HOME/intermediate****# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/intermediate** |

SAVE THIS OPENSSL CONFIG IN **$HOME/intermediate/openssl.cnf FILE**

|  |
| --- |
| **[ ca ]****default\_ca = CA\_default****[ CA\_default ]****default\_md = sha256****name\_opt = ca\_default****cert\_opt = ca\_default****preserve = no****policy = policy\_strict****# directories and files****dir = ./****database = $dir/db****serial = $dir/srl****new\_certs\_dir = $dir/newcerts****private\_key = $dir/intermediate.key.pem****certificate = $dir/intermediate.crt.pem****[ policy\_strict ]****countryName = match****stateOrProvinceName = match****organizationName = match****organizationalUnitName = optional****commonName = supplied****emailAddress = optional****[ req ]****default\_bits = 2048****string\_mask = utf8only****prompt = no****distinguished\_name = intermediate\_dn****[ intermediate\_dn ]****countryName = US****stateOrProvinceName = Pennsylvania****localityName = Philadelphia****0.organizationName = Comcast****commonName = Comcast SHAKEN Intermediate CA****[ intermediate\_ext ]****subjectKeyIdentifier = hash****authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:always,issuer****basicConstraints = critical, CA:true****keyUsage = critical, keyCertSign****[ leaf\_cert ]****1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.26=DER:30:08:a0:06:16:04:31:32:33:34****basicConstraints = critical, CA:FALSE****subjectKeyIdentifier = hash****authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid,issuer:always****keyUsage = critical, digitalSignature** |

NOTE THAT *leaf\_cert* SECTION CONTAINS TNAuthorizationList EXTENSION DERIVED FROM THE DER VALUE

|  |
| --- |
| **# od -An -t x1 -w TNAuthList.der | sed -e 's/ /:/g' -e 's/^/1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.26=DER/'** |

* 1. Create file to be used as certificate database by openssl

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/intermediate****# touch db** |

* 1. Create file that contains the certificate serial number

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/intermediate****# echo 1000 > srl** |

* 1. Create directories to be used to store keys, certificates and signing requests

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/intermediate****# mkdir -p newcerts** |

* 1. Create intermediate key

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/intermediate****# openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout -out intermediate.key.pem** |

* 1. Create CSR from intermediate key

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/intermediate****# openssl req -config openssl.cnf -new -sha256 -key intermediate.key.pem -out intermediate.csr.pem** |

* 1. Create intermediate certificate

|  |
| --- |
| **#cd $HOME/root****# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/root****# openssl ca -config openssl.cnf -extensions intermediate\_ext -days 7000 -notext -md sha256 -in ../intermediate/intermediate.csr.pem -out ../intermediate/intermediate.crt.pem** |

* 1. Verify intermediate certificate

|  |
| --- |
| **#cd $HOME/intermediate****# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/intermediate****# openssl x509 -in intermediate.crt.pem -text -noout****Certificate:** **Data:** **Version: 3 (0x2)** **Serial Number: 4099 (0x1003)** **Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256** **Issuer: C=US, ST=Pennsylvania, L=Philadelphia, O=Comcast, CN=Comcast SHAKEN Root CA** **Validity** **Not Before: Dec 10 02:20:30 2019 GMT** **Not After : Feb 8 02:20:30 2039 GMT** **Subject: C=US, ST=Pennsylvania, O=Comcast, CN=Comcast SHAKEN Intermediate CA** **Subject Public Key Info:** **Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey** **Public-Key: (256 bit)** **pub:** **04:17:74:4c:94:75:2c:f4:d7:cf:c0:8e:5a:50:17:** **0b:4a:0a:84:84:ba:71:c8:5a:23:49:d3:7e:24:3e:** **4b:b6:2e:59:9d:03:f1:60:ae:0f:6b:10:f7:65:d7:** **a5:41:66:66:16:27:41:5c:12:a7:61:6c:a0:82:e7:** **f6:2c:bb:89:b3** **ASN1 OID: prime256v1** **NIST CURVE: P-256** **X509v3 extensions:** **X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:** **E0:15:BC:55:D7:9A:7A:0D:18:67:D8:7E:82:1D:AD:35:D9:54:DD:60** **X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:** **keyid:91:90:CA:B1:86:0E:4F:16:5E:BE:B5:37:51:3F:69:79:E5:23:1B:1C** **X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical** **CA:TRUE** **X509v3 Key Usage: critical** **Certificate Sign** **Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256** **30:45:02:20:75:28:f9:51:25:ba:5f:65:71:de:b8:bc:72:51:** **d1:75:34:ef:be:3c:7a:39:a5:42:ef:46:81:90:c7:16:b6:46:** **02:21:00:f7:b6:c6:78:86:df:40:4d:71:fc:41:3a:83:c6:a0:** **2c:52:c3:c6:47:9f:6a:bb:20:be:69:5e:18:71:e0:09:b5** |

* 1. Sign CSR with intermediate cert and create end-entity certificate
* CSR was created in section 7.3.2

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/intermediate****# openssl ca -config openssl.cnf -extensions leaf\_cert -days 375 -notext -md sha256 -in ../private/private.csr.pem** |

* 1. Verify end-entity certificate

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/intermediate****# openssl x509 -in newcerts/1001.pem -text -noout****Certificate:** **Data:** **Version: 3 (0x2)** **Serial Number: 4097 (0x1001)** **Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256** **Issuer: C=US, ST=Pennsylvania, O=Comcast, CN=Comcast SHAKEN** **Intermediate CA** **Validity** **Not Before: Dec 10 02:42:14 2019 GMT** **Not After : Dec 19 02:42:14 2020 GMT** **Subject: C=US, ST=Pennsylvania, O=Comcast, CN=SHAKEN 1234** **Subject Public Key Info:** **Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey** **Public-Key: (256 bit)** **pub:** **04:f6:7d:10:e0:3f:15:08:a5:f6:6d:6a:e6:4f:98:** **51:30:c5:8e:9c:a3:d3:4c:1f:a8:fa:af:c6:c3:38:** **1c:82:df:7a:19:f1:59:d1:81:42:5a:8d:35:22:3c:** **0f:56:82:ad:d0:49:38:f8:d9:65:0d:99:d8:74:62:** **78:b7:7a:ab:e4** **ASN1 OID: prime256v1** **NIST CURVE: P-256** **X509v3 extensions:** **1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.26:** **0.....1234** **X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical** **CA:FALSE** **X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:** **07:D5:04:6D:F0:52:1F:EE:FD:B9:BD:0C:97:45:45:B0:33:D1:C1:CD** **X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:** **keyid:E0:15:BC:55:D7:9A:7A:0D:18:67:D8:7E:82:1D:AD:35:D9:54:DD:60** **X509v3 Key Usage: critical** **Digital Signature** **Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256** **30:45:02:21:00:83:b8:d6:f4:3b:20:f6:90:40:98:88:eb:97:** **84:4a:b2:e6:d7:a5:a1:e9:3a:95:8b:2c:81:7a:3e:cc:b4:86:** **4d:02:20:10:04:2b:0e:1c:42:fa:1e:37:4b:78:12:27:81:6e:** **b1:ac:f4:1c:61:68:17:18:ed:f8:78:96:b6:37:76:e5:ca** |

* 1. Verify chain of trust

|  |
| --- |
| **# pwd****/home/ubuntu/certs/intermediate****# cat intermediate.crt.pem ../root/rootca.crt.pem > chain.crt.pem****# openssl verify -CAfile chain.crt.pem newcerts/1000.pem****newcerts/1000.pem: OK** |

1. This document is available from the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS) at: < <https://www.atis.org> >. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Available from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) at: < https://www.ietf.org/ >. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)