**ATIS-0x0000x**

ATIS Standard on

**Signature-Based Handling of Asserted Information Using Tokens (SHAKEN): Delegate Certificates**

**Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions**

Approved Month DD, YYYY

**Abstract**

The base-SHAKEN framework enables a SHAKEN-authorized VoIP Service Provider to deliver a cryptographically protected assertion (the ”attestation” value) to a terminating service provider that under specified conditions indicates the calling user is authorized to use the calling telephone number. This specification extends the base-SHAKEN framework to enable SHAKEN-authorized TN Service Providers to issue delegate certificates defined in this document to their non-SHAKEN-authorized customers that allows the customer to prove it possesses an assignment or delegation of a calling TN to a SHAKEN originating service provider that is not also the TN Service Provider. This is one possible method for an originating service provider to determine that its customer’s call is entitled to full attestation for certain enterprise or legitimate spoofing call scenarios where the originating service provider does not have a direct association with the calling entity and/or the calling TN.

**Foreword**

The Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS) serves the public through improved understanding between carriers, customers, and manufacturers. The [**COMMITTEE NAME**] Committee [**INSERT MISSION**]. [**INSERT SCOPE**].

The mandatory requirements are designated by the word *shall* and recommendations by the word *should*. Where both a mandatory requirement and a recommendation are specified for the same criterion, the recommendation represents a goal currently identifiable as having distinct compatibility or performance advantages. The word *may* denotes a optional capability that could augment the standard. The standard is fully functional without the incorporation of this optional capability.

Suggestions for improvement of this document are welcome. They should be sent to the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions, [**COMMITTEE NAME**], 1200 G Street NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20005.

At the time of consensus on this document, [**COMMITTEE NAME**], which was responsible for its development, had the following leadership:

[**LEADERSHIP LIST**]

The **[SUBCOMMITTEE NAME]** Subcommittee was responsible for the development of this document.

**Revision History**

| **Date** | **Version** | **Description** | **Author** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Feb 3, 2020 | 0.1 | IPNNI-2020-00022R000 (2020 baseline) | David Hancock |
| Feb 3, 2020 | 0.2 | IPNNI-2020-00029R001 | David Hancock |
| Mar 17, 2020 | 0.3 | IPNNI-2020-00053R001 (minus new section 5.3.5) | David Hancock |
| May 18, 2020 | 0.4 | IPNNI-2020-00065R006 | David Hancock |
| June 8, 2020 | 0.5 | IPNNI-2020-00098R002 | Doug Bellows |

**Table of Contents**

1 Scope, Purpose, & Application 1

1.1 Scope 1

1.2 Purpose 1

2 Normative References 3

3 Definitions, Acronyms, & Abbreviations 3

3.1 Definitions 3

3.2 Acronyms & Abbreviations 5

4 Overview 7

4.1 Overview of Delegate Certificate Management Procedures 7

4.2 Delegate Certificates and Full Attestation 9

5 Delegate Certificate Management 11

5.1 Certificate Management Architecture 11

5.2 Certificate Management Interfaces 11

5.3 Certificate Management Procedures 13

5.3.1 Subordinate CA obtains an SPC Token from STI-PA 13

5.3.2 Subordinate CA obtains a CA Certificate from STI-CA 14

5.3.3 VoIP Entity obtains a Delegate Certificate from Subordinate CA 14

5.3.4 Issuing Delegate End-Entity Certificates to SHAKEN SPs 18

5.3.5 Delegate Certificate Revocation 18

5.3.6 Delegate Certificate Profile 18

6 Authentication and Verification using Delegate Certificates 20

6.1 Delegate Certificate Authentication procedures for Base PASSporTs 20

6.2 Delegate Certificate Verification Procedures for Base PASSporTs 21

6.2.1 Verification of base PASSporTs signed with Delegate Certificate credentials for determining attestation level of “shaken” PASSporTs 22

**Table of Figures**

Figure 1. Delegate Certificate Management Flow 8

Figure 2. Using delegate certificates to demonstrate that Full attestation criteria are satisfied 10

Figure 3. Delegate Certificate Management Architecture 12

Figure 4. Distinguishing between delegate and shaken certificates 22

Figure 5. Determining when to perform scope encompassing checks for delegate certificates 23

**Table of Tables**

No table of figures entries found.

# Scope, Purpose, & Application

## Scope

This specification extends the SHAKEN certificate management framework to enable a telephone number service provider to create telephone number or telephone block specific certificates for entities that do not have access to STI certificates. The mechanisms described in this specification are based on the STI delegate certificate procedures defined in [draft-ietf-stir-cert-delegation]. In order to manage the security and integrity of the overall SHAKEN ecosystem, this specification defines both the procedures for the entity with authority over a set of telephone number(s) to create and manage delegated certificates scoped only to the specific set of TNs assigned to the delegate certificate holder, and, in addition, the use of those credentials to create end-entity delegate certificates for authenticated end users to provide a reference to an originating service provider (OSP) or other party in the call flow, so the OSP or other party can verify a PASSporT sent in the end user’s SIP signaling.

## Purpose

The purpose of the SHAKEN framework is to provide a set of tools that enables verification of the calling party's authorization to use a particular calling telephone number for a call. The SHAKEN protocol specification [ATIS-1000074-E] describes criteria that can be invoked by the originating service provider (OSP) to "attest" to the legitimacy of the calling telephone number associated with a call. Three conditions must exist for a SHAKEN authentication service to fully attest (attestation level “A”) that an originating customer can legitimately use the calling TN:

1. The signing provider must be responsible for the origination of the call onto the IP based service provider voice network.
2. The signing provider must have a direct authenticated relationship with the customer and can identify the customer.
3. The signing provider must have established a verified association with the calling telephone number

Condition 1 is relatively unambiguous; the originating service provider *is* the signing provider.

Condition 2 is satisfied for cases where the OSP has a direct UNI relationship with the originating entity and has authenticated the originating entity. However, there are many deployment scenarios where an OSP serves a customer who in turn serves multiple other customers. For example, consider the case where a cloud communications provider serves multiple customers by providing access to the public telephone network via an OSP. In these customer-of-customer cases, where the OSP does not have a direct relationship with the originating entity, the delegate certificate mechanisms described in this document can provide the OSP authentication service with the information it needs to fully attest to the legitimacy of the calling TN.

Condition 3 is satisfied for the case where the OSP has authority over the calling TN, and has assigned the calling TN to the originating customer. However, there are a number of legitimate real-world call scenarios where this is not the case; i.e., where the OSP does not have direct knowledge of the set of TNs the calling user is authorized to use. Example scenarios where it is difficult to support condition 3 for attestation level "A" include the following (note, list is not exhaustive):

* A SIP-PBX obtains originating call service from multiple providers (e.g., for redundancy or least cost routing). In this case, the PBX can legitimately originate a call via one provider from a calling TN that it obtained from a different provider.
* An enterprise displays a Toll-Free callback number for B2C calls, and the Toll-Free number provider and originating provider are two separate entities.
* A “legitimate spoofing” service displays the subscriber’s work TN for calls originated by the user’s home phone.
* An outbound dialing service automatically initiates calls on behalf of a business or other entity, and displays the business TN to the called users (e.g., school announces weather-related school closings to students, or airline sends flight information updates to its passengers).
* Wholesale TNs used by reseller SPs, Cloud Communication Providers, and others when they originate calls
* A contact center serving multiple enterprises from various locations originates calls using the unique calling TN specified by each enterprise.

The SHAKEN specification provides guidance to originating SPs on how they can satisfy the TN-legitimacy condition in order to provide full attestation for call scenarios where the OSP does not have a direct UNI relationship with the end user, or where the OSP is not the TN service provider (TNSP). For example, the OSP could establish the legitimacy of the calling TN as part of the service level agreement with the end user, or it could obtain the necessary TN assignment information from the TNSP using some “out-of-band” mechanism.

However, these mechanisms often have shortcomings. The service level agreement approach may be unworkable in practice due to a low level of trust between the OSP and customer. Or the OSP may have no relationship with or knowledge of the TNSP. The TNSP itself may not know the identity of the end user that was ultimately assigned the TN (consider the case where the TNSP assigns the TN to a reseller, who then assigns the TN to one of the reseller’s customers). In customer-of-customer scenarios the OSP doesn’t even know the entity originating the call (i.e., the end user) making it difficult to “have a direct authenticated relationship with the indirect calling entity”. And finally, the ad-hoc and non-automated nature of some of these mechanisms may incur a large administrative overhead for the participating parties (e.g., the overhead required to establish relationships between otherwise unrelated providers) and could make full attestation non-viable in a number of enterprise scenarios.

The delegate mechanism defined in this specification addresses these shortcomings by providing an automated, protocol-based mechanism that provides an end user with the ability to create and sign a PASSporT on its calls using a set of credentials in the form of an asymmetric cryptography key pair associated with a delegate certificate that is specific to the telephone number resources that end user is authorized to use.

# Normative References

The following standards contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Standard. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All standards are subject to revision, and parties to agreements based on this Standard are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the standards indicated below.

ATIS-1000074, *Signature-based Handling of Asserted Information using Tokens (SHAKEN).1*

ATIS-1000080, *SHAKEN: Governance Model and Certificate Management.[[1]](#footnote-2)*

<ATIS Standard for RCD PASSporT>, *SHAKEN: Calling Name and Rich Call Data Handling Procedures.1*

ATIS-1000088, *A Framework for SHAKEN Attestation and Origination Identifier.1*

IETF RFC 3261, *SIP: Session Initiation Protocol.*2

RFC 4949, *Internet Security Glossary, Version 2.*2

RFC 8224, *Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol.*2

RFC 8225, *Personal Assertion Token.*[[2]](#footnote-3)

RFC 8226, *Secure Telephone Identity Credentials: Certificates.*2

draft-ietf-acme-authority-token, *ACME Challenges Using an Authority Token.* 2

draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist, *TNAuthList profile of ACME Authority Token.* 2

draft-ietf-stir-cert-delegation, STIR Certificate Delegation*.* 2

TS 24.229, IP multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP). [[3]](#footnote-4)

# Definitions, Acronyms, & Abbreviations

For a list of common communications terms and definitions, please visit the *ATIS Telecom Glossary*, which is located at < <http://www.atis.org/glossary> >.

## Definitions

The following provides some key definitions used in this document.

**Caller ID:** The originating or calling party’s telephone number used to identify the caller carried either in the P-Asserted-Identity or From header fields in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC 3261] messages.

**Call Origination**: In the context of this document, the OSP is responsible for the origination of the call onto the service provider voice network if the service provider receives the call via a "user-to-network interface" (UNI).

**(Digital) Certificate:** Binds a public key to a Subject (e.g., the end-entity). A certificate document in the form of a digital data object (a data object used by a computer) to which is appended a computed digital signature value that depends on the data object [RFC 4949]. See also STI Certificate.

**Certification Authority (CA):** An entity that issues digital certificates (especially X.509 certificates) and vouches for the binding between the data items in a certificate [RFC 4949].

**Certificate Chain:** See Certification Path.

**Certification Path:** A linked sequence of one or more public-key certificates, or one or more public-key certificates and one attribute certificate, that enables a certificate user to verify the signature on the last certificate in the path, and thus enables the user to obtain (from that last certificate) a certified public key, or certified attributes, of the system entity that is the subject of that last certificate. Synonym for Certificate Chain [RFC 4949].

**Certificate Revocation List (CRL):** A data structure that enumerates digital certificates that have been invalidated by their issuer prior to when they were scheduled to expire [RFC 4949].

**Certificate Signing Request (CSR):** A CSR is sent to a CA to request a certificate. A CSR contains a Public Key of the end-entity that is requesting the certificate.

**Chain of Trust:** Deprecated term referring to the chain of certificates to a Trust Anchor. Synonym for Certification Path or Certificate Chain [RFC 4949].

**Certificate Validation:** An act or process by which a certificate user established that the assertions made by a certificate can be trusted [RFC 4949].

**Company Code:** A unique four-character alphanumeric code (NXXX) assigned to all Service Providers [ATIS-0300251].

**Customer:** Typically a service provider’s subscriber, which may or not be the ultimate end-user of the telecommunications service. A customer, for example, may be a person, enterprise, reseller, or value-added service provider (ref [ATIS-1000088]).**End-Entity:** An entity that participates in the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Usually a Server, Service, Router, or a Person. In the context of this document, an end-entity is a Service Provider, TN Service Provider, or VoIP Entity.

**End user:** The entity ultimately consuming the VoIP-based telecommunications service. For the purposes of this report, an end user may directly be the customer of a service provider or may indirectly use the VoIP based telecommunications service through another entity such as a reseller or value-added service provider (ref [ATIS-1000088]).

**Fingerprint:** A hash result ("key fingerprint") used to authenticate a public key or other data [RFC 4949].

**Identity:** Either a canonical Address-of-Record (AoR) SIP Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) employed to reach a user (such as ’sip:alice@atlanta.example.com’), or a telephone number, which commonly appears in either a TEL URI [RFC 3966] or as the user portion of a SIP URI. See also Caller ID [RFC 8224].

**National/Regional Regulatory Authority (NRRA):** A governmental entity responsible for the oversight/regulation of the telecommunication networks within a specific country or region.

NOTE: Region is not intended to be a region within a country (e.g., a region is not a state within the US).

**Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP):** An Internet protocol used by a client to obtain the revocation status of a certificate from a server.

**Private Key:** In asymmetric cryptography, the private key is kept secret by the end-entity. The private key can be used for both encryption and decryption [RFC 4949].

**Public Key:** The publicly disclosable component of a pair of cryptographic keys used for asymmetric cryptography [RFC 4949].

**Public Key Infrastructure (PKI):** The set of hardware, software, personnel, policy, and procedures used by a CA to issue and manage certificates [RFC 4949].

**Root CA:** A CA that is directly trusted by an end-entity. See also Trust Anchor CA and Trusted CA [RFC 4949].

**Secure Telephone Identity (STI) Certificate:** A public key certificate used by a service provider to sign and verify the PASSporT.

**Service Provider Code:** In the context of this document, this term refers to any unique identifier that is allocated by a Regulatory and/or administrative entity to a service provider. In the US and Canada this would be a Company Code as defined in [ATIS-0300251].

**Signature:** Created by signing the message using the private key. It ensures the identity of the sender and the integrity of the data [RFC 4949].

**Telephone Identity:** An identifier associated with an originator of a telephone call. In the context of the SHAKEN framework, this is a SIP identity (e.g., a SIP URI or a TEL URI) from which a telephone number can be derived.

**Trust Anchor:** An established point of trust (usually based on the authority of some person, office, or organization) from which a certificate user begins the validation of a certification path. The trust anchor is a combination of a trusted public key and the name of the entity to which the corresponding private key belongs [RFC 4949].

**Trust Anchor CA:** A CA that is the subject of a trust anchor certificate or otherwise establishes a trust anchor key. See also Root CA and Trusted CA [RFC 4949].

**Trusted CA:** A CA upon which a certificate user relies for issuing valid certificates; especially a CA that is used as a trust anchor CA [RFC 4949].

**Trust Model:** Describes how trust is distributed from Trust Anchors.

**Verified Association:** In the context of this document a signing provider can establish a verified association with a telephone number by 1) having a direct UNI relationship with the originating entity (i.e., end user) and verifying their right to use the calling telephone number, or 2) verifying a PASSporT signed with a delegate certificate that cryptographically verifies the association between the originating entity (i.e., end user) and the calling telephone number.

**VoIP Entity:** A non-STI-authorized end user entity that purchases (or otherwise obtains) delegated telephone numbers from a TNSP

## Acronyms & Abbreviations

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 3GPP | 3rd Generation Partnership Project |
| ATIS | Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions |
| B2BUA | Back-to-Back User Agent |
| CRL | Certificate Revocation List |
| CSCF | Call Session Control Function |
| CVT | Call Validation Treatment |
| HTTPS | Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure |
| IBCF | Interconnection Border Control Function |
| IETF | Internet Engineering Task Force |
| IMS | IP Multimedia Subsystem |
| IP | Internet Protocol |
| JSON | JavaScript Object Notation |
| JWS | JSON Web Signature |
| NNI | Network-to-Network Interface |
| OCSP | Online Certificate Status Protocol |
| OSP | Originating Service Provider |
| PASSporT | Persona Assertion Token |
| PBX | Private Branch Exchange |
| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
| SHAKEN | Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs |
| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
| SKS | Secure Key Store |
| SP | Service Provider |
| SPID | Service Provider Identifier |
| STI | Secure Telephone Identity |
| STI-AS | Secure Telephone Identity Authentication Service |
| STI-CA | Secure Telephone Identity Certification Authority |
| STI-CR | Secure Telephone Identity Certificate Repository |
| STI-VS | Secure Telephone Identity Verification Service |
| STIR | Secure Telephone Identity Revisited |
| TLS | Transport Layer Security |
| TN | Telephone Number |
| TNSP | TN Service Provider |
| TSP | Terminating Service Provider |
| UA | User Agent |
| URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
| UUID | Universally Unique Identifier |
| VoIP | Voice over Internet Protocol |

# Overview

SHAKEN uses the protocols and mechanisms defined by the IETF Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) Working Group. The STIR document [RFC8226] describes a credential system in the form of STI certificates that enables telephone service providers to cryptographically assert authority over telephone numbers. The scope of an STI certificate is expressed by the certificate’s TNAuthList object. As defined in [RFC8226], a TNAuthList can identify the set (or a subset) of TNs assigned to the certificate holder. Alternatively, the TNAuthList may contain an SPC value assigned to the telephone service provider holding the certificate, with the implication that it identifies all of the telephone numbers associated with that identifier for the service provider.

To avoid unnecessary complexity, the SHAKEN specifications profile the STI certificate scoping mechanism provided by [RFC8226]. [ATIS-1000080-E] restricts the contents of a SHAKEN certificate TNAuthList object to a single SPC value assigned to the SHAKEN SP holding the certificate. Furthermore, [ATIS-1000074 utilizes the SPC value in the TNAuthList solely as an identifier of the signing SP independent of the calling TN. This enables a SHAKEN-compliant SP to provide full attestation for a customer originating a call from a calling TN assigned by a different TN service provider. These simplifications are justified given that a SHAKEN SP must pass a very rigorous STI-PA vetting process in order to obtain a SHAKEN certificate.

The delegate certificate mechanism described in this document provides a way to extend the SHAKEN credential system to enable non-SHAKEN entities such as enterprise PBXs to create and sign a PASSporT (for example an RFC 8225 base PASSporT) to demonstrate its association with the calling TN when initiating calls onto the public telephone network. The delegated certificate authorization model is hierarchical. At the top of the hierarchy, the STI-PA authenticates the identity of the TNSP, and authorizes the TNSP to issue delegate certificates to its customers. Since non-SHAKEN entities are not vetted directly by the STI-PA, this document mandates that the scope of a delegate certificate issued to an entity must identify only TNs that the entity is authorized to use. This means that the TNAuthList of a delegate certificate can contain a TN or list of TNs assigned to the certificate holder. This more rigorous application of the [RFC8226] scoping mechanism enables verifiers such as an OSP to explicitly verify that the delegate certificate holder is authorized to use any TN signed by the delegate certificate credentials.

By signing an originating call with delegate certificate credentials, a non-SHAKEN entity can demonstrate its authority to use the calling TN. This provides the SHAKEN authentication service in the originating service provider network with sufficient information to satisfy the full attestation criteria, therefore enabling it to deliver a standard SHAKEN PASSporT with "A" attestation to remote verification services.

## Overview of Delegate Certificate Management Procedures

The delegate certificate management framework defines two new entities:

1. Telephone Number Service Provider (TNSP):
   * An entity that is authoritative over a set of telephone numbers, and that can delegate a subset of those telephone numbers to another entity to attest for signing. In the context of this document a TNSP is a SHAKEN entity that is authorized by the STI-PA to obtain STI certificates from an STI-CA.
   * Ultimately the entities entitled to obtain STI Certificates will be defined by the STI-GA.
2. VoIP Entity:
   * A non-STI-authorized end user entity (i.e., a non-SHAKEN entity) that purchases (or otherwise obtains) delegated telephone numbers directly or indirectly from a TNSP.
   * Examples include a SIP-PBX serving a single enterprise customer, a Cloud Communications Provider serving multiple enterprise customers, a Contact Center making and receiving calls on behalf of multiple business entities, a legitimate spoofing application (e.g., call from personal phone delivers work calling number), or an automated outbound dialing service (e.g., school closing announcement).

Figure 1 provides a high-level overview of the certificate management process for issuing delegate end-entity certificates to a VoIP Entity using the STIR certificate delegation procedures defined in [draft-ietf-stir-cert-delegation]. The VoIP Entity is any non-SHAKEN X.509 entity that requires certificate credentials for signing STI PASSporTs.

The general process is as follows:

1. The TNSP obtains an SPC Token from the STI-PA that authorizes the TNSP to issue delegate certificates. The STI-PA will issue the SPC Token only if the SPC identified in the token is assigned to the requesting TNSP.
2. The TNSP Subordinate CA uses the SPC Token from step-1 to obtain a CA certificate (BasicConstraints CA boolean is true) from the STI-CA[[4]](#footnote-5). The certification path of this newly issued CA certificate terminates at an STI-CA trusted root certificate.
3. Once it has obtained a CA certificate from an STI-CA, the Subordinate CA can issue delegate certificates to VoIP Entities. Since the issued delegate certificate is a child of the TNSP CA certificate, its certification path terminates at the STI-CA’s trusted root certificate. The issued delegate certificate gives the VoIP Entity the authority to sign STI PASSporTs containing an "orig" claim TN that is within the scope of the delegate certificate’s TNAuthList.



Figure 1. Delegate Certificate Management Flow

Figure 1 shows the case where the TNSP Subordinate CA issues a delegate end-entity certificate to the VoIP entity. The TNSP Subordinate CA can also issue a delegate CA certificate to a Subordinate CA hosted by a non-SHAKEN VoIP Entity such as a reseller. The reseller can then use the delegate CA certificate as the parent to additional child delegate certificates issued to the reseller’s customers. The scope of these child certificates must be encompassed by the scope of the parent delegate CA certificate.

## Delegate Certificates and Full Attestation

[ATIS-1000074] defines three criteria that must be satisfied before an OSP can assert Full attestation.

1. The OSP must be responsible for the origination of the call onto the IP based service provider voice network.
2. The OSP must have a direct authenticated relationship with the customer and can identify the customer.
3. The OSP must have established a verified association with the calling telephone number

By definition, an OSP, as the originating service provider, satisfies Full attestation criteria 1. Furthermore, an OSP that has a direct UNI relationship with the originating customer, and has assigned the calling TN to the customer, can satisfy criteria 2 and 3 with locally available information.

However, an OSP itself cannot easily satisfy criteria 2 and 3 with locally available information for cases where it does not have a direct relationship with the calling entity, and has no locally available association with the calling TN. An example of the use of delegate certificate credentials is shown in Figure 2, where a non-shaken VoIP Entity (Enterprise-1) uses the services of a CPaaS to obtain access to the VoIP service provider network and acquires TNs directly from a TNSP. In the example , Enterprise-1 is assigned a set of TNs from the TNSP (step A). The TNSP then issues a delegate certificate to Enterprise-1, with a scope that identifies the TNs assigned to the Enterprise (step B). At call origination time, Enterprise-1 signs a PASSporT with the delegate certificate credentials to provide its identity and to demonstrate to the OSP that it is authorized to use the calling TN (steps 1 and 2). Based on verification of a PASSporT traceable to the calling entity’s identity and a set of authorized TNs, received from its CPaaS customer in INVITE “2”, the OSP shaken authentication service asserts Full attestation in INVITE “3” sent to the TSP.

In this case, there are a number of preconditions that must be met for the OSPs verification of a PASSporT from an indirectly known calling entity to be considered equivalent to meeting Full Attestation criteria 2 and 3 for such a call. A governance and policy environment must be in place that makes participating TNSPs and/or other subordinate CA providers responsible to provide a certificate holder’s valid identity information to any authorized OSP and other authorized bodies responsible for policy, regulatory, or law enforcement (industry traceback authorities, regulatory authorities, etc.). The TNSP and/or other entity that is fulfilling the Subordinate CA function must execute an identity vetting process that establishes a verified legal identity for any entity receiving delegate certificate credentials, and the credentials must only indicate authorizations to that entity for valid directly assigned or delegated TNs. The TNSP and/or other subordinate CA provider must also participate in enforcement mechanisms to respond to misuse of credentials for traffic originated through any OSP network.

The delegate certificate model supports multiple levels of delegation; e.g., where a TNSP Subordinate CA issues a delegate CA certificate to a CPaaS, and the CPaaS Subordinate CA in turn issues delegate end entity certificates to its customers. In these multi-delegation-level cases the scope encompassing rules are strictly enforced for child certificates issued from delegate CA certificates (i.e., relying parties can detect if the scope encompassing rules are violated).



Figure 2. Using delegate certificates to demonstrate that Full attestation criteria are satisfied

An OSP may use verification of a valid PASSporT signed with delegate certificate credentials as being equivalent to meeting Full attestation criteria 2 and 3, based on local policy. Example policies could include the following:

* An OSP chooses not to apply this attestation criteria procedure, and instead ignores all PASSporTs signed with delegate certificate credentials.
* An OSP chooses to apply this attestation criteria procedure for all valid PASSporTs signed with delegate certificate credentials.
* An OSP chooses to apply this attestation criteria procedure selectively based on different factors; e.g., based on the number delegation levels, the identity of the UNI customer that sent the originating INVITE to the OSP, or the reputation of an entity identified in the certification path (e.g., the reputation of an entity hosting a Subordinate CA or the identity indicated by the end-entity certificate).

# Delegate Certificate Management

This section describes the architecture, functional entities, interfaces, and procedures to issue delegate end-entity certificates to a VoIP Entity.

## Certificate Management Architecture

Figure 3 shows how the SHAKEN certificate management architecture is extended to provide delegate end-entity certificates to a VoIP Entity. The TNSP hosts a Subordinate CA that plays the role of a SHAKEN Service Provider defined in [ATIS-1000080] to obtain SPC Tokens from the STI-PA, and CA certificates from the STI-CA (i.e., from the perspective of the STI-PA and the STI-CA, the Subordinate CA is the TNSP). The Subordinate CA in turn plays the role of a CA in issuing delegate end-entity certificates to the VoIP Entity. The VoIP Entity is an entity that provides SIP-based VoIP services. For example, the VoIP Entity can be a VoIP provider or enterprise customer that has purchased telephone number resources from the TNSP. However, this same delegate certificate model could also be applied when the VoIP Entity is an originating service provider with direct responsibility for telephone numbers.



Figure 3. Delegate Certificate Management Architecture

## Certificate Management Interfaces

The Subordinate CA obtains CA certificates from the STI-CA using interfaces 1), 2), and 3) of Figure 3. Aside from the minor exceptions noted here, the procedures are identical to the certificate management procedures defined by ATIS-1000080-E.

1. The Subordinate CA obtains a fresh SPC Token from the STI-PA that authorizes the Subordinate CA to obtain CA certificates from the STI-CA. The procedure is as specified in [ATIS-1000080-E], with the exception that the SPC Token “ca” boolean must be set to ‘true’.
2. Once the Subordinate CA has obtained a valid SPC Token, it can order a CA certificate from the STI-CA using the ACME protocol as specified in [ATIS-1000080-E].
3. During the authorization phase of the certificate ordering process, the STI-CA obtains the STI-PA certificate referenced by the SPC Token in order to verify the SPC Token signature, as specified in [ATIS-1000080-E].

At this point, the Subordinate CA stores the newly issued CA certificate in preparation for issuing delegate end-entity certificates to the VoIP Entities that it serves. The VoIP Entity procedure to order a delegate end-entity certificate is similar to the STI end-entity certificate ordering procedure defined in ATIS-1000080-E, except that the ACME account can be pre-authorized by leveraging the already-established security association between VoIP Entity and Subordinate CA. This simplifies the ordering process, since the VoIP Entity does not have to obtain an SPC Token, and it does not have to respond to an ACME authorization challenge.

1. Following the procedures defined in [ATIS-1000080-E], the VoIP Entity KMS generates two public/private key pairs; one for the ACME account, and one for the delegate end-entity certificate. It stores the private keys in its SKS.
2. The VoIP Entity orders a new delegate end-entity certificate using the certificate ordering procedure specified in [ATIS-1000080-E], minus the ACME authorization challenge/response steps (since the ACME account is pre-authorized). The Subordinate CA signs the newly issued end-entity certificate with the private key of the CA certificate, and returns the URI where the newly issued certificate can be downloaded to the VoIP Entity. The VoIP Entity downloads the delegate certificate (including the certificates in the certification path).
3. The VoIP Entity stores the newly issued delegate end-entity certificate in its STI-CR.

Note, as an alternative, the STI-CR could be hosted by the TNSP instead of the VoIP Entity. In this case, the Subordinate CA would store the newly issued delegate certificate in TNSP-hosted STI-CR and provide the VoIP Entity with the STI-CR URI reference to the delegate certificate in step 5. The VoIP Entity does not need to download the delegate certificate in step 6, but can simply include the STI-CR reference in the "x5u" field of the protected header of any PASSporT signed with the private key of this certificate.

## Certificate Management Procedures

### Subordinate CA obtains an SPC Token from STI-PA

The Subordinate CA shall obtain an SPC Token as described in [ATIS-1000080-E] with the exceptions noted in this section.

As specified by [ATIS-1000080-E], the SPC Token request contains the “atc” JASON object defined in [draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist]. The “atc” object identifies the type and scope of certificates authorized by the SPC Token. (Essentially, the Subordinate CA is asking the STI-PA to issue an SPC Token that contains this same “atc” object.) In order to obtain an SPC Token that authorizes CA certificates, the token request “atc” object “ca” boolean shall be set to ‘true’. Otherwise, the token request “atc” object is populated as specified in [ATIS-1000080-E].

An example of a request for an SPC Token sent by the Subordinate CA to the STI-PA is as follows:

POST /at/account/:id/token HTTP/1.1

Host: authority.example.com

Content-Type: application/json

{

"atc":{"tktype":"TNAuthList",

"tkvalue":"F83n2a...avn27DN3==",

"ca":true,

"fingerprint":"SHA256 56:3E:CF:AE:83:CA:4D:15:B0:29:FF:1B:71:D3 \

:BA:B9:19:81:F8:50:9B:DF:4A:D4:39:72:E2:B1:F0:B9:38:E3"}

}

On receiving the above token request, the STI-PA shall verify that the requesting Subordinate CA is authorized to obtain CA certificates, and also that the requesting Subordinate CA has authority over the SPC value identified in the received TNAuthList. If these verification checks pass, then the STI-PA shall construct an SPC Token containing the received “atc” object, as shown in the following example:

{ "typ":"JWT",

"alg":"ES256",

"x5u":https://authority.example.org/cert

}

{

"iss":"https://authority.example.org/authz",

"exp":1300819380,

"jti":"id6098364921",

"atc":{"tktype":"TnAuthList",

"tkvalue":"F83n2a...avn27DN3==",

"ca":true,

"fingerprint":"SHA256

56:3E:CF:AE:83:CA:4D:15:B0:29:FF:1B:71:D3:BA:B9:19:81:F8:50:

9B:DF:4A:D4:39:72:E2:B1:F0:B9:38:E3"}

}

The STI-PA shall sign the SPC Token with the private key of the STI-PA certificate referenced by the token’s “x5u” parameter, and return the token to the Subordinate CA in a 200 OK response, as shown in the following example:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Content-Type: application/json

{

"status":"success",

"token": "DGyRejmCefe7v4N...vb29HhjjLPSggwiE"},

"crl":"<https://sti-pa.com/sti-pa/crl>",

"message":"SPC Token granted"

}

### Subordinate CA obtains a CA Certificate from STI-CA

The Subordinate CA shall create an ACME account and order a new CA certificate from the STI-CA using the ACME procedures defined in [ATIS-1000080-E], with the exceptions noted in this section.

During the finalize step of the ACME certificate ordering process, the Subordinate CA shall request a CA certificate by including a BasicConstraints object in the CSR with the cA boolean set to ‘true’. When the STI-CA receives a CSR containing a BasicConstraints object with a cA boolean of ‘true’, it shall verify that the requesting Subordinate CA is authorized to obtain CA certificates by checking that the SPC Token received in the challenge response contains a “ca” boolean with a value of ‘true’. If the Subordinate CA is authorized to receive CA certificates, then the STI-CA shall issue a certificate containing a BasicConstraints object with a cA Boolean of ‘true’. The STI-CA shall populate the newly issued CA certificate with the TNAuthList identifier received in the ACME new-order request, as specified in [draft-ietf-stir-cert-delegation]. (Note, as part of normal SHAKEN procedures, the STI-CA shall verify that the new-order TNAuthList and the CSR TNAuthList both match the "tkvalue" in the SPC Token challenge response.)

Once it has downloaded the newly issued CA certificate, the Subordinate CA shall store the certificate locally (i.e., unlike end-entity certificates, the CA certificate is not stored in the STI-CR).

### VoIP Entity obtains a Delegate Certificate from Subordinate CA

The procedure to obtain a delegate certificate is a simplified version of the ACME certificate ordering procedures defined in [ATIS-1000080-E] where the VoIP Entity KMS plays the role of the SP-KMS, and the Subordinate CA plays the role of STI-CA.

Note: this section recommends that the Subordinate CA issues delegate certificates to VoIP Entities using the ACME-based procedures described here. A Subordinate CA may instead choose to issue delegate certificates using a proprietary mechanism, as long as that mechanism has the same security properties as the procedures defined here.

#### Initial Conditions

As a pre-requisite to issuing delegate certificates, the Subordinate CA must configure the VoIP Entity with the URL of the Subordinate CA ACME directory resource, and the scope of delegate certificates that the VoIP Entity is authorized to obtain from the Subordinate CA.

#### Creating an ACME Account with the Subordinate CA

The VoIP Entity KMS and the Subordinate CA shall support the ACME account creation process defined in [ATIS-1000080-E].

The account creation process is identical to that specified by [ATIS-1000080-E]. The VoIP Entity KMS shall generate a public/private key pair using the ES256 algorithm, to serve as credentials for the account, and shall send an HTTP POST request to the “newAccount” resource to create the ACME account, as shown in the following example:

POST /acme/new-account HTTP/1.1

Host: subordinate-ca.com

Content-Type: application/jose+json

{

"protected": base64url({

"alg": "ES256",

"jwk": /\* ACME account public key \*/,

"nonce": "6S8IqOGY7eL2lsGoTZYifg",

"url": "https:/subordinate-ca.com/acme/new-account"

})

"payload": base64url({

"contact": [

"mailto:cert-admin-kms01@voip-entity.com",

"tel:+12155551212"

]

}),

"signature": /\* signed using ACME account private key \*/

}

If the account already exists for the specified account key, then the Subordinate CA shall send a “200 OK” response to the POST request. Otherwise, the Subordinate CA shall create an account object and send a “201 Created” response, as shown in the following example:

HTTP/1.1 201 Created

Content-Type: application/json

Replay-Nonce: D8s4D2mLs8Vn-goWuPQeKA

Location: https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/acct/1

Link: <https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="index"

{

"status": "valid",

"contact": [

"mailto:cert-admin-kms01@voip-entity.com",

"tel:+12155551212"

]

"orders": "https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/acct/1/orders"

}

#### Pre-authorizing the ACME Account

The Subordinate CA shall pre-authorize the new ACME account based on a security association with the VoIP Entity that was previously established via procedures outside the scope of this document. The Subordinate CA shall provision an authorization object with a “status” of “valid”, with an empty set of challenges, and containing an “identifier” field of type “TNAuthList” with the ASN.1 encoding of the TN list pre-authorized for the VoIP Entity.

The Subordinate CA shall advertise the URL of the authorization object in the “newAuthz” field of the directory object.

An example of the authorization object is as follows:

{

"status": "valid",

"expires": "2018-03-01T14:09:00Z",

"identifier": {

"type":"TNAuthList",

"value": "F83n2a...avn27DN3=="

},

"challenges": []

}

#### Obtaining a new Delegate End-Entity Certificate from Subordinate CA

The VoIP Entity KMS and Subordinate CA shall support the pre-authorization certificate ordering and issuance process defined in [draft-ietf-acme-acme].

**1) Ordering the Certificate**

As the first step in applying for a new certificate, the VoIP Entity KMS shall provide an “identifiers” field in the new-order POST request of “type” of “TNAuthList”. The TNAuthList value shall identify the set (or a subset) of the TNs that were pre-provisioned by the Subordinate CA (see 5.3.3.1). The TNAuthList must identify at least one TN.

Note, as an alternative, the VOIP Entity KMS could simply use the TNAuthList contained in the authorization object (see section 5.3.3.3).

An example of the new-order POST request is as follows:

POST /acme/new-order HTTP/1.1

Host: subordinate-ca.com

Content-Type: application/jose+json

{

"protected": base64url({

"alg": "ES256",

"kid": " https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

"nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA",

"url": " https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/new-order"

})

"payload": base64url({

"identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],

"notBefore": "2018-01-01T00:00:00Z",

"notAfter": "2018-01-08T00:00:00Z"

}),

"signature": /\* signed using ACME account private key \*/

}

**2) Verifying the order**

The Subordinate CA shall verify that the “Identifiers” field in the new-order request is authorized by the “identifier” field of the pre-provisioned authorization object described in section 5.3.3.3 (i.e., the TNs must either match or be a subset of pre-authorized TNs).

If the request is valid, then the Subordinate CA shall send a “201 Created” response containing the newly created order object, as shown in the following example:

HTTP/1.1 201 Created

   Content-Type: application/json

Replay-Nonce: MYAuvOpaoIiywTezizk5vw

Location: https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/order/asdf

{

"status": "ready",

"expires": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z",

"notBefore": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z",

"notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:00:00Z",

"identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],

"authorizations": [

"https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/authz/1234"

],

"finalize": "https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/order/asdf/finalize"

}

The “authorizations” field contains the URL to the pre-provisioned authorization object described in section 5.3.3.3. The “finalize” field contains the URL that the VoIP Entity will use to finalize the order.

**3) Finalizing the order**

The VoIP Entity KMS knows that that the account is pre-authorized to issue the requested certificate based on the returned order object status of “ready”, and therefore shall proceed to finalize the order. (As an option, the VOIP Entity KMS may verify that the ACME account has been pre-authorized by performing an HTTP GET for the URL contained in the “authorizations” field in step-2, and check that the returned authorization object has a status of “valid”.)

To finalize the order, the VoIP Entity KMS shall create a CSR as specified in [ATIS-1000080-E], but containing a TNAuthList identical to the “identifiers” field of the new-order request in step-1.

Note: Although draft-ietf-stir-cert-delegation defines a passed-by-reference option for the TNAuthList, this specification does not incorporate this option, but recognizes it as a future consideration.

The VoIP Entity KMS shall then finalize the order by sending an HTTP POST request to the “finalize” URL received in step-2, as shown in the following example:

POST /acme/order/asdf/finalize HTTP/1.1

Host: subordinate-ca.com

Content-Type: application/jose+json

{

"protected": base64url({

"alg": "ES256",

"kid": "https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

"nonce": "MSF2j2nawWHPxxkE3ZJtKQ",

"url": "https://subordinaate-ca.tn-provider.com/acme/order/asdf/finalize"

}),

"payload": base64url({

"csr": "5jNudRx6Ye4HzKEqT5...FS6aKdZeGsysoCo4H9P",

}),

"signature": /\* signed using ACME account private key \*/

}

The Subordinate CA shall respond to the finalize request with a “200 OK” response containing the order object, as shown in the following example:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

   Content-Type: application/json

Replay-Nonce: MYAuvOpaoIiywTezizk5vw

Location: https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/order/asdf

{

"status": "processing",

"expires": "2018-01-01T00:00:00Z",

"notBefore": "2018-01-01T00:00:00Z",

"notAfter": "2018-01-08T00:00:00Z",

"identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],

"authorizations": [

"https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/authz/1234"

],

"finalize": "https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/order/asdf/finalize"

}

At this point in the process, the Subordinate CA shall execute the order by constructing a certificate containing the requested TNAuthList, and signed with the private key of the Subordinate CA’s CA certificate. While the Subordinate CA is filling the order, it shall maintain an order object status of “processing”.

**4) Polling for the certificate**

Once it has finalized the certificate order with the Subordinate CA, the VoIP Entity KMS shall periodically poll the order object resource with a POST-as-GET request, as specified in [ATIS-1000080-E]. When the order has been filled, the Subordinate CA shall store the newly issued certificate in the STI-CR, and shall indicate to the VoIP Entity KMS that the certificate is available by responding to the next poll as shown in the following example:

   POST /acme/order/asdf HTTP/1.1

   Host: subordinate-ca.com

Content-Type: application/jose+json

{

"protected": base64url({

"alg": "ES256",

"kid": "https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

"nonce": "uQpSjlRb4vQVCjVYAyyUWg",

"url": "https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/new-order"

}),

"payload": "",

"signature": "nuSDISbWG8mMgE7H...QyVUL68yzf3Zawps"

}

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

   Content-Type: application/json

Replay-Nonce: MYAuvOpaoIiywTezizk5vw

Location: https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/order/asdf

{

"status": "valid",

"expires": "2018-01-01T00:00:00Z",

"notBefore": "2018-01-01T00:00:00Z",

"notAfter": "2018-01-08T00:00:00Z",

"identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],

"authorizations": [

"https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/authz/1234"

],

"finalize": [https://subordinate-ca.com/acme/order/asdf/finalize](https://subordinate-ca.tn-provider.com/acme/order/asdf/finalize)

"certificate": "https://sti-cr.tn-provider.com/cert-1"

}

Based on a pre-established agreement between the Subordinate CA and VoIP Entity, the newly issued delegate end-entity certificate shall be stored in the STI-CR either by the Subordinate CA or the VoIP Entity. If the Subordinate CA stores the certificate in the STI-CR, then the VoIP Entity does not need to download the actual certificate. Instead, it can simply use the URI identified in the “certificate” field of the step-4 response to populate the “x5u” field in the PASSporT token created during STI authentication.

### Issuing Delegate End-Entity Certificates to SHAKEN SPs

A SHAKEN Service Provider itself may want to sign PASSporTs, such as “rcd” PASSporTs, with a delegate end-entity certificate. For example, instead of obtaining short-lived SHAKEN end-entity certificates from an STI-CA, an OSP could obtain a long-lived CA certificate from the STI-CA using the procedures described above in section 5.3.2, and then use the CA certificate to efficiently coin new short-lived delegate end-entity certificates for its own use. Since it is both the producer and the consumer of the delegate end-entity certificates in this case, the OSP could use a proprietary mechanism to issue the delegate end-entity certificates from the CA certificate.

### Delegate Certificate Revocation

Delegate certificates should generally be issued with short validity periods (24 to 48 hours is recommended), and therefore rely on passive revocation. The STI-PA CRL mechanism shall not be used for delegate certificate revocation.

### Delegate Certificate Profile

This section defines the certificate profile that must be supported for the following two types of certificates:

* Delegate certificate: a certificate that contains a TNAuthList identifying one or more TNs, and whose parent certificate contains a TNAuthList. Delegate certificates can be intermediate certificates (Basic Constraints CA boolean = true) or end entity certificates (Basic Constraints CA boolean = false).
* STI intermediate certificate held by the Subordinate CA of a TNSP: an intermediate certificate that contains a TNAuthList identifying a single SPC value and whose parent is a STI certificate held by an approved STI-CA. This type of certificate is not a delegate certificate since its parent certificate does not contain a TNAuthList.

STI intermediate certificates held by the Subordinate CA of a TNSP shall comply with all the SHAKEN intermediate certificate requirements in section 6.4.1 of [ATIS-1000080] with the following exceptions:

* The certificate shall contain a TNAuthList extension identifying a single SPC value,
* The Subject field Common Name attribute of a Subordinate CA STI intermediate certificate shall comply with the Common Name attribute requirements for SHAKEN intermediate certificate as defined in [ATIS-1000080], with the exception that it shall not include the text string "SHAKEN”, shall include the text string "Subordinate CA", and shall identify the SPC value in the TNAuthList extension (e.g., "CN=Comcast Subordinate CA intermediate cert 1234").

Delegate intermediate and end entity certificates shall comply with the SHAKEN intermediate and end entity certificate requirements defined in [ATIS-1000080] with the following exceptions:

* A delegate certificate shall not contain a CRL Distribution Points extension,
* A delegate certificate shall contain a TNAuthList identifying one or more TNs,
* The Subject field Common Name attribute of a delegate certificate shall not contain the text string "SHAKEN", shall not contain an SPC value (since the TNAuthList does not contain an SPC value), shall contain the string "Delegate cert", and shall contain the string “Subordinate CA” if the Basic Constraints CA boolean is true (e.g., AAA Auto Repair, Delegate cert). The Common Name may contain the TN(s) identified in the TNAuthList extension of the delegate certificate.

Delegate certificates, and STI intermediate certificates held by the Subordinate CA of a TNSP shall contain a Certificate Policies extension as specified in section 6.4.1 of [ATIS-1000080] with the exception that the OID shall identify a Certificate Policy Statement published by the STI-PA specifically for certificate delegation (i.e., an OID that is different than the SHAKEN CPS OID referred to in [ATIS-1000080]).

# Authentication and Verification using Delegate Certificates

The authentication and verification of PASSporTs and Identity headers that use Delegate Certificates is a function that is above and beyond the base authentication and verification procedures for "shaken" PASSporTs defined in [ATIS-1000074]. Therefore, delegate certificates must not be used to sign "shaken" PASSporTs. Per base SHAKEN verification procedures, a “shaken” PASSporT that is signed with delegate certificate credentials must be treated by the STI-VS as a verification failure.

Delegate certificate credentials may be used to sign PASSporT types other than "shaken" PASSporTs if and only if explicitly defined elsewhere. In these cases, the authentication and verification service procedures associated with delegate certificates is defined in the IETF and/or ATIS specification specific to the PASSporT type; e.g., the authentication procedures for signing "rcd" PASSporTs with delegate certificate credentials are defined in the [ATIS Standard for RCD PASSporT].

Clause 6.1 of this document describes how delegate certificates can be used to sign base PASSporTs defined in [RCF 8225].

## Delegate Certificate Authentication procedures for Base PASSporTs

An authentication service may sign a base PASSporT with delegate certificate credentials to demonstrate authority to use the telephone number identified in the PASSporT "orig" claim. In this case, the authentication service must construct the base PASSporT as follows:

* The protected header must be constructed as specified in RFC 8225. The "x5u" field must reference a delegate certificate chain, the “alg” must be “ES256”, and there shall be no "ppt" field.
* The payload "orig", "dest", and "iat" claims must be populated as specified in ATIS-1000074.

An example of a base PASSPorT is as follows:

*Protected Header*

{ "alg":"ES256",

"typ":"passport",

"x5u":"https://del-cert.example.org/passport.cer"

}

*Payload*

{ "dest":{“tn”:["12155551213"]},

"iat":1471375418,

"orig":{“tn”:"12155551212"}

}

Authentication services that use delegate certificate credentials must ensure that the TNAuthList scope of a delegate end-entity certificate authoritatively covers the TN that it is asserting.

The authentication service shall add an Identity header field containing the signed PASSporT to the originating INVITE request as described in RFC 8224.

An example of an INVITE request with an Identity header field that contains a signed base PASSporT is as follows:

INVITE sip:+12155551213@tel.example1.net SIP/2.0  
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 10.36.78.177:60012;branch=z9hG4bK-524287-1---77ba17085d60f141;rport  
Max-Forwards: 69  
Contact: <sip:+12155551212@69.241.19.12:50207;rinstance=9da3088f36cc528e>  
To: <sip:+12155551213@tel.example1.net>  
From: "Alice"<sip:+12155551212@tel.example2.net>;tag=614bdb40  
Call-ID: 79048YzkxNDA5NTI1MzA0OWFjOTFkMmFlODhiNTI2OWQ1ZTI

P-Asserted-Identity: "Alice"<sip:+12155551212@tel.example2.net>,<tel:+12155551212>  
CSeq: 2 INVITE  
Allow: SUBSCRIBE, NOTIFY, INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, BYE, REFER, INFO, MESSAGE, OPTIONS  
Content-Type: application/sdp  
Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2016 19:23:38 GMT  
Identity: eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9kZWwtY2VydC5leGFtcGxlLm9yZy9wYXNzcG9ydC5jZXIifQo=.eyJkZXN0Ijp74oCcdG7igJ06WyIxMjE1NTU1MTIxMyJdfSwiaWF0IjoxNDcxMzc1NDE4LCJvcmlnIjp74oCcdG7igJ06IjEyMTU1NTUxMjEyIn19Cg==.\_V41ThRJ74MktxeLGaZQGAir8pcIvmB6OQEMgS4Ym7FPwGxm3tDUTRTpQ5X0relYset-EScb9otFNDxOCTjerg ;info=<https://del-cert.example.org/passport.cer>  
Content-Length: 122

v=0  
o=- 13103070023943130 1 IN IP4 10.36.78.177  
s=-

c=IN IP4 10.36.78.177  
t=0 0  
m=audio 54242 RTP/AVP 0  
a=sendrecv

## Delegate Certificate Verification Procedures for Base PASSporTs

A verification service shall verify a base PASSporT defined in [RFC 8225] that is signed with delegate certificate credentials as specified in [RFC 8224]. In addition, the verification service shall verify that the value of the “orig”, “dest”, and “iat” claims of the base PASSporT are as specified in [ATIS-1000074] and [ATIS-1000085].

Verification services can detect when a PASSporT is signed by delegate certificate credentials by observing that the parent to the signing certificate contains a TNAuthList. For example, Figure 4 shows the certification path for two end entity certificates. The end entity certificate on the left is a delegate certificate because its parent contains a TNAuthList extension. The end entity certificate on the right is not a delegate certificate, because its parent certificate does not contain a TNAuthList extension (in this case the end entity certificate is a shaken certificate, since the certificate itself contains a TNAuthList extension with a single SPC value).



Figure 4. Distinguishing between delegate and shaken certificates

When verifying a base PASSporT signed with delegate certificate credentials, verifiers shall determine the validity of the certificate referenced in the “x5u” field in the base PASSporT protected header as specified in section 5.3.1 of [ATIS-1000074], with the following modifications:

* Verify that the certificates in the certification path contain a TNAuthList extension as specified in section 5.3 (e.g., delegate certificates must contain a TNAuthList identifying one or more TNs, the first non-delegate certificate encountered while traversing up the path from the signing certificate must contain a TNAuthList identifying a single SPC value).
* Verify that the PASSporT "orig" TN is within the scope of the signing certificate (i.e., the "orig" TN belongs to the set of TNs identified by the TNAuthList of the signing certificate).
* Verify that the scope of each delegate CA certificate in the certification path encompasses the scope of its child certificate. For example, if the parent of a delegate end entity certificate is itself a delegate certificate, then verifiers must check that the scope of the parent encompasses the scope of the child. However, if the parent of a delegate end entity certificate is not a delegate certificate, then verifiers shall skip the encompassing check (this would be the case where a Subordinate CA obtains a CA certificate from the STI-CA, and then issues child delegate end entity certificates from that CA certificate). These two cases are illustrated in Figure 5.



Figure 5. Determining when to perform scope encompassing checks for delegate certificates

Any failure of the above certificate validation checks shall be treated as a verification failure (response code 437 'unsupported credential').

### Verification of base PASSporTs signed with Delegate Certificate credentials for determining attestation level of “shaken” PASSporTs

Base PASSporTs signed with delegate certificate credentials can be used as an optional mechanism to support the ability for an OSP authentication service to provide “A” level attestation to a “shaken” PASSporT defined by [ATIS-1000074].

A VoIP entity can demonstrate to the signing provider (i.e., the OSP) that it has a verified association with the calling telephone number, and therefore that it has the authority to use the calling TN, by populating the originating INVITE request with an "rcd" PASSporT signed with delegate certificate credentials (as described in [ATIS Standard for RCD PASSporT]). For the case where the VoIP endpoint does not want to convey any rich call data to the called endpoint, it can demonstrate its authority to use the calling TN by providing a base PASSporT signed with delegate certificate credentials, as described in clause 6.1.

If an OSP receives a base or rcd PASSporT in an Identity header of a INVITE request received from a UNI customer, the OSP should attempt to verify the received PASSporT to determine if the originating entity has authority to use the signaled Calling Number.

* If the base or rcd PASSporT verification passes, the OSP authentication service may, based on local policy, interpret this verification result as establishing that the entity populating the PASSporT has a known authenticated identity and an association with the calling TN. Armed with this attestation criteria information, the OSP shall perform the SHAKEN authentication procedures defined in [ATIS-1000074] and may assert an attestation level of Full or "A" attestation. The OSP shall sign the "shaken" PASSporT with SHAKEN certificate credentials [ATIS-1000080] tied to its SPC.
* If the base or rcd PASSporT verification fails, the OSP authentication service should ignore this as input to determine the attestation level of a generated "shaken" PASSporT and follow the standard procedures of [ATIS-1000074] for determining attestation level as described in [ATIS-1000074] and based on local policy.

After the OSP has used the base PASSporT to determine shaken attestation level as described above, it shall discard the base PASSporT and not forward it to the TSP. Absent specification elsewhere, the OSP should apply this same rule for non-base PASSporT types signed with delegate certificate credentials.

1. This document is available from the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS) at: < https://www.atis.org/ >. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Available from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) at: < <https://www.ietf.org/> >. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Available from 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) at: < [https://www.3gpp.org](http://www.3gpp.org) > [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. A TNSP that is also an OSP obtains two types of certificates; CA certificates for certificate delegation, and end entity certificates for SHAKEN authentication. The TNSP can obtain both types of certificates from the same STI-CA (or the same set of STI-CAs). Alternatively, the TNSP could choose to obtain the different certificate types from different STI-CAs. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)