**ATIS IPNNI Task Force**

**December 10, 2019**

**Contribution**

**TITLE: Draft Baseline for ATIS Standard on SIP RPH Signing for Emergency Calling**

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**ISSUE NUMBER:**

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Abstract**

This contribution provides a proposed draft baseline for an ATIS standard describing SIP RPH signing in the context of emergency (9-1-1) calling.

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**ATIS-10000XX**

ATIS Standard on

**Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Resource-Priority Header (RPH) Signing in Support of Emergency Calling**

**Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions**

Approved Month DD, YYYY

**Abstract**

This standard defines how the IETF Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT) Extension for Resource-Priority Authorization (IETF RFC 8443) with the extensions defined in draft-dolly-stir-rph-emergency-services-00 and the associated STIR mechanisms are used to sign the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Resource-Priority Header (RPH) header field and convey assertions of Resource-Priority associated with an emergency call or callback call. Specifically, this standard describes a procedure for providing cryptographic authentication and verification of the information in the SIP RPH field in Internet Protocol (IP)-based service provider communication networks in support of emergency calling.

**Foreword**

The Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS) serves the public through improved understanding between carriers, customers, and manufacturers. The [**COMMITTEE NAME**] Committee [**INSERT MISSION**]. [**INSERT SCOPE**].

The mandatory requirements are designated by the word *shall* and recommendations by the word *should*. Where both a mandatory requirement and a recommendation are specified for the same criterion, the recommendation represents a goal currently identifiable as having distinct compatibility or performance advantages. The word *may* denotes a optional capability that could augment the standard. The standard is fully functional without the incorporation of this optional capability.

Suggestions for improvement of this document are welcome. They should be sent to the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions, [**COMMITTEE NAME**], 1200 G Street NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20005.

At the time of consensus on this document, [**COMMITTEE NAME**], which was responsible for its development, had the following leadership:

[**LEADERSHIP LIST**]

The **[SUBCOMMITTEE NAME]** Subcommittee was responsible for the development of this document.

**Revision History**

| **Date** | **Version** | **Description** | **Author** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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# Scope & Purpose

## Scope

As specified in [RFC4412], the SIP RPH field may be used by SIP user agents, including Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) gateways and terminals, and SIP proxy servers to influence prioritization afforded to communication sessions, including PSTN calls. As discussed in 3GPP [TS 24.229], where the network has a requirement to prioritize emergency calls, it can use the "esnet" namespace in the Resource-Priority header field (as defined in [RFC 7135]) to do so. Where the Resource-Priority header field is used for this purpose, it is inserted by the entity identifying the emergency call, i.e. the P-CSCF or the IBCF. There is no usage of this namespace from the UE, and when this namespace is used, the trust domain implementation is set to remove it if it occurs from the UE

Like caller identity information associated with emergency calls and callback calls, the SIP RPH field could also be spoofed by unauthorized entities impacting Public Safety communications and emergency response Next Generation 9-1-1 (NG9-1-1) Emergency Services Networks receiving SIP RPHs across IP Network-to-Network Interfaces (IPNNIs) from IP originating networks cannot easily determine whether the SIP RPH was populated by an authorized Originating Service Provider or by an unauthorized entity.

This ATIS standard leverages the SHAKEN model specified in [ATIS-1000074] to cryptographically sign and verify the SIP RPH field associated with emergency calls and callback calls using the PASSPorT extension defined in [IETF RFC 8443], with the assertion values described in draft-dolly-stir-rph-emergency-services-00, and the associated Secure Telephone Identity (STI) protocols. Note that application of SIP RPH signing of emergency an callback calls is in addition to the caller identity authentication and verification defined in [ATIS-1000074].

This ATIS standard is intended to provide a framework and guidance on how use the PASSPorT extension defined in [IETF RFC 8443], with the assertion values specified in draft-dolly-stir-rph-emergency-services-00 and the associated STI protocols to cryptographically sign and verify the SIP RPH values associated with emergency calls or callback calls that cross IP NNI boundaries.

The scope of this ATIS standard is limited to the cryptographic signing and verifying SIP RPH field contents associated with emergency and callback calls (i.e., values in the “esnet” namespace). This standard does not address caller identity authentication and verification associated with emergency calls and callback calls, nor does it impact specific call processing or routing procedures associated with emergency calls and callback calls. The display of information associated with the verification of SIP RPH values is also outside the scope of this document

## Purpose

Illegitimate spoofing of SIP RPH values in the “esnet” namespace parameters in the signaling associated with emergency calls and callback calls are a concern for Public Safety. NG9-1-1 System Service Providers will interconnect with multiple Originating Service Providers and will benefit from knowing whether the SIP RPH value received in incoming signaling can be trusted. The purpose of this standard is to provide a framework for cryptographically signing the SIP RPH field and verifying that the SIP RPH field can be trusted to mitigate against unauthorized spoofing or tampering of the information conveyed in the SIP RPH. This framework will leverage the SHAKEN infrastructure for caller identity authentication and verification and will describe how the PASSporT rph extension defined in [IETF RFC 8443], with the assertion values described in draft-dolly-stir-rph-emergency-services-00 can be used for the purpose of providing a trust mechanism for the SIP RPH associated with emergency and callback calls that cross IPNNIs boundaries.

# Normative References

The following standards contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this ATIS Standard. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All standards are subject to revision, and parties to agreements based on this Standard are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the standards indicated below.

Editor’s Note: the draft RFCs below will be changed to the normative RFC numbers when available from IETF.

[IETF RFC 4412], *Communications Resource Priority for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP).*[[1]](#footnote-1)

[3GPP TS 24.229], *Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; IP multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); Stage 3.[[2]](#footnote-2)*

[ATIS-1000074], *ATIS Standard on Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN).*

[IETF RFC 8443], *PASSporT Extension for Resource-Priority Authorization*. 1

[IETF RFC 7135], *Registering a SIP Resource Priority Header Field Namespace for Local Emergency Communications*. 1

[draft-dolly-stir-rph-emergency-services-00], *Assertion Values for a Resource Priority Header Claim in Support of Emergency Services Networks*.1

[IETF RFC 8225], PASSporT: *Personal Assertion Token.*[[3]](#footnote-3)

[IETF RFC 8224], *Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol.*1

[IETF RFC 8226], *Secure Telephone Identity Credentials: Certificates.*1

[IETF RFC 3325], *Private Extensions to SIP for Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks.*1

[IETF RFC 3261], *SIP: Session Initiation Protocol.*1

[IETF RFC 5280], *Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.*1

[IETF RFC 3326], *The Reason Header Field for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP).*1

[3GPP TS 23.228], *3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2.3.2*

[IETF RFC 2616], *Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1*.1

[IETF RFC 5280], *Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile*.1

# Definitions, Acronyms, & Abbreviations

For a list of common communications terms and definitions, please visit the *ATIS Telecom Glossary*, which is located at < <http://www.atis.org/glossary> >.

## Definitions

**Callback Call:** A request whose purpose is to re-contact party that originated an emergency call.

**Emergency Call:** A generic term used to include any type of Request For Emergency Assistance (RFEA). In North America, the 3-digit code “9-1-1” is typically used to facilitate the reporting of an emergency requiring response by a Public Safety agency.

**Next Generation 9-1-1 (NG9-1-1):** An IP-based system comprised of managed IP-based networks (e.g., ESInets), functional elements (applications), and databases that replicate traditional E9-1-1 features and functions, and provide additional capabilities. NG9-1-1 is designed to provide access to emergency services from all connected communications sources, and provide multimedia data capabilities for Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) and other emergency service organizations.

**Resource-Priority Header (RPH):** A SIP header field that may be used by SIP user agents, including Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) gateways and terminals, and SIP proxy servers to influence their treatment of SIP requests, including the priority afforded to PSTN calls.

## Acronyms & Abbreviations

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 3GPP | 3rd Generation Partnership Project |
| ATIS | Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions |
| B2BUA | Back-to-Back User Agent |
| CRL | Certificate Revocation List |
| CSCF | Call Session Control Function |
| CVT | Call Validation Treatment |
| E-CSCF | Emergency Call Session Control Function |
| HTTPS | Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure |
| IBCF | Interconnection Border Control Function |
| I-CSCF | Interrogating Call Session Control Function |
| IETF | Internet Engineering Task Force |
| IMS | IP Multimedia Subsystem |
| IP | Internet Protocol |
| JSON | JavaScript Object Notation |
| JWS | JSON Web Signature |
| LRF | Location Retrieval Function |
| NG9-1-1 | Next Generation 9-1-1 |
| NNI | Network-to-Network Interface |
| OCSP | Online Certificate Status Protocol |
| PASSporT | Persona Assertion Token |
| PBX | Private Branch Exchange |
| P-CSCF | Proxy Call Session Control Function |
| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
| PSAP | Public Safety Answering Point |
| RDF | Routing Determination Function |
| SHAKEN | Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs |
| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
| SKS | Secure Key Store |
| SPID | Service Provider Identifier |
| STI | Secure Telephone Identity |
| STI-AS | Secure Telephone Identity Authentication Service |
| STI-CA | Secure Telephone Identity Certification Authority |
| STI-CR | Secure Telephone Identity Certificate Repository |
| STI-VS | Secure Telephone Identity Verification Service |
| STIR | Secure Telephone Identity Revisited |
| TLS | Transport Layer Security |
| TN | Telephone Number |
| UA | User Agent |
| URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
| UUID | Universally Unique Identifier |
| VoIP | Voice over Internet Protocol |

# Assumptions

This standard makes the following assumptions regarding the application of RPH signing to emergency calls and callback calls:

1. A Resource-Priority Header (RPH) in the ‘esnet’ namespace may or may not be associated with an emergency origination by the P-CSCF in the originating IMS network.
2. Caller Identity assertion/authentication and/or rph signing will be performed by the originating network after it has been determined that the emergency call is to be routed to an NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network.
3. The NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network will be responsible for performing verification of PASSporT information received with an emergency call.
4. Callback calls routed via the NG Emergency Services Network will be marked as “psap-callback” and will contain an RPH with a value of “esnet.0.
5. The NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network will be responsible or performing caller identity attestation/authentication and rph signing on callback calls.
6. Verification of caller ID/rph signing will be performed by the terminating home network for the callback call.
7. A Service Provider can use the same certificates for signing SIP RPH as they use for TN signing, but is not required to do so.
8. SIP RPH signing does not change or modify 9-1-1/callback call processing, signaling and routing procedures; it simply provides a security tool for transit and receiving providers to determine if the SIP RPH is trusted.
9. If validation of the signed Caller Identity or SIP RPH associated with a 9-1-1 origination fails, the 9-1-1 call will be delivered to the PSAP with Caller Identity and SIP RPH, as well as the results of the Caller Identity and RPH verification.

Note: The use of a specific indicator (e.g., ‘verstat’) to convey RPH signing verification success/failure is for further study.

1. If validation of the signed Caller Identity or SIP RPH associated with a callback call fails, terminating Service Provider local policy will determine terminating call processing, such as whether the call should be delivered with Caller Identity and/or SIP RPH information intact. Note that if the call proceeds, a verstat parameter will be included in the associated SIP signaling.
2. Signing of Caller Identity is separate from SIP RPH signing. Separate SIP Identity headers are used for SIP RPH signing and Caller Identity signing.

# Overview

In addition to Caller Identity authentication/verification, 9-1-1 calls and callback calls may also be subject to Resource-Priority Header (RPH) signing. In the context of 9-1-1 calls, a signed RPH received in an incoming INVITE message will convey to an NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network provider that they can trust that the RPH was populated by the originating service provider, as opposed to being inserted by a threat agent. In the context of callback calls, a signed RPH would indicate that the NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network provider asserts that they recognize the call is a callback call and as such that an RPH value in the ‘esnet’ namespace is appropriate. The SHAKEN model specified in ATIS-1000074 can be leveraged to cryptographically sign and verify the SIP RPH field in SIP INVITE messages associated with 9-1-1 and callback calls using the PASSporT extension defined in IETF RFC 8443, including the assertion values described in draft-dolly-stir-rph-emergency-services-00, and the associated Secure Telephone Identity (STI) protocols

The framework specified in this standard supports a trust mechanism for SIP RPH values associated with emergency calls and callback calls crossing IPNNI boundaries. A high-level description of the RPH signing flow supported by the framework specified in this standard is as follows:

For emergency calls:

1. The Originating Service Provider cryptographically signs the SIP RPH if present in the SIP INVITE associated with an emergency (9-1-1) origination before sending the call across an IP NNI boundary. The SIP RPH signing is only performed by an authenticating NS/EP Service Provider (i.e., NS/EP NGN-PS performing authentication of the Service User).
2. The NG9-1-1 System Service Provider verifies the received signed PASSPorT token for the SIP RPH.

For callback calls:

1. The NG9-1-1 System Service Provider cryptographically signs the SIP RPH (unless a signed RPH is received in the SIP INVITE associated with the callback call from the PSAP) before sending the call across an IP NNI boundary to/toward the emergency caller’s home network. If the NG9-1-1 System Service Provider receives a signed RPH in a SIP INVITE from a PSAP associated with a callback call, the NG9-1-1 System Service Provider may validate a signed SIP RPH, but must transparently pass the received Identity header associated with the SIP RPH forward.
2. The emergency caller’s home Service Provider verifies the received signed PASSporT token for the SIP RPH.

## Protocol Support for SIP RPH Signing of Emergency Calls and Callback Calls

This ATIS standard uses the PASSporT “rph” extension specified in [IETF RFC 8443], the attestation values described in draft-dolly-stir-rph-emergency-services-00, and associated STIR protocols for cryptographic signing of the SIP RPH field in support of emergency service calls.

### RFC 8225: PASSporT: Personal Assertion Token

[IETF RFC 8225] defines a token-based signature that combines the use of JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Tokens, JSON Web Signatures, and X.509 certificate key pairs, or Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), to create a trusted signature. The authorized owner of the certificate used to generate the signature can be validated and traced back to the known trust anchor who signed the certificate. The Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT) includes a number of claims the signer of the token is asserting. The associated public certificate is used to verify the digital signature and the claims included in the PASSporT token. The public certificate is also used to validate the entity that signed the token, as defined in [IETF RFC 8226]. The validated claims and the validated identity of the entity signing the claims can both be used to determine the level of trust in the originating entity and their asserted SIP RPH information.

### RFC 8224: Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)

[IETF RFC 8224] defines a SIP-based framework for an authentication service and verification service for using the PASSporT signature in a SIP INVITE. It defines a new Identity header field that delivers the PASSporT signature and other associated parameters. The authentication service adds the Identity header field and signature to the SIP INVITE generated by the originating provider. The INVITE is delivered to the destination provider which uses the verification service to verify the signature using the identity in the P-Asserted-Identity header field or From header field.

### RFC 8443: Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT) Extension for Resource Priority Authorization

[IETF RFC 8443] defines an optional extension to PASSporT and the associated STIR mechanisms to support the signing of the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field. It extends PASSporT to allow cryptographic-signing of the SIP 'Resource-Priority" header field which is used for communications resource prioritization. It also describes how the PASSPorT extension is used in SIP signaling to convey assertions of authorization of the information in the SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field.

the ‘esnet’ namespace will be in addition to the PASSporT object that is used for caller ID attestation. Specifically, assertion of the information in the RPH will involve the inclusion of a “ppt” extension with an “rph” claim in the PASSporT. Based on RFC 8443, a PASSporT header with the "ppt" extension will consist of the following information:

{

"typ":"passport",

"ppt":"rph",

"alg":"ES256",

"x5u":"https://www.example.org/cert.cer"

}

According to RFC 8443, the "rph" claim will provide an assertion of authorization for the information in the SIP RPH. In the context of emergency calls and callback calls, the “rph” claim will provide an assertion of the value of the SIP RPH. Specifically, the "rph" claim includes an assertion of the priority level to be used for a given communication session.

### Assertion Values for a Resource Priority Header Claim in Support of Emergency Services Networks

[draft-dolly-stir-rph-emergency-services-00] adds new assertion values for the Resource Priority Header ("rph") claim defined in RFC 8443, in support of Emergency Services Networks for emergency call origination and callback. Specifically, this specification defines new assertions values for:

* "ESorig": Emergency Services call origination
* "EScallback": Emergency Services callback.

The following is an example of an "rph" claim for SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field with a "ESorig" assertion:

{

"orig":{"tn":"CgPN"},

"dest":{["tn":"911 or URN-SOS"]},

"iat":1443208345,

"rph":{"ESorig":["esnet,x"]}

}

The following is an example of an "rph" claim for SIP 'Resource-Priority' header field with a "ESorig" assertion:

{

"orig":{"tn":"EmergNet Num"},

"dest":{["tn":"CgPN that originated emergency call"]},

"iat":1443208345,

"rph":{"EScallback":["esnet,x"]}

}

After the header and claims PASSporT objects have been constructed, their signature is generated normally per the guidance in [RFC8225] using the full form of PASSporT.

## Governance Model and Certificate Management

The credentials (i.e., Certificate) used to create the signature must have authority over the namespace of the "rph" claim, and there is only one authority per claim. The authority MUST use its credentials associated with the specific service supported by the resource priority namespace in the claim.

The governance model and the management of the credentials (i.e., certificates) used by Originating Service Providers (for emergency originations) and NG9-1-1 System Service Providers (for callback calls) for cryptographic signing of the SIP RPH is not within the scope of this standard.

## Reference Architecture for SIP RPH Signing

Figure 1 shows the reference architecture for SIP RPH signing in the context of emergency originations. The architecture used for signing the SIP RPH associated with emergency originations builds on the calling number authentication/verification architecture supported by 3GPP [TS 24.229] and [23.228] in which an IBCF in an originating network, if configured through operator policies, invokes an AS via the Ms reference point for the signing of attestation and identity information if available in an incoming request. The IBCF then includes the signed information in the outgoing request. In Figure 1, the emergency call is originated from service provider A’s network that performs the authentication service and is terminated in NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network Provide 1’s network, which performs the verification service.

As described in Section V.2.1 of 3GPP [TS 24.229], the Ms reference point is used to request the signing of an Identity header field or to request verification of a signed identity in an Identity header field. The protocol to be used on the Ms Reference Point is HTTP 1.1, as specified in RFC 2616.



Figure – Architecture for Signing SIP RPH of Emergency Originations

The reference architecture includes the following elements:

**IMS Elements:**

* SIP User Agent (SIP UA) – This component represents the originating end point for an emergency origination.
* Proxy Session Control Function (P-CSCF) – This component receives the emergency session establishment request from the UE, detects that it is an emergency session request, and forwards it to the E-CSCF.
* Emergency Call Session Control Function (E-CSCF) – In the context of an originating IMS network the E-CSCF receives the emergency session establishment request from the P-CSCF, obtains location information, obtains routing information, and forwards the emergency session establishment request per the routing information.

In the context of an NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network, the E-CSCF receives the emergency session establishment request from the I-CSCF, queries the LRF for routing information, and forwards the call request toward the appropriate PSAP per the routing information. After initial call routing to the appropriate PSAP, the E-CSCF may or may not remain in the call path per implementation

* Location Retrieval Function (LRF) - The LRF obtains location information for a UE and uses that location to acquire routing information for an emergency session from the Routing Determination Function (RDF).
* Interconnection Border Control Function (IBCF) – This function is at the edge of the service provider network and represents the Network-to-Network Interface (NNI) or peering interconnection point between telephone service providers. It is the ingress and egress point for SIP calls between providers.
* Interrogating Call Session Control Function (I-CSCF) – This component receives emergency call requests from the entry IBCF in an NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network. The I-CSCF forwards the emergency call request to the provisioned (or pre-configured) E-CSCF in the NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network.

**SHAKEN Elements**

* Secure Telephone Identity Authentication Service (STI-AS) – Defined in [ATIS-1000074] as an application server that performs the function of the authentication service defined in RFC 8224 in the context of caller identity authentication.
* Secure Telephone Identity Verification Service (STI-VS) – Defined in [ATIS-1000074] as an application server that performs the function of the verification service defined in RFC 8224 in the context of caller identity verification.
* Call Validation Treatment (CVT) – Defined in [ATIS-1000074] as a logical function that could be an application server function or a third party application for applying anti-spoofing mitigation techniques once the caller identity signature is positively or negatively verified.
* Secure Key Store (SKS) – Defined in [ATIS-1000074] as a highly secure logical element that stores secret private key(s) for the STI-AS to access.
* Certificate Provisioning Service – Defined in [ATIS-1000074] as a logical service used to provision certificate(s) used for STI.
* Secure Telephone Identity Certificate Repository (STI-CR) – Defined in [ATIS-1000074] as a publicly accessible store for public key certificates.

**Public Safety Elements**

* i3 Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) – A PSAP is an entity responsible for receiving emergency (9‑1‑1) calls and processing those calls according to a specific operational policy. An i3 PSAP is a SIP end point (client) that is capable of receiving IP-based signaling and media associated with emergency calls in a manner conformant with NENA i3 standards.

## SIP RPH Signing Call Flow for Emergency Calling

### SIP RPH Signing Call Flow for Emergency Originations



Figure 2 – Emergency Origination SIP RPH Signing Call Flow

1. The originating SIP UA, which first REGISTERs and is authenticated to the P-CSCF, creates a SIP INVITE with a telephone number identity.
2. The P-CSCF in the originating network adds a P-Asserted-Identity header field asserting the Caller ID of the originating SIP UA, and an RPH with value “esnet.1”. The P-CSCF will also include Attestation information consisting of an attestation level and an origination identifier in Attestation-Info headers associated with the Caller ID and the RPH. The P-CSCF passes the SIP INVITE to the E-CSCF.
3. The E-CSCF sends the INVITE to the LRF to determine routing instructions.
4. The LRF acquires location, if required, and queries the RDF for the routing URI.
5. The LRF returns the routing URI to the E-CSCF.
6. If the emergency call is to be routed to an NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network, the E-CSCF forwards the emergency call to the exit IBCF.
7. The exit IBCF sends an HTTP signingRequest over the Ms reference point to the STI-AS/RPH-AS. The signingRequest includes an “attest” parameter that contains the attestation information received by the IBCF in Attestation-Info parameters in the SIP INVITE, as well as other PASSporT information (i.e., “orig”, “dest”, and “rph” claims and iat and origid).[[4]](#footnote-4)

NOTE: The STI-AS must be invoked after originating call processing.

1. The RPH-AS function within/associated with the STI-AS in the originating SP (i.e., Service Provider A) determines through service provider-specific means the legitimacy of the content of the caller identity and the RPH field (i.e., the value in the “esnet” namespace) sent to it in the HTTP signingRequest. The STI-AS then securely requests its private key from the SKS.
2. The SKS provides the private key in the response, and the STI-AS signs and adds Identity header fields per [IETF RFC 8224].
3. The STI-AS returns a signed Identity header field value for the caller identity and a signed Identity header field value for the RPH in JSON objects.
4. The IBCF routes the SIP INVITE (with the Identity headers) over the NNI using standard inter-domain routing resolution.
5. Upon receiving the SIP INVITE, the ingress IBCF in the NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network sends an HTTP verificationRequest to the STI-VS (RPH-AS). The verificationRequest includes an identityHeader claim for each Identity header received, as well as the “to” parameter containing the destination identity from the To header, the “from” parameter containing the asserted identity from the From or P-Asserted-Identity, and a “time” parameter based on the Date header field in the incoming request.

NOTE: The STI-VS must be invoked before terminating call processing.

1. The terminating SP STI-VS determines the STI-CR Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) and makes an HTTPS request to the STI-CR as per [ATIS-1000074].
2. The STI-VS (RPH-VS) validates the certificate and then extracts the public key as per [ATIS-1000074]. It constructs the RFC 8224 format and uses the public key to verify the signature in the Identity header fields, which validate the caller identity and RPH field used when signing the INVITE on the originating service provider STI-AS (RPH-AS).
3. The STI-VS (RPH-VS) may interact with the CVT based on local policy and agreements between the 9-1-1 Authority and the analytics/CVT provider.
4. The STI-VS (RPH-VS) returns a verificationResponse to the ingress IBCF. The verificationResponse contains a “verstatValue” that contains the result of the verification process.

NOTE: The use of “verstat” values specific to RPH signing is for further study. If a separate “verstat” value associated with verification of the RPH is defined, the verificationResponse message will need to be able to carry multiple “verstatValues”.

1. The ingress IBCF passes the INVITE to the I- CSCF in the NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network.
2. The I-CSCF passes the INVITE to the pre-configured E-CSCF.
3. The E-CSCF forwards the SIP INVITE to the LRF.
4. The LRF queries the RDF using the location information received in the INVITE message and the emergency service URN (urn:service:sos). The RDF returns a route URI. In this example, the route URI is associated with an i3 PSAP that is served by the NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network.
5. The LRF redirects the call back to the E-CSCF, passing the Route (PSAP) URI.
6. The E-CSCF generates an outgoing INVITE message, using the information received from the LRF as well as information received in the initial INVITE message, and forwards it to the (egress) IBCF.
7. The (egress) IBCF forwards the SIP INVITE to the i3 PSAP with the appropriate “verstat” value(s), and normal call processing associated with the emergency origination continues.

### SIP RPH Signing Call Flow for Callback Calls

To be provided

# Procedures for SIP RPH Signing

This section will detail the procedures at key elements in the architecture that play a role in attesting, signing and verifying the information in the SIP RPH field in the context of emergency calling.

## Procedures at the IBCF

The IBCF shall adhere to Clauses 4 and 5.10 in 3GPP [TS 24.229] with additions as noted below. For emergency originations, an IBCF will be the exit point from the Originating Service Provider network and the entry point to the NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network. For emergency originations there will also be an exit point IBCF between the NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network and the PSAP. For callback calls, there will be an IBCF at the entry point of the NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network facing the PSAP and an IBCF that will be the exit point from the NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network to the interconnected network. There will also be an IBCF at the entry point into an interconnected network.

### Entry Point IBCF

For emergency (9-1-1) originations, the entry point IBCF associated with the NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network will perform normal border control functions. As described in Section 5.10.10.2 of 3GPP TS 24.229, when receiving an initial INVITE request containing one or more SIP Identity header fields, the IBCF shall determine the originating identity to be verified by decoding the Identity header field containing a PASSporT SHAKEN JSON Web Token. While not yet addressed in TS 24.229, the IBCF shall also determine the RPH value to be verified by decoding the Identity header associated with the signed RPH. The IBCF will then build and send a verificationRequest to the STI-VS/RPH-VS over the Ms reference point. Upon receiving a verificationResponse with a “verstatValue” parameter reflecting the verification status of the Identity header associated with calling identity, the IBCF will add this parameter to the verified identity in the SIP From header field or the SIP P-Asserted-Identity header field in the forwarded SIP request. Whether a specific “verstatValue” reflecting the verification status of the Identity header associated with the signed RPH, and how that will be reflected in the outgoing SIP INVITE are for further study.

Once the IBCF validates the received SIP message and receives the results from the STI-VS, it will forward the SIP INVITE to the I-CSCF. As the first active SIP element in an NG9 1 1 Emergency Services Network in the path of an emergency call, the IBCF must add the Call Identifier, Incident Tracking Identifier, and a Resource-Priority header set to “esnet.1” (if not already present) to the SIP INVITE message associated with the emergency call. The entry point IBCF will ensure that the Resource Priority Header is set to esnet.1 to indicate an emergency call.

For callback calls, the entry point IBCF in the NG9-1-1 Emergency Service Network (i.e., the IBCF facing the PSAP) will perform normal border control functions, and once the message is validated, it will forward the SIP INVITE to the Transit Function. As the first active SIP element in an NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network in the path of a callback call, the IBCF must add a Resource-Priority header set to “esnet.0” (if not already present) to the SIP INVITE message associated with the callback call.

For callback calls, the entry point IBCF in the interconnected network (i.e., the Service Provider network interconnected to the NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network via the IP NNI) will perform normal border control functions, and once the message is validated, it will forward the SIP INVITE based on normal routing procedures.

### Exit Point IBCF

For an emergency (9-1-1) origination, the exit point IBCF in the Originating Service Provider network will interact with an STI-AS/RPH-AS via the Ms reference point for the signing of attestation and identity and RPH information, if available in an incoming request. Specifically, the exit point IBCF sends an HTTP signingRequest over the Ms reference point to the STI-AS/RPH-AS. The signingRequest includes the claims included in a PASSporT SHAKEN JSON Web Token, specified in [RFC 8224] (i.e., “orig” and “dest”, claims, iat and origid) an “attest” parameter that contains the attestation information received by the IBCF in Attestation-Info parameters in the SIP INVITE, as well as an “rph” claim as described in [RFC 8443] with the enhancements described in [draft-dolly-stir-rph-emergency-services-00]. The IBCF then includes the signed Identity headers received in the HTTP signingResponse in the outgoing request.

For an emergency (9-1-1) origination, the exit point IBCF in the NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network shall use the Route header to determine where to forward the SIP INVITE (e.g., to the NENA i3 PSAP). The IBCF shall pass all headers and message bodies unless passing of the parameters is prohibited with its role as a border gateway function.

In support of callback calls, the exit point IBCF in the NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network shall use the Route header to determine the well-known URI associated with the interconnected network. The IBCF shall pass all headers and message bodies unless passing of the parameters is prohibited with its role as a border gateway function.

## Procedures at the STI-AS

In the context of emergency (9-1-1) originations, the STI-AS/RPH-AS will receive an HTTP signingRequest from the IBCF that contains the attestation information and PASSporT claims (i.e., “orig”, “dest”, and rph claims, iat and origid). The STI-AS/RPH-AS determines through service provider-specific means the legitimacy of the content of the caller identity and the RPH field (i.e., the value in the “esnet” namespace), then securely requests its private key from the SKS. Upon receiving the private key from the SKS, the STI-AS/RPH-AS signs and returns to the IBCF an Identity header field value for the caller identity and an Identity header field value for the RPH in JSON objects in a signingResponse message.

In the context of callback calls, the STI-AS/RPH-AS will receive SIP INVITE messages associated a callback call from a Transit Function and will be responsible for determining, through service provider-specific means, the legitimacy of the telephone number identity and RPH being used in the INVITE. The STI-AS is then responsible for cryptographically signing the PASSporT and adding Identity header fields and signatures (corresponding the Caller ID and RPH) to the SIP INVITE that it returns to the Transit Function.

## Procedures at the STI-VS

The STI-VS is an application server the performs the function of the verification service defined in RFC 8224. In the context emergency calling, the STI-VS provides verification services applicable to emergency calls destined for PSAPs that are served by an NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network. Upon receiving an HTTP verificationRequest associated with an emergency (9-1-1) origination from an ingress IBCF in the NG9-1-1 Emergency Services Network, the STI-VS retrieves the certificate referenced by the “x5u” field in the PASSporT protected header from the STI-CR. The STI-VS follows the basic certificate path processing as described in [RFC 5280], following the chain until the root is reached. The STI-VS ensures that the root certificate is on the list of trusted STI-CAs. The STI-VS validates that the PASSporT information provided in the Identity headers contained in the verificationRequest includes all of the baseline claims, as well as the SHAKEN extension claims and rph claim. The verifier shall also follow the RFC 8224-defined verification procedures to check the corresponding date, originating identity and destination identities, with the restrictions specified in ATIS-1000074. The STI-VS will return the “verstatValue” parameter in the HTTP verificationResponse to convey the results of the verification. The STI-VS may include another appropriate indicator (not defined in this document) in the verificationResponse based on interactions with the CVT. The STI-VS must be invoked prior to terminating call processing associated with the emergency call.

**Note**: The conveyance of an indicator (e.g., ‘verstat’) associated with RPH signing verification success/failure is for further study.

## Procedures at the P-CSCF

A P-CSCF operating in an Originating Service Provider network that supports calling number authentication and RPH signing will be responsible for inserting attestation information related to the calling identity and RPH in a SIP INVITE associated with an emergency origination. According to 3GPP [TS 24.229], when a node performs attestation of an identity in an incoming request or can attest the origin of the request, the node can inform a downstream node about what kind of attestation the node has performed. In the context of emergency (9-1-1) originations, a P-CSCF is the element in the call path that will be in the best position to attest to the caller identity and RPH. The P-CSCF will therefore insert an Attestation-Info header field in the SIP INVITE with a value of "A", "B" or "C", as defined in [ATIS-1000074], associated with the caller identity and with the RPH, as well as an origination identifier (in the form of a UUID) in an Origination-Id header field.

1. Available from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) at: < <https://www.ietf.org/> >. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This document is available from the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) at:   
   < <http://www.3gpp.org/specs/specs.htm> >. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The HTTP interface used over the Ms interface needs to be enhanced to support the conveyance of the “rph” claim and associated attestation values. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)