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ATIS Standard on

**Errata to Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN):
Governance Model and Certificate Management**

**Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions**

Approved date

**Abstract**

Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN) is an industry framework for managing and deploying Secure Telephone Identity (STI) technologies with the purpose of providing end-to-end cryptographic authentication and verification of the telephone identity and other information in an IP-based service provider voice network. This specification expands the SHAKEN framework, introducing a governance model and defining X.509 certificate management procedures. Certificate management provides mechanisms for validation of a certificate and verification of the associated digital signature, allowing for the identification of illegitimate use of national telecommunications infrastructure.

**Foreword**

The Alliance for Telecommunication Industry Solutions (ATIS) serves the public through improved understanding between providers, customers, and manufacturers. The Packet Technologies and Systems Committee (PTSC) develops and recommends standards and technical reports related to services, architectures, and signaling, in addition to related subjects under consideration in other North American and international standards bodies. PTSC coordinates and develops standards and technical reports relevant to telecommunications networks in the U.S., reviews and prepares contributions on such matters for submission to U.S. International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Sector (ITU-T) and U.S. ITU Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R) Study Groups or other standards organizations, and reviews for acceptability or per contra the positions of other countries in related standards development and takes or recommends appropriate actions.

The SIP Forum is an IP communications industry association that engages in numerous activities that promote and advance SIP-based technology, such as the development of industry recommendations, the SIPit, SIPconnect-IT, and RTCWeb-it interoperability testing events, special workshops, educational seminars, and general promotion of SIP in the industry. The SIP Forum is also the producer of the annual SIP Network Operators Conference (SIPNOC), focused on the technical requirements of the service provider community. One of the Forum's notable technical activities is the development of the SIPconnect Technical Recommendation – a standards-based SIP trunking recommendation for direct IP peering and interoperability between IP Private Branch Exchanges (PBXs) and SIP-based service provider networks. Other important Forum initiatives include work in Video Relay Service (VRS) interoperability, security, Network-to-Network Interoperability (NNI), and SIP and IPv6.

Suggestions for improvement of this document are welcome. They should be sent to the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions, PTSC, 1200 G Street NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20005, and/or to the SIP Forum, 733 Turnpike Street, Suite 192, North Andover, MA, 01845.

The mandatory requirements are designated by the word *shall* and recommendations by the word *should*. Where both a mandatory requirement and a recommendation are specified for the same criterion, the recommendation represents a goal currently identifiable as having distinct compatibility or performance advantages. The word *may* denotes an optional capability that could augment the standard. The standard is fully functional without the incorporation of this optional capability.

The **ATIS/SIP Forum IP-NNI Task Force** under the **ATIS** **Packet Technologies and Systems Committee (PTSC)** and the **SIP Forum** **Technical Working Group (TWG)** was responsible for the development of this document.

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# Scope & Purpose

## Scope

This document expands the Signature-based Handling of Asserted Information using Tokens (SHAKEN) [ATIS-1000074] framework, introducing a governance model and defining certificate management procedures for Secure Telephone Identity (STI) technologies. The certificate management procedures identify the functional entities and protocols involved in the distribution and management of STI Certificates. The governance model identifies functional entities that have the responsibility to establish policies and procedures to ensure that only authorized entities are allowed to administer digital certificates within Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) networks. However, the details of these functional entities in terms of regulatory control and who establishes and manages those entities are outside the scope of this document.

## Purpose

This document introduces a governance model, certificate management architecture, and related protocols to the SHAKEN framework [ATIS-1000074]. The governance model defines recommended roles and relationships, such that the determination of who is authorized to administer and use digital certificates in VoIP networks can be established. This model includes sufficient flexibility to allow specific regulatory requirements to be implemented and evolved over time, minimizing dependencies on the underlying mechanisms for certificate management. The certificate management architecture is based on the definition of roles similar to those defined in “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile”, [Internet Engineering Task Force](http://www.ietf.org/rfc.html) (IETF) [RFC 5280]. Per the SHAKEN framework, the certificates themselves are based on X.509 with specific policy extensions based on [RFC 8226]. The objective of this document is to provide recommendations and requirements for implementing the protocols and procedures for certificate management within the SHAKEN framework.

# Normative References

The following standards contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Standard. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All standards are subject to revision, and parties to agreements based on this Standard are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the standards indicated below.

ATIS-1000074, *Signature-based Handling of Asserted Information using Tokens (SHAKEN).*[[1]](#footnote-1)

ATIS-0300251, *Codes for Identification of Service Providers for Information Exchange.*[[2]](#footnote-2)

ATIS-1000054*, ATIS Technical Report on Next Generation Network Certificate Management.[[3]](#footnote-3)*

draft-ietf-acme-acme, *Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME).*4

draft-ietf-acme-authority-token, *ACME Challenges Using an Authority Token.*4

draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist, *TNAuthList profile of ACME Authority Token.*4

RFC 2986, *PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7.*4

RFC 3261, *SIP: Session Initiation Protocol.*4

RFC 3966, *The tel URI for Telephone Numbers.*4

RFC 4949, *Internet Security Glossary, Version 2.*4

RFC 5246, *The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2.*4

RFC 5280, *Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.*4

RFC 5958, *Asymmetric Key Package.*4

RFC 6749, *The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework.*4

RFC 6960, *Online Certificate Status Protocol (OSCP).*4

RFC 7159, *The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON).*4

RFC 7231, *Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content.*4

RFC 7375, *Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model.*4

RFC 7515, *JSON Web Signatures (JWS).*4

RFC 7516, *JSON Web Algorithms (JWA).*4

RFC 7517, *JSON Web Key (JWK).*4

RFC 7519, *JSON Web Token (JWT).*4

RFC 8224, *Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol*.4

RFC 8225, *Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT)*.4

RFC 8226, *Secure Telephone Identity Credentials: Certificates.*4

# Definitions, Acronyms, & Abbreviations

For a list of common communications terms and definitions, please visit the *ATIS Telecom Glossary*, which is located at < <http://www.atis.org/glossary> >.

## Definitions

The following provides some key definitions used in this document. Refer to IETF RFC 4949 for a complete Internet Security Glossary, as well as tutorial material for many of these terms.

**Caller ID:** The originating or calling party’s telephone number used to identify the caller carried either in the P-Asserted-Identity or From header fields in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC 3261] messages.

**(Digital) Certificate:** Binds a public key to a Subject (e.g., the end-entity). A certificate document in the form of a digital data object (a data object used by a computer) to which is appended a computed digital signature value that depends on the data object. [RFC 4949]. See also STI Certificate.

**Certification Authority (CA):** An entity that issues digital certificates (especially X.509 certificates) and vouches for the binding between the data items in a certificate. [RFC 4949].

**Certificate Validation:** An act or process by which a certificate user established that the assertions made by a certificate can be trusted. [RFC 4949].

**Certificate Revocation List (CRL):** A data structure that enumerates digital certificates that have been invalidated by their issuer prior to when they were scheduled to expire. [RFC 4949].

**Chain of Trust:** Deprecated term referring to the chain of certificates to a Trust Anchor. Synonym for Certification Path or Certificate Chain. [RFC 4949].

**Certificate Chain:** See Certification Path.

**Certification Path:** A linked sequence of one or more public-key certificates, or one or more public-key certificates and one attribute certificate, that enables a certificate user to verify the signature on the last certificate in the path, and thus enables the user to obtain (from that last certificate) a certified public key, or certified attributes, of the system entity that is the subject of that last certificate.Synonym for Certificate Chain. [RFC 4949].

**Certificate Policy (CP):** A named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements. [RFC 3647].

**Certification Practice Statement (CPS):** A statement of the practices that a certification authority employs in issuing, managing, revoking, and renewing or re-keying certificates. [RFC 3647].

**Certificate Signing Request (CSR):** A CSR is sent to a CA to request a certificate. A CSR contains a Public Key of the end-entity that is requesting the certificate.

**Company Code:** A unique four-character alphanumeric code (NXXX) assigned to all Service Providers [ATIS-0300251].

**End-Entity:** An entity that participates in the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Usually a Server, Service, Router, or a Person. In the context of SHAKEN, it is the Service Provider on behalf of the originating endpoint.

**Fingerprint:** A hash result ("key fingerprint") used to authenticate a public key or other data [RFC 4949].

**Identity:** Unless otherwise qualified (see, for example, Telephone Identity below), an identifier that unambiguously distinguishes an entity for authentication and other security and policy application purposes. In this report, a Service Provider Code is an example of the identity of one kind of participant in the certificate management process.

**National/Regional Regulatory Authority (NRRA):** A governmental entity responsible for the oversight/regulation of the telecommunication networks within a specific country or region.

NOTE: Region is not intended to be a region within a country (e.g., a region is not a state within the US).

**POST-as-GET**: An HTTP POST Request containing a JWS body as defined by [draft-ietf-acme-acme], where the payload of the JWS is a zero-length octet string.

**Private Key:** In asymmetric cryptography, the private key is kept secret by the end-entity. The private key can be used for both encryption and decryption [RFC 4949].

**Public Key:** The publicly disclosable component of a pair of cryptographic keys used for asymmetric cryptography [RFC 4949].

**Public Key Infrastructure (PKI):** The set of hardware, software, personnel, policy, and procedures used by a CA to issue and manage certificates [RFC 4949].

**Root CA**: A CA that is directly trusted by an end-entity. See also Trust Anchor CA and Trusted CA [RFC 4949].

**Secure Telephone Identity (STI) Certificate:** A public key certificate used by a service provider to sign and verify the PASSporT.

**Service Provider Code:** In the context of this document, this term refers to any unique identifier that is allocated by a Regulatory and/or administrative entity to a service provider. In the US and Canada this would be aCompany Code as defined in [ATIS-0300251].

**Service Provider Code (SPC) Token:** An authority token that can be used by a SHAKEN Service Provider during the ACME certificate ordering process to demonstrate authority over the identity information contained in the TN Authorization List extension of the requested STI certificate. The SPC Token complies with the structure of the TNAuthList Authority Token defined by [draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist], but with the restriction for SHAKEN where the TNAuthList value contained in the token’s "atc" claim identifies a single Service Provider Code.

**Signature:** Created by signing the message using the private key. It ensures the identity of the sender and the integrity of the data [RFC 4949].

**Telephone Identity:** An identifier associated with an originator of a telephone call. In the context of the SHAKEN framework, this is a SIP identity (e.g., a SIP URI or a TEL URI) from which a telephone number can be derived.

**Trust Anchor:** An established point of trust (usually based on the authority of some person, office, or organization) from which a certificate user begins the validation of a certification path. The combination of a trusted public key and the name of the entity to which the corresponding private key belongs. [RFC 4949].

**Trust Anchor CA:** A CA that is the subject of a trust anchor certificate or otherwise establishes a trust anchor key. See also Root CA and Trusted CA [RFC 4949].

**Trusted CA:** A CA upon which a certificate user relies for issuing valid certificates; especially a CA that is used as a trust anchor CA [RFC 4949].

**Trust Model:** Describes how trust is distributed from Trust Anchors.

## Acronyms & Abbreviations

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ACME | Automated Certificate Management Environment (Protocol) |
| ASCII | American Standard Code for Information Interchange |
| AoR | Address-of-Record |
| ATIS | Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions |
| CA | Certification Authority |
| CORS | Cross-Origin Resource Sharing |
| CP | Certificate Policy |
| CPS | Certification Practice Statement |
| CRL | Certificate Revocation List |
| CSR | Certificate Signing Request |
| DER | Distinguished Encoding Rules |
| DN | Distinguished Name |
| DNS | Domain Name System |
| ECDSA | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm |
| HTTPS | Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure |
| IETF | [Internet Engineering Task Force](http://www.ietf.org/rfc.html) |
| JDK | Java Development Kit |
| JSON | JavaScript Object Notation |
| JWA | JSON Web Algorithms |
| JWK | JSON Web Key |
| JWS | JSON Web Signature |
| JWT | JSON Web Token |
| NECA | National Exchange Carrier Association |
| NNI | Network-to-Network Interface |
| NRRA | National/Regional Regulatory Authority |
| OAuth | Open Authentication (Protocol) |
| OCN | Operating Company Number |
| PASSporT | Personal Assertion Token |
| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
| PKIX | Public Key Infrastructure for X.509 Certificates |
| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
| SHAKEN | Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs |
| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
| REST | Representational State Transfer |
| SKS | Secure Key Store |
| SMI | Structure of Management Information |
| SP | Service Provider |
| SP-KMS | SP Key Management Server |
| STI | Secure Telephone Identity |
| STI-AS | Secure Telephone Identity Authentication Service |
| STI-CA | Secure Telephone Identity Certification Authority |
| STI-CR | Secure Telephone Identity Certificate Repository |
| STI-GA | Secure Telephone Identity Governance Authority |
| STI-PA | Secure Telephone Identity Policy Administrator |
| STI-VS | Secure Telephone Identity Verification Service |
| STIR | Secure Telephone Identity Revisited |
| TLS | Transport Layer Security |
| TN | Telephone Number |
| URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
| VoIP | Voice over Internet Protocol |

# Overview

This document introduces a governance model and defines certificate management procedures for the SHAKEN framework [ATIS-1000074]. The SHAKEN framework establishes an end-to-end architecture that allows an originating Service Provider to authenticate and assert a telephone identity and provides for the verification of this telephone identity by a terminating service provider. The SHAKEN framework defines a profile, using protocols standardized in the IETF Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) Working Group (WG). This document provides recommendations and requirements for implementing these IETF specifications, [RFC 8225], [RFC8224], and [RFC 8226], to support management of Service Provider-level certificates within the SHAKEN framework.

The SHAKEN framework uses X.509 certificates, as defined in “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile”, IETF [RFC 5280], to verify the digital signatures associated with SIP identifiers. Specifically, SHAKEN uses STI certificates that support the TN Authorization List extension defined in [RFC 8226].

The governance model is described in clause 5 of this document. Clause 6 then defines the protocols and procedures used to create and manage STI certificates using the recommended governance model where there is a central policy administrator who authorizes Service Providers to acquire certificates from trusted Certification Authorities (CAs).

# SHAKEN Governance Model

This clause introduces a governance model to support STI, defining two new functional entities: an STI Governance Authority (STI-GA) and an STI Policy Administrator (STI-PA). Clause 5.1 defines baseline requirements that lead to this model, and clause 5.2 defines the roles and responsibilities of these functional elements and the relationship of the STI-PA to the STI Certification Authority (STI-CA) and Service Provider.

## Requirements for Governance of STI Certificate Management

The governance, creation, and management of certificates to support STI introduce the following requirements:

1. A PKI infrastructure to manage and issue the STI certificates, including a trust model.
2. A mechanism to authorize Service Providers to be issued STI certificates.
3. An entity to define the policies and procedures around who can acquire STI certificates.
4. An entity to establish policies around who can manage the PKI and issue STI certificates.
5. An entity to apply the policies and procedures established for STI certificate management.

Clause 5.2 defines a certificate governance model to support these requirements.

## Certificate Governance: Roles & Responsibilities

The SHAKEN governance model for STI certificate management is illustrated in the following diagram.



Figure 5.1 – Governance Model for Certificate Management

This diagram identifies the following roles associated with governance and STI certificate management:

* Secure Telephone Identity Governance Authority (STI-GA).
* Secure Telephone Identity Policy Administrator (STI-PA).
* Secure Telephone Identity Certification Authority (STI-CA).
* Service Provider (SP).

The STI-GA serves in an oversight role for the policies established or endorsed by a National/Regional Regulatory Authority (NRRA). The SHAKEN governance model assumes there is only one STI-GA for a given country or region.

The STI-GA is responsible for:

* Defining the policies and procedures governing which entities can acquire STI certificates.
* Establishing policies governing which entities can manage the PKI and issue STI certificates.

There is a relationship required between the STI-GA and the STI-PA as the latter serves in a policy enforcement role for the policies defined by the former. The STI-GA role satisfies requirements 3 and 4 in clause 5.1. The STI-PA role satisfies requirement 5 in clause 5.1. The STI-GA and the STI-PA are defined as distinct roles in this model, though in practice both roles could be performed by a single entity.

NOTE: The details of the policies and procedures defined by the STI-GA and enforced by the STI-PA are outside the scope of this document.

This document specifies the protocols and message flows between the STI-PA, the Service Providers, and STI-CAs to support the issuance and management of certificates to support STI, satisfying the first two requirements identified in clause 5.1. The following clauses summarize the roles and responsibilities of these functional elements within the SHAKEN framework.

### Secure Telephone Identity Policy Administrator (STI-PA)

The STI-PA serves in a policy enforcement role and is entrusted by the STI-GA to apply the defined rules and policies to confirm that Service Providers are authorized to request STI certificates and to authorize STI-CAs to issue STI certificates.

The STI-PA manages an active, secure list of approved STI-CAs in the form of their public key certificates. The STI-PA provides this list of approved STI-CAs to the service providers via a Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) interface as specified in clause 7 of [ATIS-1000084]. The SHAKEN-defined Secure Telephone Identity Verification Service (STI-VS) can then use a public key certificate to validate the root of the digital signature in the STI certificate by determining whether the STI-CA that issued the STI certificate is in the list of approved STI-CAs.

The STI-PA also issues Service Provider Code (SPC) Tokens to SHAKEN Service Providers. The STI-PA maintains a distinct X.509 based PKI for digitally signing these SPC tokens. The SP uses the SPC Token during the ACME certificate ordering process to demonstrate to the issuing STI-CA that the SP has authority over the scope of the requested STI certificate. The mechanism by which the SP acquires the SPC token from the STI-PA is described in clause 6.3.4.2, while the structure of the SPC Token is described in clause 6.3.4.1.

The trust model for SHAKEN defines the STI-PA as the Trust Anchor for this token-based mechanism for validation of Service Providers within a national/regional administrative domain. For example, all STI certificates for the SPC tokens in the United States would be associated with a single STI-PA Trust Anchor. Other countries could have a different Trust Anchor.

### Secure Telephone Identity Certification Authority (STI-CA)

In the X.509 model, the STI-CA serves as the Root CA for the STI certificates used to digitally sign and verify telephone calls. The STI-CA provides the service of issuing valid STI certificates to the validated SPs. There will likely be a number of STI-CAs, supporting specific or multiple SPs, depending upon the SP. It is also worth noting that although the STI-CA and Service Provider are distinct roles, it would also be possible for a Service Provider to establish an internal STI-CA for its own use under the authority of the STI-PA.

In the North American telephone network, it is anticipated that the number of entities that would serve as STI-CAs is relatively small. However, this framework and architecture does not impose a specific limit.

### Service Provider (SP)

The Service Provider obtains STI certificates from the STI-CA to create signatures authenticating itself as the signing entity and protecting the integrity of the identity header field. The SP can obtain STI certificates from any approved STI-CA in the list of approved CAs, which is received from the STI-PA. During account registration with the STI-PA, as detailed in clause 6.3.3, the SP selects the preferred STI-CA(s). During the verification process by the STI-VS, the SP checks that the STI-CA that issued the STI certificate is in the list of approved STI-CAs received from the STI-PA.

In the context of the SHAKEN framework, STI certificates are not required for each originating telephone identity but rather, the same STI certificates can be used by a given SP to sign requests associated with multiple originators and SIP requests. The key aspect is that the identity-related information in the SIP requests is authenticated by the originating Service Provider and can be verified by the terminating Service Provider. Information contained within the Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT) in the SIP messages, attesting to a Service Provider’s knowledge of specific telephone identities that the terminating SP can use to determine specific handling for a call. Details for the attestation are provided in [ATIS-1000074].

The SHAKEN certificate management framework is based on using a signed Service Provider Code token for validation when requesting an STI certificate. Prior to requesting a certificate, the SP requests a Service Provider Code token from the STI-PA as described in clause 6.3.4.2. When an SP applies to the STI-CA for issuance of a new STI certificate, the SP proves to the STI-CA that it has been validated and is eligible to receive an STI certificate via the use of the Service Provider Code token that is received from the STI-PA. Clause 6.3.5.2, steps 3, 4 and 5, provide the details of the SP validation mechanism.

# SHAKEN Certificate Management

Management of certificates for Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC 5246] and HTTPS [RFC 7231] based transactions on the Internet is a fairly well-defined and common practice for website and Internet applications. Generally, there are recognized certification authorities that can "vouch" for the authenticity of a domain owner based on out-of-band validation techniques such as e-mail and unique codes in the Domain Name System (DNS).

The certificate management model for SHAKEN is based on Internet best practices for PKI [ATIS-1000054] to the extent possible. The model is modified where appropriate to reflect unique characteristics of the service provider-based telephone network. STI certificates are initially expected to take advantage of service providers’ recognized ability to legitimately assert telephone identities on a VoIP network. The fundamental requirements for SHAKEN certificate management are identified in clause 6.1. Clause 6.2 describes the functional elements added to the SHAKEN framework architecture to support certificate management. Clause 6.3 details the steps and procedures for the issuance of STI certificates.

## Requirements for SHAKEN Certificate Management

This clause details the fundamental functionality required for SHAKEN certificate management. An automated mechanism for certificate management is preferred and includes the following fundamental functional requirements:

1. A mechanism to determine the STI-Certification Authorities (STI-CAs) that can be used when requesting STI certificates.
2. A procedure for registering with the STI-CA.
3. A process to request issuance of STI certificates.
4. A mechanism to validate the requesting Service Provider.
5. A process for adding public key STI certificates to a Certificate Repository.
6. A mechanism to renew/update STI certificates.
7. A mechanism to revoke STI certificates.

In terms of certificate issuance, the primary difference between Web PKI and the requirements for STI is the procedure to validate that the entity requesting a certificate is authorized to acquire STI certificates. Existing mechanisms for Web PKI, including the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol, rely on DNS or e-mail. SHAKEN uses a Service Provider Code token mechanism as described in clause 6.3.4.

## SHAKEN Certificate Management Architecture

The following figure represents the recommended certificate management architecture for SHAKEN.

 

Figure 6.1 – SHAKEN Certificate Management Architecture

The above SHAKEN certificate management architecture introduces the following additional elements:

* Service Provider Key Management Server (SP-KMS) – The service provider’s server that generates private/public key pair for signing, requests and receives a token from the STI-PA, requests an STI certificate from the STI-CA, and receives the STI-CA signed public key certificate.
* Secure Key Store (SKS) – The store for private keys used by the originating service provider Authentication Service.
* Secure Telephone Identity Certificate Repository (STI-CR) – The HTTPS server that hosts the public key certificates used by the destination service provider’s Verification Service to validate signatures.

## SHAKEN Certificate Management Process

This clause describes the detailed process for acquiring a signed public key certificate. It is based on an automated approach using the ACME protocol. Readers can also refer to Appendix A which illustrates an example of the steps for certificate creation and validation using openSSL.

Clause 6.3.1 lists the necessary functions in the process and provides a high-level flow. Subsequent clauses describe the specific details for using the ACME protocol for each of the STI certificate management functions.

### SHAKEN Certificate Management Flow

This clause describes the detailed STI certificate management process and the interaction model between the Service Provider, the STI-PA, and the STI-CA for acquiring STI certificates.

The SHAKEN certificate management process encompasses the following high-level process functions that will be performed by the Service Provider and are detailed in the subsequent clauses of the document:

* STI-PA Account Registration and Service Provider Authorization.
* STI-CA Account Creation.
* Service Provider Code token acquisition.
* Application for a Public Key Certificate.
* STI certificate acquisition.
* Lifecycle Management of STI certificates (including Revocation).

The certificate management process follows two main flows:

1. The STI-PA has a two-party Open Authentication (Protocol) (OAuth) [RFC 6749]-style HTTP interface with the Service Provider in order to provide a token the Service Provider can use for authorization by the STI-CA when requesting a certificate.

NOTE: Per clause 5.2.1, the STI-PA maintains a list of approved STI-CAs that are authorized to create STI certificates.

1. The Service Provider uses the ACME [draft-ietf-acme-acme] protocol for interfacing to the STI-CA for the acquisition of STI certificates. ACME is a Representational State Transfer (REST) services-based request and response protocol that uses HTTPS as a transport.

Typical HTTP caching of resources with long lives (e.g., certificates, tokens, etc.) is recommended, although not required, to minimize overall transaction delays whenever possible. Another consideration for the HTTP interface is the requirement for a secure interface using TLS [RFC 5246] (i.e., HTTPS). HTTP redirects shall not be allowed. Additional considerations on the use of HTTPS for ACME are provided in section 6.1 of draft-ietf-acme-acme. Since an ACME server supporting SHAKEN is not intended to be generally accessible, Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) shall not be used.

The processing flow for certificate management is as follows:



Figure 6.2 – SHAKEN Certificate Management High Level Call Flow

Prior to requesting STI certificates from the STI-CA, the SP-KMS generates an SP STIR public/private key pair per standard PKI. The private key is used by the STI-AS in signing the PASSporT in the SIP Identity header field. The public key will be included in the public key certificate being requested.

1. The SP-KMS securelydistributes the SP STIR private key to itsSKS.

The ACME client on the Key Management Server presents a list of STI-CAs from which it could get a certificate. The Service Provider selects the preferred STI-CA and initiates the following steps:

1. The SP generates or chooses a set of public/private key ACME credentials for all transactions with the STI-CA. Assuming a first-time transaction or if the Service Provider Code token is either expired or not cached, the SP-KMS sends a request for a Service Provider Code token to the STI-PA with a fingerprint of the ACME account public key. This Service Provider Code token is used for service provider validation during the process of acquiring a certificate.
2. If it has not already done so, the ACME client on theSP-KMS registers with the STI-CA by creating an ACME account using the ACME key credentials from step 2, prior to requesting an STI certificate per the procedures in draft-ietf-acme-acme.
3. Once the ACME client on the SP-KMS has registered with the STI-CA, the ACME client can send a request for a new STI certificate to theACME server hosted on the STI-CA. The response to that request includes a URL for the authorization challenge.
4. The service provider that is requesting a signed STI certificate responds to that challenge by providing the current valid token acquired from the STI-PA.
5. The STI-CA sends a request for a public key certificate to the STI-PA in order to validate that the signature of the token has been signed by the STI-PA. Once the STI-CA has verified that the SPC Token is valid,it canissue the certificate.
6. In parallel with step 4, the ACME client starts polling for the “valid” status to determine if the service provider has been authorized to get an STI certificate and whether an STI certificate is available. Upon successful authorization, additional steps are taken to complete the certificate acquisition process per clause 6.3.5.2. Once the ACME client receives the status indicating the STI certificate has been issued, the ACME client downloads the STI certificate for use by the SP-KMS.
7. The SP-KMS notifies the STI-AS that the public key certificate is available through implementation specific means (e.g., SIP MESSAGE, WEBPUSH, etc.).
8. The SP-KMSputs the public key certificate in the STI-CR.

After initially retrieving the certificate, the ACME client periodically contacts the STI-CA to get updated public key certificates to keep the server functional and its credentials up-to-date as described in clause 6.3.8.

### STI-PA Account Registration & Service Provider Authorization

The authorization model for SHAKEN assumes there is a single authorized STI-PA chosen by the STI-GA.

As identified in clause 5.2.3, while the criteria by which a Service Provider is authorized to serve in the role is out of scope of this document, an interface to the STI-PA from the SP is required to determine if a specific Service Provider is allowed to assert and digitally sign the Caller ID associated with the originating telephone number of telephone calls initiated on the VoIP telephone network. A verification and validation process shall be followed by the STI-PA to provide a secure set of credentials (e.g., username and password combined with other secure two-factor access security techniques) to allow the SP to access a management portal for the STI-PA set of services.

This management portal will be specified by the STI-PA, but should allow Service Providers to input Service Provider-specific configuration details such as the following:

* Login password management.
* SP-KMS instance(s) configuration.
* API security client id/secret information.

The STI-PA shall provide secure API protection for the Service Provider that follows the procedures in [RFC 6749] Section 2.3 client credentials to access its HTTP-based APIs. This includes the use of an STI-PA-defined client id/secret that is used in the HTTP Authorization header of each request from the Service Provider to the STI-PA. This authorization will allow an SP to acquire the Service Provider Code token as described in clause 6.3.4.2 and determine the preferred STI-CA to use when requesting STI certificates.

### STI-CA Account Creation

Before ACME account creation, the SP-KMS ACME client shall be configured with an ACME directory object URL for each of the SP’s preferred STI-CAs. The ACME client can use the directory object URL of the selected STI-CA to discover the URLs of the ACME server resources that the ACME client will use to create and manage its ACME accounts, and to obtain STI certificates.

When a Service Provider selects a particular STI-CA to service STI certificate requests, the Service Provider shall use the ACME account creation process defined in [draft-ietf-acme-acme].

In order to initiate the account creation process, the requesting Service Provider shall create a key pair using the ES256 algorithm. This key pair represents the Service Provider’s ACME account credentials.

NOTE: The public key of this account key pair is also used for the STI-PA Service Provider Code Token fingerprint value to tie the ACME account credentials to the validation of the Service Provider Code token by the STI-CA, as detailed in Clause 6.3.4.

The Service Provider’s ACME account is created with the STI-CA using the following HTTP POST request:

NOTE: Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the ACME examples in clause 6 are included for illustrative purposes only and not intended to profile the referenced ACME specifications.

 POST /acme/new-account HTTP/1.1

   Host: sti-ca.com

   Content-Type: application/jose+json

   {

     "protected": base64url({

       "alg": "ES256",

       "jwk": {...},

       "nonce": "6S8IqOGY7eL2lsGoTZYifg",

       "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/new-account"

     })

     "payload": base64url({

 "contact": [

        "mailto:cert-admin-sp-kms01@sp.com",

         "tel:+12155551212"

       ]

     }),

     "signature": "RZPOnYoPs1PhjszF...-nh6X1qtOFPB519I"

   }

Per ACME, the requesting Service Provider shall sign this request with the ACME account private key. The public key shall be passed in the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Key (“jwk” header parameter) [RFC 7515] as a JSON Web Key (JWK) [RFC 7517]. An example JWK is as follows:

{

 "kty":"EC",

  "crv":"P-256",

  "x":"f83OJ3D2xF1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8Tus9uPHvRVEU",

  "y":"x\_FEzRu9m36HLN\_tue659LNpXW6pCyStikYjKIWI5a0",

  "kid":"sp.com Reg Public key 123XYZ"

}

If the account already exists with the key, then the response shall be 200 OK. Otherwise, if the account creation succeeds and is created at the STI-CA, the response shall be 201 OK in the following form:

   HTTP/1.1 201 Created

   Content-Type: application/json

   Replay-Nonce: D8s4D2mLs8Vn-goWuPQeKA

   Location: https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1

   Link: <https://sti-ca.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="index"

   {

     "status": "valid",

     "contact": [

      "mailto:cert-admin-sp-kms01@sp.com",

       "tel:+12155551212"

     ]

 "orders": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1/orders"

   }

In the case where the Service Provider wants to change the account’s public/private key pair used for the particular STI-CA, it can use the following request with both the old key and signature, and updated key and signature as follows:

   POST /acme/key-change HTTP/1.1

   Host: sti-ca.com

   Content-Type: application/jose+json

   {

     "protected": base64url({

       "alg": "ES256",

       "jwk": /\* old key \*/,

       "nonce": "K60BWPrMQG9SDxBDS\_xtSw",

       "url": “https://sti-ca.com/acme/key-change"

     }),

     "payload": base64url({

       "protected": base64url({

         "alg": "ES256",

         "jwk": /\* new key \*/,

       "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/key-change"

       }),

       "payload": base64url({

         "account": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

         "newKey": /\* new key \*/

       })

       "signature": "Xe8B94RD30Azj2ea...8BmZIRtcSKPSd8gU"

     }),

     "signature": "5TWiqIYQfIDfALQv...x9C2mg8JGPxl5bI4"

   }

### Service Provider Code Token

Before a Service Provider can apply for issuance of an STI certificate from the STI-CA, it shall get a valid and up-to-date SPC token from the STI-PA.

#### SPC Token Definition

An SP uses an SPC Token during the certificate ordering process to demonstrate to the issuing STI-CA that the SP has control over the scope of the requested certificate. The scope of an STI certificate is determined by the SPC and TN identity information contained in the TN Authorization List certificate extension defined in [RFC 8226]. SHAKEN shall restrict the scope of STI certificates to a single Service Provider Code assigned to the SP holding the certificate. Therefore, the scope of an SPC Token shall identify the single SPC value of the certificate it authorizes.

An SPC Token shall comply with the TNAuthList Authority Token structure defined in [draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist per the following example::

**JWT Protected Header**

{

 "alg": "ES256",

 "typ": "JWT",

 "x5u": "https://sti-pa.com/sti-pa/cert.crt"

}

The “alg” value defines the algorithm used in the signature of the token. For Service Provider Code tokens, the algorithm shall be “ES256”.

The “typ” is set to standard “JWT” value.

The “x5u” value defines the URL of the STI-PA certificate that contains the public key corresponding to the private key that was used to sign the token.

**JWT Payload**

{

 "iss":"https://sti-pa.com/sti-pa/authz"

 "exp":1300819380,

 "jti":"id6098364921",

 "atc":{"TnAuthList":"F83n2a...avn27DN3==",

 "ca":false,

 "fingerprint":"SHA256 56:3E:CF:AE:83:CA:4D:15:B0:29:FF:1B:71:D3:

 BA:B9:19:81:F8:50:9B:DF:4A:D4:39:72:E2:B1:F0:B9:38:E3"}

 }

The required values for the token are as follows:

* The "iss" claim shall contain the URL identifying the STI-PA that issued the TNAuthList Authority Token.
* The “exp” claim contains the DateTime value of the ending date and time that the token expires.
* The “jti” claim contains a universally unique identifier for this TNAuthlist Authority token transaction.
* The “atc” claim is comprised of three elements, as defined in [draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist]. In the context of SHAKEN, the contents of the elements is as follows:
	+ The “TNAuthList“ key shall be equal to the TNAuthList identifier “value” string, which shall contain the base 64 encoding of the TN Authorization List certificate extension ASN.1 object. This object shall contain a single SPC assigned to the requesting Service Provider.
	+ The “ca” key shall be set to false, indicating that the token is being used to authorize the request for an end-entity certificate.
	+ The “fingerprint“ key shall be equal to the fingerprint of the ACME account credentials. The fingerprint value consists of the name of the hash function, which shall be ‘SHA256’ for this specification, followed by the hash value itself. The hash value is represented as a sequence of uppercase hexadecimal bytes, separated by colons. The number of bytes is defined by the hash function.

**JSON Web Token Signature**

The JSON Web token signature follows the standard JSON Web Signature (JWS)-defined signature string.

#### SPC Token Request API

The following is the HTTP-based POST request that the STI-PA shall provide to a service provider to make the request for an SPC Token. As a convenience, the STI-PA shall also include the URL to the Certificate Revocation List (clause 6.3.9) in the response, since it is also required when the service provider applies for a certificate.

**POST /sti-pa/account/:id/token**

**Description**

A request to get a current Service Provider Code token from the STI-PA, that a Service Provider can use during the ACME certificate ordering process to demonstrate to the issuing STI-CA that the SP has authority over the identity information contained in the TN Authorization List of the requested certificate.

**Request**

The following information is included in the request parameter.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Filter** | **Description** |
| id | A unique account id provided to Service Provider |

And, the following information is included in the JSON body of the request.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Property** | **Type** | **Description** |
| atc | JSON Object | The “atc” object as defined in 6.3.4.1. |

**Response**

A 200 OK response shall be sent in the case that an SPC token has been allocated and in the case of specific errors that do not directly map to HTTPS error responses.

**200 OK Response**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Filter** | **Type** | **Description** |
| status | string | The status of the request. Initial values are: “success” and “error”  |
| token | string | A signed Service Provider Code token, using the STI-PA certificate with a TTL of the token set by policy |
| crl | string | A URL to the Certificate Revocation List maintained by the STI-PA |
| error  | string | An optional field included in the response in the case of a status value of “error”. Initial values are defined in the table below. |

In the case of a status of “error” in the 200 OK response, the error field shall include one of the following values:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Error Value** | **Description**  |
| Invalid ATC | The “atc” claim is not properly formatted or has invalid content (e.g., “ca” claim must be false for SHAKEN).  |
| Invalid SPC | SPC value in the TNAuthList in the “atc” claim does not match the SPC value associated with the account.  |

If there is an error, the “token” field shall be set to “null”.

**HTTP Error Responses**

**400 – Bad Request**

There is missing information in the message body (i.e., no “atc” object).

**403 - Forbidden**

Authorization header credentials are invalid.

**404 - Invalid account ID**

Account ID provided does not exist or does not match credentials in Authorization header.

[Editor’s Note: We should add some examples here.]

### Application for a Certificate

Assuming the Service Provider has a current and up-to-date signed Service Provider Code token, as detailed in the previous clause of this document, it can immediately initiate an application for a new STI certificate to the STI-CA.

This process includes two main steps, creation of the CSR and the ACME-based certificate application process as defined in [draft-ietf-acme-acme].

#### CSR Construction

The general creation of a CSR is defined in [RFC 5280] with a format defined as PKCS #10 and defined in [RFC 2986]. For the SHAKEN certificate framework and ACME-based protocols the overall process and definitions do not change, however there are a few specific uses of and guidelines for CSR attributes defined as part of the SHAKEN Certificate Framework.

Following [RFC 8226], a Telephone Number (TN) Authorization List certificate extension shall be included in the CSR. In the case of SHAKEN, the TN Authorization List shall include only one Service Provider Code. A service provider can obtain multiple certificates for a given service provider code or for different service provider codes. The essential aspect is that the service provider code uniquely identifies a given service provider. The Service Provider Code shall be the same SPC as that included in the TNAuthList in the SPC token (clause 6.3.4) included in the ACME challenge response.

As defined in [RFC 8226] the OID defined for the TN Authorization list extension will be defined in Structure of Management Information (SMI) Security for Public Key Infrastructure for X.509 Certificates (PKIX) Certificate Extension registry here: <http://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1> and assigned the value 26.

The URL to the STI-PA CRL (clause 6.3.9) shall also be included in the CRL Distribution Points extension. The URL is included in the DistributionPointName.

#### ACME Based Steps for Application for an STI Certificate

Once the ACME account has been created, the steps in the ACME protocol flow are as follows. It should be noted that it is possible for the ACME client to do a pre-authorization prior to applying for a certificate, in which case processing equivalent to steps 3-6 is done prior to an application for a certificate and thus the polling period for step 7 is abbreviated. However, that is not the recommended approach for the SHAKEN certificate framework at this time.

1) The application is initiated by the ACME client with an HTTP POST as shown in the following example:

   POST /acme/new-order HTTP/1.1

   Host: sti-ca.com

   Content-Type: application/jose+json

   {

     "protected": base64url({

       "alg": "ES256",

       "kid": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

       "nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA",

       "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/new-order"

     })

     "payload": base64url({

 "identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],

       "notBefore": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z",

       "notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:00:00Z"

     }),

     "signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g"

   }

The TNAuthList identifier is inserted into the JWS payload along with the requested time frame of the certificate application. The TNAuthList identifier, as defined in [draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist], consists of a type field set to "TNAuthList", and a value field containing the base64 encoding of the TN Authorization List certificate ASN.1 object defined in [RFC 8226]. The request is signed using the private key used in the ACME registration with the STI-CA.

2) Upon successful processing of the application request, the STI-CA sends a 201 (Created) response containing the newly created order object, as shown in the following example:

   HTTP/1.1 201 Created

   Replay-Nonce: MYAuvOpaoIiywTezizk5vw

   Location: https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/1234

   {

     "status": "pending",

     "expires": "2015-03-01T14:09:00Z",

     "notBefore": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z",

     "notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:00:00Z",

 "identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],

 "authorizations": [

 "https://sti-ca.com/acme/authz/1234"

 ],

 "finalize": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/1234/finalize"

   }

The order object has a status of “pending” indicating that the order authorizations have not yet been satisfied. The “authorizations” field URL references the authorization object containing the challenges the ACME client must satisfy in order to demonstrate authority over the TNAuthList identifier listed in the “identifiers” field. The “finalize” field contains the URL that the ACME client will use to finalize the order once the outstanding authorizations have been satisfied.

3) The ACME client shall retrieve the authorization challenge details by sending a POST-as-GET request to the order object “authorizations” URL, an example of which follows:

   POST /acme/authz/1234 HTTP/1.1

   Host: sti-ca.com

 Content-Type: application/jose+json

 {

 "protected": base64url({

 "alg": "ES256",

 "kid": " https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

 "nonce": "uQpSjlRb4vQVCjVYAyyUWg",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/authz/1234",

 }),

 "payload": "",

 "signature": "nuSDISbWG8mMgE7H...QyVUL68yzf3Zawps"

 }

4) The STI-CA shall respond to the POST-as-GET with a 200 OK response containing an authorization object. The authorization object identifies the challenges that the ACME client must respond to in order to demonstrate authority over the TNAuthList identifier requested in step-1. In the case of SHAKEN, the STI-CA shall return a challenge "type" of "tkauth-01" and a "tkauth-type" of "ATC", as specified in [draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist]. The authorization object has a “status” of “pending”, indicating that there are outstanding challenges that have not been satisfied.

   HTTP/1.1 200 OK

   Content-Type: application/json

   Link: <https://sti-ca.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="index"

   {

     "status": "pending",

     "identifier": {

       "type": "TNAuthList",

       "value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="

     },

     "challenges": [

       {

         "type": "tkauth-01",

 "tkauth-type": "ATC",

         "url": "https://sti-ca.com/authz/1234/0",

 "token": "DGyRejmCefe7v4NfDGDKfA"

       }

     ],

   }

5) Using the URL of the challenge, the ACME client shall respond to this challenge with the Service Provider Code token to validate the Service Provider’s authority to request an STI certificate whose scope is indicated by the Service Provider Code value contained in the TNAuthList identifier from step 1. An HTTP POST shall be sent back in the form as follows:

   POST /acme/authz/1234/0 HTTP/1.1

   Host: sti-ca.com

   Content-Type: application/jose+json

   {

     "protected": base64url({

       "alg": "ES256",

       "kid": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

       "nonce": "Q\_s3MWoqT05TrdkM2MTDcw",

       "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/authz/1234/0"

     }),

     "payload": base64url({

 "ATC": "evaGxfADs...62jcerQ"

     }),

     "signature": "9cbg5JO1Gf5YLjjz...SpkUfcdPai9uVYYQ"

   }

This challenge response JWS payload shall include an “ATC” field containing the SPC token described in clause 6.3.4.1.

6) On receiving the challenge response from the ACME client, the STI-CA ACME server shall transition the challenge object “status” field to the “processing” state while it verifies the received Service Provider Code token. As a part of that token validation, the STI-CA needs to retrieve the public key of the STI-PA, as identified in the x5u protected header value in the SPC token. Once the token has been verified, the “status” of both the challenge and authorization objects shall be changed to “valid”, and the "status" of the order object shall be changed to “ready”.

7) While the challenge response is being verified by the STI-CA in step 6, the SHAKEN ACME client shall poll the status of the authorization object, waiting for the “status” to transition to the “valid” state. This is performed with the following POST-as-GET request:

   POST /acme/authz/1234 HTTP/1.1

   Host: sti-ca.com

 Content-Type: application/jose+json

 {

 "protected": base64url({

 "alg": "ES256",

 "kid": " https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

 "nonce": "uQpSjlRb4vQVCjVYAyyUWg",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/authz/1234",

 }),

 "payload": "",

 "signature": "nuSDISbWG8mMgE7H...QyVUL68yzf3Zawps"

 }

8) The STI-CA responds to the POST-as-GET request with a 200 OK response containing the authorization object. Once the challenge response has been verified, the STI-CA shall update the status of the authorization object to “valid”. The STI-CA responds to the next POST-as-GET request from the ACME client as follows:

   HTTP/1.1 200 OK

   {

     "status": "valid",

     "expires": "2015-03-01T14:09:00Z",

     "identifier": {

      "type": "TNAuthList",

       "value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="

     },

     "challenges": [

       {

         "type": "tkauth-01",

 "tkauth-type": "ATC",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/authz/1234/0",

         "status": "valid",

         "validated": "2014-12-01T12:05:00Z",

 "token": "DGyRejmCefe7v4NfDGDKfA",

       }

     ]

   }

As an alternative (or in addition) to polling the authorization object, the ACME client may poll the order object with a POST-as-GET request, waiting for the “status” to transition to the “ready” state.

9) Once the challenge is “valid”, and the order object has transitioned to the “ready” state, the ACME client shall finalize the order by sending an HTTP POST request to the order object “finalize” URL that was returned by the ACME server in step 2. The body of the POST request shall contain the CSR described in clause 6.3.5.1, as follows:

POST /acme/order/asdf/finalize HTTP/1.1

 Host: sti-ca.com

 Content-Type: application/jose+json

 {

 "protected": base64url({

 "alg": "ES256",

 "kid": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

 "nonce": "MSF2j2nawWHPxxkE3ZJtKQ",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/asdf/finalize"

 }),

 "payload": base64url({

 "csr": "MIIBPTCBxAIBADBFMQ...FS6aKdZeGsysoCo4H9P",

 }),

 "signature": "uOrUfIIk5RyQ...nw62Ay1cl6AB"

 }

10) On receiving the request to finalize the order, the STI-CA shall update the order object status to “processing” while finalizing the order, and respond with a 200 OK response containing the order object, as follows:

 HTTP/1.1 200 OK

 Replay-Nonce: CGf81JWBsq8QyIgPCi9Q9X

 Location: https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/asdf

 {

 "status": "processing",

 "expires": "2015-12-31T00:17:00.00-09:00",

 "notBefore": "2015-12-31T00:17:00.00-09:00",

 "notAfter": "2015-12-31T00:17:00.00-09:00",

 "identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],

 "authorizations": ["https://sti-ca.com/acme/authz/1234"],

 "finalize": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/asdf/finalize",

 }

11) While the order is being finalized, the ACME client shall poll the order object with a POST-as-GET request, waiting for the “status” to transition from “processing” to the “valid” state.

   POST /acme/order/1234 HTTP/1.1

   Host: sti-ca.com

 Content-Type: application/jose+json

 {

 "protected": base64url({

 "alg": "ES256",

 "kid": " https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

 "nonce": "uQpSjlRb4vQVCjVYAyyUWg",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/1234",

 }),

 "payload": "",

 "signature": "nuSDISbWG8mMgE7H...QyVUL68yzf3Zawps"

 }

12) Once the order has been finalized and the STI-certificate is available, the STI-CA shall update the order object status from “processing” to “valid”. The STI-CA responds to the next POST-as-GET poll request from the ACME client as follows:

 HTTP/1.1 200 OK

 Replay-Nonce: CGf81JWBsq8QyIgPCi9Q9X

 Location: https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/asdf

 {

 "status": "valid",

 "expires": "2015-12-31T00:17:00.00-09:00",

 "notBefore": "2015-12-31T00:17:00.00-09:00",

 "notAfter": "2015-12-31T00:17:00.00-09:00",

 "identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],

 "authorizations": ["https://sti-ca.com/acme/authz/1234"],

 "finalize": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/order/asdf/finalize",

 "certificate": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/cert/mAt3xBGaobw"

 }

The “certificate” field contains the URL to the STI certificate that has been issued in response to this order.

###  STI Certificate Acquisition

 Once the authorization process that validates the Service Provider and its ability to request an STI certificate is complete, and the STI-CA has issued the certificate, the SP-KMS ACME client can retrieve the STI certificate from the STI-CA ACME server using the URL in the “certificate” field of the order object. This is performed using a POST-as-GET request and response as follows:

   POST /acme/cert/ mAt3xBGaobw HTTP/1.1

   Host: sti-ca.com

   Accept: application/pem-certificate-chain

 Content-Type: application/jose+json

 {

 "protected": base64url({

 "alg": "ES256",

 "kid": " https://sti-ca.com/acme/acct/1",

 "nonce": "uQpSjlRb4vQVCjVYAyyUWg",

 "url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/cert/mAt3xBGaobw",

 }),

 "payload": "",

 "signature": "nuSDISbWG8mMgE7H...QyVUL68yzf3Zawps"

 }

   HTTP/1.1 200 OK

 Content-Type: application/pem-certificate-chain

 Link: <https://sti-ca.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="index"

   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

   [End-entity certificate contents]

   -----END CERTIFICATE-----

   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

   [Issuer certificate contents]

   -----END CERTIFICATE-----

   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

   [Other certificate contents]

   -----END CERTIFICATE-----

This certificate response will include the “end-entity” STI certificate requested in the CSR. It will also include any of the issuer STI certificates as part of the certificate chain needed for validating intermediate or root certificates appropriate for the STI-CA specific certificate chain.

The SP-KMS shall store the certificate chain in the STI-CR and make the URL available to the STI-AS.

### STI Certificate Management Sequence Diagrams

Figure 6.3 provides the sequence of processing for a service provider to set up an account with the STI-PA and then create an account with the STI-CA using the ACME protocol. Figure 6.4 provides the sequence of processing for the SP-KMS to acquire a certificate using the ACME protocol.

 

Figure 6.3 – STI-PA Account Setup and STI-CA (ACME) Account Creation

****

Figure 6.4 – STI Certificate Acquisition

### Lifecycle Management of STI certificates

There are a number of lifecycle processes that can happen for each of the three main participants in the SHAKEN Certificate Framework lifecycle.

The STI-PA has a role in the management and upkeep of the verification of Service Providers and the potential need to revoke the STI-PA certificate used to sign the Service Provider Code token.

The STI-CA provides the capability to renew or update STI certificates for Service Providers through standard ACME interface capabilities. STI certificate renewal requests shall use the same authentication procedures that are applied to requests for a new STI certificate as described in clause 6.3.5.

The Service Provider has the ability to manage, renew, and update STI certificates and the ability to renew Service Provider Code tokens as credentials used to obtain STI certificates as part of the SHAKEN certificate framework.

### STI Certificate Revocation

It is anticipated that initially many service providers will not support short-lived certificates, thus a mechanism to handle certificate revocation is required. Rather than each STI-CA publishing a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) an indirect CRL published by the STI-PA shall be used, following the model outlined in [RFC 5280]. The CRL shall be an X.509 V2 CRL format as detailed in [RFC 5280].

The scope of the STI-PA CRL is certificates that have been revoked by one of the STI-CAs in the list of trusted STI-CAs or by a Service Provider. The CRL shall not include expired certificates.

It is anticipated that the list will not be large given that service providers are not expected to be using a large number of certificates initially and some service providers will choose to use short-lived certificates. The Certification Practice Statement (CPS) shall outline the criteria under which a specific STI-CA would revoke a certificate. Service providers likely will establish their own criterion as well, thus an STI-CA shall provide a mechanism that allows an SP to revoke a certificate. The STI-CA or Service Provider shall notify the STI-PA, when a certificate is revoked via a mechanism as defined by the Certificate Policy (CP) established by the STI-PA. Initially, an out-of-band mechanism is deemed sufficient, until operational experience indicates otherwise.

The URL to the STI-PA CRL shall be provided to the service providers for inclusion in the CSR. Given the static nature of this URL, it does not need to be frequently updated. Rather than defining a separate API, this URL shall be included as a field in the response to the SPC Token Request (clause 6.3.4.2), per the following diagram:



Figure . – Distribution of the CRL

The inclusion of the STI-PA CRL in the STI certificates follows standard practices per [RFC 5280] for inclusion of a CRL distribution point in a certificate. In the case of SHAKEN, the STI-VS uses this field to ensure that the certificate used to sign the PASSporT in the SIP Identity header field has not been revoked, per the following diagram:



Figure . – Using the CRL

### Evolution of STI Certificates

SHAKEN proposes starting with Service Provider-level certificates. There are important use cases that may require finer granularity for STI certificates, including the possibility of telephone number level certificates (e.g., for School Districts, Police, government agencies, and financial institutions), where calls should be validated in order to guarantee delivery through the potential use of anti-spoofing mitigation techniques.

Future versions of this document and associated documents may provide the ability to validate telephone numbers and blocks of telephone numbers likely utilizing certificate details and practices defined in [RFC 8226].

# Appendix A – Certificate Creation & Validation with OpenSSL

## Steps for Generating STI-CA CSR with OpenSSL

Check OpenSSL version and make sure it is at least 1.0.1e:

|  |
| --- |
| **# openssl version****OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013** |

Check if 256-bit Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) keys are supported, such as prime256v1:

|  |
| --- |
| **# openssl ecparam -list\_curves****secp384r1 : NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime fieldsecp521r1 : NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime fieldprime256v1: X9.62/SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field** |

Prepare the configuration file for generating DER encoded value of the TNAuthorizationList extension. For example, for requesting a STI-CA certificate with Service Provider Code “1234”, the following configuration file, TNAuthList.conf, would be generated:

|  |
| --- |
| **# cat > TNAuthList.conf << EOFasn1=SEQUENCE:tn\_auth\_list[tn\_auth\_list]field1=EXP:0,IA5:1234EOF** |

Generate the DER encoded value for the TNAuthorizationList extension; for example, by using the TNAuthList.conf file generated in the previous step. The TNAuthList.der file will be generated:

|  |
| --- |
| **# openssl asn1parse -genconf TNAuthList.conf -out TNAuthList.der** **0:d=0 hl=2 l= 8 cons: SEQUENCE** **2:d=1 hl=2 l= 6 cons: cont [ 0 ]** **4:d=2 hl=2 l= 4 prim: IA5STRING :1234** |

Construct the OpenSSL configuration file for including the TNAuthorizationList extension (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.26) in generating CSR, by using the DER value generated from the previous step:

|  |
| --- |
| **# cat > openssl.conf << EOF[ req ]distinguished\_name = req\_distinguished\_namereq\_extensions = v3\_req[ req\_distinguished\_name ]commonName = "SHAKEN"[ v3\_req ]EOF# od -An -t x1 -w TNAuthList.der | sed -e 's/ /:/g' -e 's/^/1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.26=DER/' >> openssl.conf****# cat openssl.conf[ req ]distinguished\_name = req\_distinguished\_namereq\_extensions = v3\_req[ req\_distinguished\_name ]commonName = "SHAKEN"[ v3\_req ]1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.26=DER:30:08:a0:06:16:04:31:32:33:34** |

Generate 256-bit ECDSA key pairs, without explicitly encoding EC parameters for avoiding potential problems of PKI toolkits, such as standard JDK:

|  |
| --- |
| **# openssl ecparam -noout -name prime256v1 -genkey -out private\_key.pem -outform PEM****# openssl ec -in private\_key.pem -textread EC keyPrivate-Key: (256 bit)priv: 15:6b:c5:b8:df:84:d8:e3:83:96:2f:18:db:39:e7: fe:8c:f7:10:68:49:01:75:87:90:2e:1f:57:14:3f: 0a:75pub: 04:77:c6:b0:d6:df:fd:1f:0a:23:dc:40:24:a4:ea: 93:ca:d7:3f:9e:b7:8e:c7:70:6b:e2:d2:0e:8e:79: 0c:5a:38:b8:a5:fd:52:5d:db:43:bf:00:b1:cd:df: d4:cf:cb:69:35:13:d1:52:9a:e3:10:fe:1b:51:5b: 74:c2:96:9c:22ASN1 OID: prime256v1writing EC key-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----MHcCAQEEIBVrxbjfhNjjg5YvGNs55/6M9xBoSQF1h5AuH1cUPwp1oAoGCCqGSM49AwEHoUQDQgAEd8aw1t/9Hwoj3EAkpOqTytc/nreOx3Br4tIOjnkMWji4pf1SXdtDvwCxzd/Uz8tpNRPRUprjEP4bUVt0wpacIg==-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----** |

Generate the CSR file with a SHA256 signature, by using the openssl.conf file that includes the TNAuthorizationList extension:

|  |
| --- |
| **# openssl req -new -nodes -key private\_key.pem -keyform PEM \** **-out csr.pem -outform PEM \ -subj '/C=US/ST=VA/L=Somewhere/O=AcmeTelecom, Inc./OU=VOIP/CN=SHAKEN' \ -sha256 -config openssl.conf** |

Verify that the CSR file contains the TNAuthorizationList extension:

|  |
| --- |
| **# openssl req -in csr.pem -text -nooutCertificate Request: Data: Version: 0 (0x0) Subject: C=US, ST=VA, L=Somewhere, O=AcmeTelecom, Inc., OU=VOIP, CN=SHAKEN Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey Public-Key: (256 bit) pub: 04:77:c6:b0:d6:df:fd:1f:0a:23:dc:40:24:a4:ea: 93:ca:d7:3f:9e:b7:8e:c7:70:6b:e2:d2:0e:8e:79: 0c:5a:38:b8:a5:fd:52:5d:db:43:bf:00:b1:cd:df: d4:cf:cb:69:35:13:d1:52:9a:e3:10:fe:1b:51:5b: 74:c2:96:9c:22 ASN1 OID: prime256v1 Attributes: Requested Extensions: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.26: 0.....1234  Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:45:02:20:5c:f0:4b:cd:16:a3:e7:66:d8:68:fe:65:e2:7b: 8f:70:92:e6:4c:25:c9:41:bf:45:d1:e9:20:16:64:04:fc:cf: 02:21:00:82:7c:24:9a:aa:22:c6:23:9d:6d:04:c2:e7:76:ed: 44:d1:bc:bd:a2:1b:af:cb:97:71:9d:7b:bf:3a:4e:6a:59** |

Verify that the certificate obtained from a STI-CA contains the TNAuthorizationList extension:

|  |
| --- |
| **# openssl x509 -in cert.pem -text -nooutCertificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 6734468596164949790 (0x5d75a381e96f771e) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 Issuer: CN=CallAuthnCA, O=Neustar IOT Lab, C=US Validity Not Before: May 10 20:19:22 2017 GMT Not After : May 10 20:19:22 2019 GMT Subject: CN=SHAKEN, OU=VOIP, O=AcmeTelecom, Inc., L=Somewhere, ST=VA, C=US Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey Public-Key: (256 bit) pub: 04:77:c6:b0:d6:df:fd:1f:0a:23:dc:40:24:a4:ea: 93:ca:d7:3f:9e:b7:8e:c7:70:6b:e2:d2:0e:8e:79: 0c:5a:38:b8:a5:fd:52:5d:db:43:bf:00:b1:cd:df: d4:cf:cb:69:35:13:d1:52:9a:e3:10:fe:1b:51:5b: 74:c2:96:9c:22 ASN1 OID: prime256v1 X509v3 extensions: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.26: 0.....1234  X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: ED:87:91:08:DA:FC:82:A8:8A:CD:56:F5:A1:D6:7A:91:43:70:C5:C6 X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:03:93:A5:3B:9B:2E:8B:14:D6:C4:CF:58:CF:46:DB:83:31:54:D0:C8****X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment X509v3 Extended Key Usage: critical TLS Web Client Authentication, E-mail Protection Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 88:6b:1b:7a:7a:69:33:53:34:ca:53:a8:b6:87:7b:ed:ba:6d: f3:73:96:91:57:1c:ea:4e:e6:66:c7:fa:d3:6d:79:98:f9:7b: 00:78:bb:19:fd:51:f5:c2:46:d8:ce:f1:7b:13:e3:e2:72:de: 6e:e3:9d:37:8c:f9:41:9a:b6:89:82:64:6d:d9:e7:22:e3:4b: 21:90:ad:ad:82:6f:d2:cc:2f:48:a8:46:da:b7:27:10:72:b8: 97:9c:2b:8d:8a:67:4a:9e:1c:77:c4:32:8c:6e:a1:37:49:3a: d8:9c:9c:23:d8:1c:ce:58:d7:39:10:1f:7d:8c:e1:4f:c0:64: ef:b9:80:22:06:7f:59:6c:85:79:d4:86:f9:a1:87:75:0e:76: 51:7b:c6:bf:7b:6b:c7:43:55:e2:a6:88:0f:f7:d7:37:02:b1: 54:71:a5:3e:81:fc:68:b7:65:eb:de:89:8f:95:a6:c7:fe:84: a9:66:58:eb:a8:b3:70:ec:a0:93:2a:b1:01:5d:95:6e:be:49: 7e:01:17:fe:5f:d4:55:a9:77:e5:51:67:33:ca:20:97:82:66: 05:e3:59:60:24:25:93:89:46:90:5f:2f:cc:57:2a:b3:d4:a8: c4:5c:2a:23:82:6e:80:c2:cf:23:eb:65:39:4c:16:02:0f:bc: a3:17:65:6b** |

1. This document is available from the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS) at: < <https://www.atis.org> >. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
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